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TIIVISTELMÄ (ABSTRACT): 
 
Ihmistieteissä on jatkunut jo pitkään kahden tiedenäkemyksen vastakkainasettelu. 
Dikotomiat positivismi–hermeneutiikka ja kvantitatiivinen–kvalitatiivinen ovat tuon 
vastakkainasettelun muunnelmia. Niiden ydinajatukset ovat säilyneet samoina, vaikka 
ne aika ajoin esiintyvät ikään kuin uusina. Tämän työn keskeinen kanta on se, että 
hermeneuttinen ja kvalitatiivinen tutkimusote sekä niiden uudemmat muunnelmat kuten 
postmodernismi ja sosiaalinen konstruktionismi ovat tieteenfilosofisesti ja 
käytännöllisesti kestämättömiä. Kysymys ei ole niinkään siitä, mikä on ”ainut ja oikea” 
kanta, vaan siitä mikä toimii paremmin ja mikä on paremmin perusteltu.  
 
Tarkoituksena on tarkastella, miten mediatutkimus sopii tähän kuvaan. Tämä tapahtuu 
vertailemalla mediatutkimusta suhteessa muihin ihmistieteisiin sekä niissä harjoitettuun 
tieteenfilosofiseen argumentaatioon. Tällainen laaja tarkastelu on sikäli oikeutettua, että 
mediatutkimuksen metodologia ei ole ainutlaatuinen eikä se ole syntynyt itsestään 
itseään varten. Se on päinvastoin läpikyllästetty niin ihmistieteiden kuin yleisen 
tieteenfilosofian ja tieteen käytännöillä. Mediatutkimuksen tarkastelussa on siis 
välttämättä otettava huomioon laajempi kokonaisuus. 
 
Mediatutkimuksen analyysi perustuu tässä tutkimuksessa kahteen osaan: 
mediatutkimuksesta alana otettuihin esimerkkeihin ja Vaasan yliopiston 
mediatutkimuksesta tehtyjen pro gradu -töiden tarkasteluun. Osittain on siis kyse case-
tutkimuksesta, jossa Vaasan yliopisto on tarkasteltu tapaus. Testattavana hypoteesina on 
oletus, että pro gradu -töiden tieteellinen taso ja arvosana korreloivat keskenään. Vaikka 
eroja löytyi siinä, miten esimerkiksi eri ajatuksia kehiteltiin ja käsiteltiin, ei tieteellisen 
argumentaation, tieteellisten periaatteiden, toisin sanoen tieteellisyyden sinänsä tasolla 
eroa pystytty havaitsemaan. Lisäksi pro gradu -työt eivät yleisesti ottaen täyttäneet 
tieteellisyyden vaatimuksia, vaikka arvosanan perusteella olisi syytä olettaa toisin. Jos 
yhtäältä pro gradu -työt eivät täyttäneet ”perinteisen” (positivistisen, kvantitatiivisen) 
tiedenäkemyksen kriteerejä, ne toisaalta vastasivat hermeneuttis–kvalitatiivisen jne. 
ihmistiedesuuntauksen ihanteita. 
AVAINSANAT: tieteenfilosofia, postmoderni, positivismi, sisällönanalyysi, feminismi 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Brubacher (1977: 1) described the state of American education with the following 
words: 
 
At present, to borrow a phrase from Arnold Toynbee, American higher education seems to be in 
a "time of troubles." From one standpoint this is nothing new. Higher education has faced 
grumbling demands for change since the beginning of this century—and even further back. Most 
of the changes demanded have been for new means to achieve old and well-accepted ends. 
Recently, however, there has been disagreement about ends, about the underlying philosophy of 
higher education itself. When there is doubt about the fundamental frame of reference, there is 
real trouble. Indeed, some have gone so far as to speak of an "identity crisis"... 
 
I think that we can substitute the words “higher education” with “social sciences”, 
“humanities”, or “media studies” and the message, its importance, would remain the 
same. This is nothing new, of course, as the philosophical discussion, especially the 
“rivalry” between the two opposing camps, hermeneutics (or qualitative) and positivism 
(or quantitative), has shown. Unfortunately, lately, the discussion has not really been a 
discussion as such, rather it has been a one-sided “name-calling” where the core issue, 
doing good science, has been forgotten. Science has been replaced with different 
fashion trends and “epistemological flavours of the month”. The origins of this 
discussion – as mostly anything philosophical – can be traced to the Ancient Greece, 
especially Aristotle and his teleology which Fearn (2001: 41) describes as the 
 
notion that the present could be understood by reference to the future. The nature of a thing - be 
it an acorn or a man - was inextricably linked to its telos, its goal or final end. The final end of an 
object informs its nature, and that nature subsequently drives it towards its goal. ... Human 
beings too had a final end and, if we could understand what it was, we would be all the better 
equipped to achieve it. 
 
The Aristotelian view of epistemology dominated science, at least officially, until the 
Renaissance when natural sciences, mathematics, and philosophy of science witnessed a 
decisive transformation. This change did not come “out of nowhere”, of course, but the 
changes of scientific conduct cannot be overlooked. Such names like Galileo, Descartes, 
Bacon, among others, became the driving force of “new” science; one distancing itself 
from teleological explanations of the world.  
 6 
This turning point in science, however, did not lead to a “unification” of all scientific 
endeavour. On the one hand, there were the “practising” scientists who at least 
implicitly followed what is traditionally considered the “scientific method”. This is the 
sphere of history of science which tells what has been done. On the other hand, there 
were the philosophers of science – of whom many were also practicing scientists – who 
wrote about what ought to be done, i.e., what science should be like, limitations of 
science, and what is the nature of this or that scientific field. 
 
Natural sciences went their own way while most of the then, and present, controversies 
concerned the then emerging social sciences, history, or simply, the non-natural 
sciences that more or less tried to study the societal, whether it was the past, present, or 
future. Traditionally English philosophy of science was empirically oriented. 
Empiricism, in this sense, did not mean a mechanistic observation or experience. 
Rather, experience was considered as necessary “inspiration” for our ideas. This is 
evident, for instance, in Hume’s writings about cause and effect. According to Hume 
(1955: 27), “no object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the sense, either 
the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, 
unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter 
of fact.” This means that, according to him, there are no synthetic a priori judgements. 
He continues (ibid.) that “Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very 
first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of 
water that it would suffocate him...” Instead of being a naive, and one-sided opposition 
to rationalism, at least Hume’s version of empiricism is quite similar to Comte’s (the 
father of positivism) idea of the “core” method of science: “reasoning and observing, 
correctly combined” (Töttö, 1996: 77). Herbert Spencer, The English sociologist, or 
social philosopher, continued this line of thought. For him sociology did not differ from 
other sciences in spirit, rather, in approachability of the object, for instance, to what 
extent social phenomena can be “measurable” (Turner, 1989: 18, 22). This general 
approachability was contested during Spencer’s time as it is being contested even today 
by many literary critics, historians, academic feminists, and people generally not 
categorisable as practitioners of the “hard” sciences. While this kind of opposition is 
certainly possible, in the same sense as jumping from a cliff is possible, it would lead to 
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a difficulty that Spencer noticed and which is rather awkward if or when the present 
state of the humanities or social sciences are honestly evaluated. Spencer’s position, 
Turner (ibid.: 19) writes, was that  
 
there are many who refuse to believe that the social world reveals regularities that can be 
understood an stated in lawlike ways. If such is the case, sociology is unnecessary, and those 
who do not believe that the world reveals regularities should retire or write opinion columns for 
newspapers. 
 
There can be no misconceptions about this point: if a scholar, academic, or anyone else 
who claims to do research, denies the tenets of science, then the only sensible thing to 
do is to withdraw from scientific activity altogether. Anything else would be hypocrisy, 
charlatanism, or any form of dishonesty. Nonetheless, despite the claims opposite to the 
established – and established for very good reasons - canons of at least 300 years worth 
of science, their argumentative power has been somewhat lacking. Thus, the questions 
of whether or not society contains lawlike regularities, if they can be researched, and 
with what methodology, are the main issues of the debate today as they have been in the 
1930s and during Spencer’s time. 
 
But it is, in fact, the German speaking part of the world where the “scientific method” 
broke into three different approaches, or traditions. Natural sciences and mathematics 
continued to proceed along the lines of Galileo. From the philosophical point of view, 
perhaps the most important evolution regarded mathematics and logic which through 
Leibniz, then (much) later, Schröder, Hilbert, and Frege, culminated in what was to 
become the most important philosophical thought of science, logical positivism. This 
was a combination of both German and English “mathematical logic” or “logical 
mathematics”, Comte’s positivism and empiricism. 
 
The third tradition, which we can call social sciences from the present perspective, can 
be further separated into two paths which overlapped each other in many ways, 
although, in many other, they were distinct. One was German historicism – including 
such names as Droysen, von Ranke, Savigny, Niebuhr, etc. – which, according to Kusch 
(1986: 46), contained two phases. In the first, proponents of historicism opposed, 
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especially regarding the societal, everything ahistorical, i.e., lawlike regularities of 
society that were thought to be independent of history. The supposed “uniqueness” of 
the historical objects and, especially, that “history was taken as the normative basis of 
thought and action”, led to the second phase of historicism, a form of relativism. (ibid.: 
46-48.) Popper (1966: 5) summarised the idea historicism similarly, that it “denies that 
the regularities detectable in social life have the character of the immutable regularities 
of the physical world. For they depend upon history, and upon differences in culture … 
and on a particular historical situation.” 
 
The other, overlapping, tradition was German hermeneutics which shared many 
qualities with historicism and, of course, added new ones. For example, Dilthey – 
perhaps the most used example of the hermeneutic tradition – can be seen as both 
continuing the historicist tradition and criticising it for being incomplete. To repair this 
incompleteness, Dilthey wanted to show that, firstly, social sciences 
(Geistesswissenschaften) are independent and differ from natural sciences. He stated 
three reasons for this: “1) social sciences research a unique object, the historico-societal 
reality; 2) they contain normative statements which are absent in the natural sciences; 3) 
when natural sciences can claim only hypothetically the relations between elements, in 
social sciences the relations are originally experienced in psychical reality.” Because of 
this, psychology was supposed to be the primary means of understanding this psychical 
reality. “Understanding” in this sense was connected to psychology; the idea was to 
“understand” how societal (Vergesellschaftung) processes happen. (Kusch, 1986: 52-
53.) 
 
If we compare, for instance, Dilthey’s hermeneutics to contemporary qualitative 
research, we find that the latter, to a large extent, is a watered down version of both 
historicism and hermeneutics, where on the one hand, researchers claim that objectivity 
does not exist and that everything is, more or less, relative and, on the other hand, want 
to do science despite the fact that the possibility of those things that make science as 
“science” have been denied. The former, Dilthey’s hermeneutics, wants (or rather 
wanted) to find a “firm basis” for social sciences which, as an idea, was much closer to 
the traditional idea of science than to the contemporary qualitative trends. 
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Unfortunately Dilthey’s solution to this “firm basis” failed. The historicist in him took 
the separation of natural and societal as a given and the resulting difference in method is 
even today accepted in qualitative research. These are: 1) the study of what is unique, 
individual, and different rather than, what according to him characterised natural 
sciences, similarities and lawlike regularities; 2) that as opposed to the natural scientist, 
social scientist cannot distance himself from the researched object; that if he wants to 
understand the object then the researcher must be “brought” into the research. (Kusch, 
1986: 58, 61.) The solution was a vague concept of “lived experience” or “Erlebnis”; a 
some kind of ambiguous mixture of a holistic understanding of the self and an 
“empathic” ability to “step into shoes” of others. Neurath writes about Dilthey that 
“although he himself wished to avoid metaphysics, he inspired it greatly” (Empiricism 
and Sociology, 1973: 355-356). 
 
Dilthey’s “method” was criticised and rejected even by his contemporaries, most 
notably by Rickert, Windelband, and later, by Weber. The former two, although, 
rejecting the method, supported the basic duality of sciences (natural sciences vs. social 
sciences). In this, they also continued the historicist tradition. Weber’s – by many 
incorrectly included in the “qualitative camp” – solution was “the middle path”. The 
basic division of sciences was still present but this division and the resulting 
methodological differences seem forced and artificial. Weber’s sociological method 
includes the aspect of “understanding” but this is further extended with the aspect of 
causality. Both are necessary in social research in the sense that human conduct must be 
causally adequate, i.e., that people do similar things and that we can make that causality 
meaningful, or understandable, by attaching to it the interpretation of motives of that 
conduct. (Weber, 1975: 125-126.) From a positivistic point of view, this division seems 
artificial because natural sciences are not limited to the kind of “meaningless” and 
mechanistic observation of events – that whenever X then Y – as Weber makes it look 
like. The idea of adding meaning to causality essentially means asking the question 
“Why this or that happens?” and then giving an explanation. For Weber, the 
explanations of human conduct are the motives of that conduct. But natural sciences act 
precisely the same way. Granted, they do not ask the objects of their research anything 
(because they cannot) but they do try to offer explanations why this or that happens. 
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What tied Weber to historicism was his acceptance of the “unique”, especially the 
uniqueness of European capitalism. Its methodological effect can be seen from the 
following event chain: the societal contains both a causal and meaning element -> we 
make the causally established human conduct understandable by explaining it through 
human motives -> motives are the product of culture -> cultural epochs change -> each 
epoch is essentially unique -> the contents of human motives will, therefore, change 
with time. To this we must say that Weber was only partially right, that some motive 
contents might have changed with time, while many have remained essentially the same 
and that not even the natural sciences, or positivism, have remained unchanged. (The 
fact that not all motives, or human traits and dispositions, have changed becomes 
particularly apparent when it is understood that being a human means being a physical 
and psychological totality. If the former is denied, then it may chime well with mostly 
ideological or moral preconceptions, however, it will be extremely lean on factuality. 
And if, on the other hand, the former is accepted, many anti-traditional-science claims 
turn out to be quite ridiculous.) 
   
The present discussions, or lack thereof, in social sciences – I mean with the term 
“social sciences” all non-natural sciences, excluding mathematics – builds heavily on 
the events from roughly 100 years ago (plus the lingering teleological component). The 
last “undecided” round happened during the 60s and 70s., the core issues being the 
same as before and as they are now. The disheartening thing is that much of the present 
discussion revolves around straw man attacks, and arguments that have been rejected 
ages ago. Yet for some mysterious reason they are taken from the grave, slightly 
cleaned up, and presented as “new” in favour of this or that view. Although this can 
make me sound biased – and to a certain extent I am – I fault mainly the qualitative 
camp of these sorts of shenanigans. (While positivism is not the monolithic monster that 
it is claimed to be, it is, nonetheless, much more conservative in its argumentation. The 
justification for positivism is essentially the same as it has been since the philosophers 
of The Vienna Circle, or even since Hume. Although the older ideas of absolute and 
universal requirements of positivistic science have given way to slightly more 
reasonable, the principle ideas have remained the same. These are, more or less, that: we 
ultimately can know things through our senses (and thinking); in this sense, then, there 
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is no difference between nature and man; different sciences can have different methods 
as long as they meet certain basic criteria, or conditions (for instance, things requiring a 
causal analysis must produce it, no amount of empathy, understanding, or some other 
metaphysical nonsense can be an acceptable substitute); scientific results are not 
necessarily eternal, they are subject to modification and change; this does not mean that 
we should abandon the scientific in favour of the ambiguous, truth remains still as the 
ideal; for if things cannot be known then science is unnecessary and to seek justification 
where there is none becomes pointless; history of science has shown that scientific 
endeavour has been fruitful (despite many mistakes); and that if we want to know 
something, science has been, eventually, our best bet. 
 
Why is this situation important? The fact that there are people writing different things 
is, in itself, harmless; there have always been people writing “different things”, and this 
will, at least to a certain extent, continue even in the future. A clash between these 
different things is, as a principle, necessary since, as Popper (1994: 34) wrote, 
“orthodoxy is the death of knowledge, since the growth of knowledge depends entirely 
on the existence of disagreement”. This means that in an environment where everyone is 
busy congratulating and agreeing with each other, no truly new thing can evolve. But 
the total opposite is also to be avoided; a principal disagreement about everything will 
lead nowhere as well, especially if the objects of that disagreement are age-old facts. 
For instance, a sudden disagreement about the basic concepts of electricity would be 
silly, especially if it was referred to as “the sign of the devil”. Now, as long as this 
irrational disagreement goes on “somewhere else”, science can continue to function. 
However, if that disagreement becomes part of science, especially in an even more 
twisted form, for instance, a principal disagreement about already established facts and 
a subsequent agreement of that disagreement, then science will be impossible. And if 
this non-science attitude becomes the main content of methodology-literature, the same 
literature that is supposed to teach future scientists and researchers how to do science, 
then what will be the most likely outcome? Kuhn (1996: 80) wrote that “science 
students accept theories on the authority of teacher and text, not because of evidence”; 
adding, rightly, on the same page, that “what alternatives have they, or what 
competence? The situation, then, becomes the following: a student, who, by the 
 12  
definition of a student, does not have knowledge enters the environment of higher 
education to receive it by those who supposedly have it, and is, subsequently, being 
taught that “Z is good”, “we commonly do Z”, or “in our field Z is being done”, then 
this is exactly what will be learned. In this sense, then, “the sins of the fathers will 
become the sins of their sons”. 
 
Töttö, among the few, has noticed this; not only that there exists a dichotomy between 
philosophies of science – between positivism (quantitative) and hermeneutics 
(qualitative) – and that this dichotomy is based on various misconceptions and straw 
man arguments, or that this dichotomy is present in much of the methodological 
literature – especially the critique of positivism seems to come from those who have 
very little to no knowledge about the matter – but it has, as to be expected, found its 
way into the vocabulary of the students. (see, for example, the introduction in Töttö, 
2000; 2005: 12.) 
 
Now, there have been some attempts at closing down this dichotomy but, unfortunately, 
in many cases it has amounted to a “in theory unification, in practice dichotomy”. For 
example, Lehto (1998), instead of bridging these opposites (where possible), continues 
to maintain the false arguments, old and rejected methodology (including the claim that 
empathy is typical of the humanities methodology, ibid.: 211), in short, it is mostly the 
“same old, same old” ideology rather than critical analysis of methodology; Kakkuri-
Knuuttila & Heinlahti (2006) also want to go ”beyond” by creating a ”pluralist 
epistemology” (p. 13). But how can this be achieved when they do not seem to be 
adequately aware of the philosophical contents of at least one of the camps; according to 
them, for instance, naturalism is in opposition to positivism (ibid.). They continue that 
“according to pluralistic epistemology, research must offer argumentation about results, 
selection of research problem(s) and method(s)” (ibid.: 22). But there does not exist any 
version of positivism (or traditional scientific approach) according to which this kind of 
argumentation would not be necessary. 
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In the literature that is not intended as “going beyond”, the situation is, of course, no 
better. The old arguments are repeated with the addition of new ones, equally bad. So, 
for example, Karlberg et al. (2002: 22) write that  
 
public health research needs qualitative research methods to find the “meaning behind the 
numbers” and to help us to improve our understanding of public health concerns. ... Qualitative 
methods could be used when the research questions intend to answer questions based on the 
how, the what and the why. 
 
Based on this, positivism or quantitative research is then left only with the “how much” 
option. If this is the case then how is it possible that, for instance, in natural sciences – 
but not only in them, the case is the same in experimental psychology, sociology, social 
sciences in general and, yes, in media studies as well – quantitative methods, or more 
generally, positivistic attitude has managed to produce answers not only to the “how 
much” but also to the how, what, and why questions? To continue, according to Hesse-
Biber & Leavy (2004: 5-6) 
 
What distinguishes the field of qualitative research is its diversity. It encompasses a wide range 
of epistemological positions and theoretical frameworks while offering many distinct research 
methods. Qualitative inquiry, then, allows researchers to ask different kinds of questions than its 
quantitative counterparts. ... Qualitative inquiry is characterised by multiple research methods 
and multimethod approaches. ... This allows for not only a wide range of researchable topics, but 
also a wide range of approaches to the same topic. This lends a depth to qualitative research.  
 
Again, this more or less says, that quantitative approach (or positivistic) is limited in the 
scope of questions and approach, and if this was not enough, it is also “shallow”. It must 
be, after all, that is the option left if qualitative approach has been labelled as “deep”. 
Not only is positivism left with only one type of possible research question, and being 
shallow, it is also quite easy. At least if we believe Jari Eskola (2001: 133) according to 
whom “quantitative research, compared to qualitative, is in a more advantageous 
position because there the researcher does not necessarily encounter any truly 
challenging situations.”  Many more examples could be given. If this is the kind of 
literature that is being used by the students; if the false arguments are then adopted, 
presented, and accepted by the educational staff, then not only the particular scientific 
field, or the whole university institution (which is already showing signs of ”wear and 
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tear”), but future of science as such is in deep trouble. Now, it is not that science as such 
will vanish but by twisting and/or demonising it beyond recognition will create a 
hostile, and possibly even directly dangerous, environment where only the foolhardy 
will continue to do real research. On the other hand, this might actually be good because 
this would filter out the all those who do ”research” as a means to a particular end: 
namely, bringing bread on the table. In the older days, commitment to science usually 
meant loss of money rather than having a regular salary. (Then again, I am not 
advocating that a scientist must remain poor in order to produce credible science.) 
 
Be as it may, the core issue here is about polarisation in the sciences, or as the second 
part of the title of Gross’s and Levitt’s book (1994) says: The Academic Left and Its 
Quarrels with Science. The polarisation is not only about certain views but also about 
from which fields the representatives of these views come from. C. P. Snow recognised 
this rift, or ”The Two Cultures”, as between the humanities and the (natural) sciences. 
Of course, in reality, this polarisation is not complete; for instance, the social sciences 
as well as the humanities contain more traditionally oriented researchers who either 
have not abandoned the rationality of science or who have returned to it after realising 
that the so called alternatives lead or have led to a dead end. But regardless of how 
complete or incomplete the separation is, the critics of science do mostly come from the 
humanities and social sciences. Yet the interesting thing is, as Gross and Levitt (ibid.: 6) 
noticed, that 
 
it would seem to follow, then, that the last eight or ten years [in reality much more] should have 
seen a flock of earnest humanists and social critics crowding into science and mathematics 
lecture rooms, the better to arm themselves for the fateful confrontation. This has not happened. 
A curious fact about the recent left-critique of science is the degree to which its instigators have 
overcome their former timidity or indifference toward the subject not by studying it in detail but 
rather by creating a repertoire of rationalisations for avoiding such study. Buoyed by a ”stance” 
on science, they feel justified in bypassing the grubby necessities of actual scientific knowledge. 
... The assumption that makes specific knowledge of science dispensable is that certain new 
forged intellectual tools – feminist theory, postmodern philosophy, deconstruction, deep ecology 
– and, above all, the moral authority with which the academic left emphatically credits itself are 
in themselves sufficient to guarantee the validity of the critique. (brackets added) 
 
One of these rationalisations is the already mentioned separation between “deep” and 
“shallow” science where the former is the new and improved whereas the latter is 
 15  
attached to the old and in every way bad. But it is a mere sloganeering that certainly has 
not been able to show how, say, the approach of natural sciences is shallow or 
superficial. On the other hand, and to the disadvantage of the ”in-depth” researchers, it 
can be easily shown that it is actually their ”deep-approach” that suffers from 
superficiality: by demonising and denying an approach (positivistic or traditionally 
scientific) without understanding what is it about, how it can be used, and in what 
situations, they necessarily limit their sphere of research possibilities and related 
sources of information. In other words, to close one’s eyes and stick fingers in one’s 
ears may guarantee ideological purity of method, although I am not at all sure how this 
is supposed to be a sign of “depth”. Positivism can certainly explain why, for instance, 
empathy does not offer any reliability to claims of empirical nature of the world (people 
included). And if this wasn’t enough, there is the success-rate of science, and so far the 
results of various “alternative” approaches are not exactly stellar.  
 
Additionally, even those few critics that seem to know what they are talking about 
(which doesn’t mean that whatever they say is correct), like Feyerabend, for example, 
are being misunderstood and their message distorted. For instance, in Against Method 
(1975), one of Feyerabend’s central themes is that to take any method, call it “The 
Science”, and then demand total adherence to it, is actually counterproductive to 
science. Then again, we must realise that science has never been about one particular 
method and that Feyerabend is not really criticising science as much as he is criticising 
totalising and unrealistic demands of some of its representatives. The second 
misunderstanding is about the concept of “anything goes”. Many critics of science seem 
to think that this means there is no need to legitimise arguments. Feyerabend points out 
in Farewell to Reason (1987: 284) that this is not the case. The point of “anything goes” 
is simply that science is an opportunistic enterprise. However, I think Feyerabend made 
en error in the way he emphasised this anarchistic nature of science. For, even if it can 
be shown that in this or that instant in the history of science some, or even many, things 
were done rather anarchically, this doesn’t explain why many theories and things that 
are now accepted as common knowledge eventually evolved from the shaky origins to 
as close to absolute knowledge as is possible. What in the end saved these theories or 
damned them was not that anything goes, rather, it was evidence, or lack thereof. The 
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anarchistic nature of science merely means that at some particular point in time, the 
supposed scientific standards were compromised. However, it doesn’t follow logically 
or empirically from this that science is 100 % anarchistic, void of any phase that can be 
referred to as scientific rationalism. Maybe this is or was one of the things that led 
Feyerabend (1992: 28-32), to write: 
 
How can an enterprise [science] depend on culture in so many ways, and yet produce such solid 
results? Most answers to this question are either incomplete or incoherent. Physicists take the 
fact for granted. Movements that view quantum mechanics as a turning-point in thought – and 
that include fly-by-night mystics, prophets of a New Age, and relativists or all sorts – get 
aroused by the cultural component and forget predictions and technology. 
 
Perhaps the physicists are doing the right thing after all, to take the situation for granted, 
for the precise answer would have to lead to what Feyerabend rejects (and rightly): 
namely, that it is this or that explicitly formulated method which leads to correct 
answers. There are certain conditions that have to be met in any serious scientific 
enterprise but they are not a “method”, and one can certainly produce wrong results 
despite adhering to these conditions as best as one can. 
 
The third misconception is based on the false idea that all belief-systems or traditions 
are equal; that, say, African animism is no better or worse than Western (scientific) 
rationalism. There are two things that need to be separated here: (any) tradition 1) as a 
way of life and 2) as the means to arrive at the truth (or as close as possible). What 
Feyerabend stresses, for instance, throughout Farewell to Reason, is the former point. 
He asks “By what right can the rest of the world be forced to live according to the 
Western way of life?” Of course, there exist no such right or legitimisation for this kind 
of action. But if we are interested in what is true and how to reach it, i.e., if we are 
interested in what the world is like, then, so far, science has been able to “beat” any 
other alternative, be it religion or any “other way of knowing” – one only needs to 
compare the so called anarchistic science with any other supposedly equal belief-
system. 
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Another widely cited author among the critics of science is Thomas Kuhn (1996), 
especially his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Three concepts have been 
referred to above else – again, in an attempt to show how science is just a subjective 
belief-system among many. These concepts are: 1) incommensurability of theories or 
paradigms, 2) the theoryladennes of observations, and 3) the element of subjectivity that 
ultimately chooses the future path during a scientific revolution (i.e., when an 
established theory or a whole research program is beyond repair. Of the first Kuhn 
(ibid.: 112, 148-149) writes that 
 
at times of revolution, when the normal-scientific tradition changes, the scientist's perception of 
his environment must be re-educated—in some familiar situations he must learn to see a new 
gestalt. After he has done so the world of his research will seem, here and there, 
incommensurable with the one he had inhabited before. In the first place, the proponents of 
competing paradigms will often disagree about the list of problems that any candidate for 
paradigm must resolve. Their standards or their definitions of science are not the same. Within 
the new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and experiments fall into new relationships one with the 
other. The inevitable result is what we must call, though the term is not quite right, a 
misunderstanding between the two competing schools. 
 
The second point is a logical conclusion of this. That is, if there is a gestalt switch, then 
even the same things will be viewed differently, hence the theoryladennes of 
observations. Regarding the third point, the element of subjectivity, Kuhn (ibid.: 155-
156) continues that 
 
there is also another sort of consideration that can lead scientists to reject an old paradigm in 
favour of a new. These are the arguments, rarely made entirely explicit, that appeal to the 
individual's sense of the appropriate or the aesthetic — the new theory is said to be "neater," 
"more suitable," or "simpler" than the old. The early versions of most new paradigms are crude. 
By the time their full aesthetic appeal can be developed, most of the community has been 
persuaded by other means. Nevertheless, the importance of aesthetic considerations can 
sometimes be decisive. Ordinarily, it is only much later, after the new paradigm has been 
developed, accepted, and exploited that apparently decisive arguments ... are developed. 
Producing them is part of normal science, and their role is not in paradigm debate but in 
postrevolutionary texts. 
 
However, there are many things, in Kuhn’s text, that do not make it the “proof” of 
traditional science having run its course. Simply put, it is not the ammunition that the 
anti-science brigade might think it is. First of all, the whole idea of science as an 
oscillation between normal and revolutionary science has been – quite successively, I 
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might add – criticised by Feyerabend in his article, Consolations for the Specialist 
(1980) – though Kuhn’s model can be easily criticised on its logical difficulties alone. 
About incommensurability Hintikka (2002: 253) says: 
 
Kuhn, for instance, speaks as if his famous concept of incommensurability was totally 
impossible to approach through the logical or empirical consequences of these theories. 
Incommensurability means, according to Kuhn, the conceptual difference of theories. I have 
showed, however, that this kind of impossibility exist nowhere except in Kuhn’s own head... At 
least in certain clear cut examples we can, on the contrary, show that the conceptual distancing 
between theories is directly dependable on the difference of their consequences. 
 
And on the part of theoryladennes, Hintikka (ibid.) more or less dismisses it, as 
contradictory with incommensurability, on the grounds that Ptolemy, Copernicus, as 
well as Brahe worked with exactly the same observations, yet arrived at different 
conclusions; how is this to be explained with theoryladennes? As to the subjective 
element of science, well, Kuhn never said that science is subjective (and relativist) only 
that these happen from time to time (mostly during crisis). It is both a logical as well as 
an empirical error to assume that because something happens (or has happened) it must 
happen exclusively all the time. 
 
As the reader can see, this could be carried on for ages, and, indeed, it has continued for 
ages – despite the fact that many issues are now, really, non-issues. By now the debate 
has turned into a self-sustained “perpetum mobile” which may serve more personal 
academic careers rather than actually improving scientific endeavour. This has become 
predominantly evident during the present “sausage-factory” styled scientism carried out 
at the modern factory university. Like with any production, research is now being 
treated as a product which must be churned out at an ever increasing rate to keep the 
corporation (university) afloat and “profitable” – or at least “academically respectable”. 
For instance, the saying “publish or perish” is a direct symptom of this disease which 
forces academics to say something when there is really nothing to be said. In this kind 
of atmosphere text is produced for its own sake while the content becomes 
inconsequential; a total opposite if or when compared to the older days of science. I fail 
to see why otherwise nonsense is being written and published (about the same things) 
by the tons. 
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This insignificance of the content – for the anti-scientific criticism is either plainly 
wrong, repetitive, politicised, etc. – is perhaps its own biggest enemy. But not only that, 
even the fields themselves have it difficult to shield themselves from being, in the end, 
unimportant. The customary defence of the humanities and the social sciences against 
demands to be scientific is to invoke the rheumatic mantra of the two worlds: that there 
is nature and culture; the latter is ontologically and epistemologically different; the 
humanities and the social sciences are interested in culture; therefore they cannot adopt 
the traditionally scientific way of doing things. But we, the people, are not only cultural 
beings; we are also biological beings which means that nature is an inseparable part of 
us. This involves practical problems, i.e., the questions about shelter, food, and health, 
for instance. Their solution is a technical matter and so far the humanities and the social 
sciences haven’t been able to offer any answers. 
 
But these fields are not faring any better even from the cultural part point of view. We 
have had writers, composers, painters, for example, who have produced absolutely 
marvellous pieces of artistic work. I know of no-one literary critic, media scholar or a 
sociologist who has been able to create such immensely affecting melodies or deeply 
moving streams of words. Would anything bad happen if, say, the government cut all its 
financial support of the humanities? Well, although I am speaking for myself here, I 
simply fail to see what would be missed; what and where is the impact of the “softer 
sciences”. A politicised discourse that is not only lean on facts but doesn’t even 
recognise the importance of them will hardly be missed. Then again, we already have 
this type of discourse already produced by actual politics, there is no need to do the 
same under the banner of “science”.  
 
So far this introductory part has been going on at a fairly general level, and it is, to a 
large extent, unavoidable. There cannot be an epistemological/methodological/scientific 
discussion without references and remarks of a wide-ranging nature. For instance, the 
methodology of media studies is not a creation of media studies, it is an import from the 
methodology of social sciences as well as attempts at a more “artistic” approach, again 
imported from elsewhere. And of course, all of this – whether we say “there is truth”, 
“there is no truth”, or “inductive reasoning fails because of X” – connects at an even 
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higher or more general level: the philosophy of science. On the other hand, this general 
level is made possible only because it is connectible to and arises from the actual 
instances of doing science. I have so far, then, introduced the general idea that there are 
many fields that suffer from confusion of what is science, what are its methods, and 
other related issues. In the next chapter I intend to illuminate the matters somewhat by 
talking about aim and structural issues, i.e., by particularising the discussion. 
 
 
1.1 Aim, Structure, and Preliminary Remarks on Method 
 
The aim of this thesis is simple: to conduct a basic analysis of the nature of media 
studies. By “nature” I mean the level of “scientificness” which refers to such things as 
basic tenets of sciences, methodological issues, and so on. I am not so much interested 
in what is being done right and how, but, rather, what isn’t. In other words, the intention 
is to locate and criticise what, exactly, is wrong. As was said in the previous chapter, 
discussion about science must be by necessity general which means that the discussion 
about media studies will be, where necessary or otherwise appropriate, compared to a 
general level of thought. 
 
Evaluation of media studies not only can but must be split further: 1) first of all, there is 
the established field itself, with its authors and published material; 2) however such a 
field is not a closed system. Streams of information enter and leave it. Such information 
flow is especially important because it connects any particular field – media studies in 
this case – to its surroundings. Thus the formation of a field depends on a combination 
of both internal and external factors – as evident from the fact that, for instance, the 
methodology of human sciences (to a large extent) has been implemented in media 
studies. But it is not only human sciences as such that have affected the field. The same 
can be said about natural sciences and, particularly, philosophy of science in general. 
Therefore, if one wishes to speak of media studies, it is at the same time necessary to 
speak of the external factors; 3) this can be further divided into what happens in these 
fields as such and how they are being taught. Of course I am talking about the part of 
higher education, the “initiation rites” that are supposed to turn raw material (students) 
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into new researchers that will, if not come up with revolutionary results, then at least 
continue renewing the existence of the field. It is about what the students are being 
taught and what, scientifically speaking, is required of them in order to become 
“academically adequate”, i.e., what the students need to do before they get the magical 
paper that determines their knowledge, competency, abilities of the mind, etc. 
 
Structurally, the content will be divided into three main sections (chapters), each dealing 
with one of the above mentioned themes: A) some general comments about science. 
This will not be intended as an “introduction to science”, dealing with all the traditional 
concepts like modes of reasoning, problem of induction, comparing empiricism and 
rationalism, and the like; there are plenty of such works available already. Nor will this 
be a historical tracking of the development of various scientific thoughts; again, there 
are better books of this sort in existence than this thesis would ever be and, also, there is 
simply no need to make every inquiry historical. It is not that the content will be 
completely “new” and “different”, just that I will apply “creative” selection (just like 
any other researcher in his or her work); emphasising what I feel either deserves a 
special mention in a general sense or what is otherwise underrepresented in the 
literature. In addition, there will be two examples of “alternative approaches” to science 
and why these either fail or turn out to be no different than traditional scientific 
approach. These are: postmodernism, and feminism. Although to traditional science 
these approaches are “alternative”, they are, nonetheless, common in media studies, or 
social sciences and the humanities in general; 
 
B) superficial analysis of media studies. I say superficial because to present a 
“complete” summary of the field is either impossible or it would require such amount of 
work that it would be unfair to demand a master’s level student to produce it. As I 
mentioned previously, I am interested in the negatives rather than the positives, so I am 
perfectly aware of the fact that there are or can be well conducted scientific inquiries in 
the field. But the idea that the negatives are not representative of the field at all; that 
these are mere case examples would be, I think, unjustified; for there should be 
dissimilarity between these negative cases and pretty much everything else. However, if 
similarity can be shown between these cases, the way students are educated, and an 
 22  
even wider method-discourse carried out in the humanities and the social sciences, then 
it will be justified to consider that these examples are, in fact, quite representative of the 
field. The negativity (or positivity) of the cases shall be approached from a basic 
methodological point of view, i.e., not if this or that research used absolutely correctly 
analysis X, Y, or Z but whether the whole approach was justifiable; whether the results 
or methodological recommendations/advice were justifiable on logical and/or empirical 
grounds. For instance, to say “positivism is bad” without any explanation whatsoever as 
to why this is the case will be considered as a negative example; 
 
C) analysis of the education. This will be partly a pure case example, for it is, after all, 
the University of Vaasa that I will be analysing. Furthermore, the concrete object of 
analysis will be a randomised sample of media studies theses. The same pros and cons 
can be raised about this point as well; that the case might not necessarily be 
representative, that things can, overall, be totally different. While the representativeness 
of a case study is always more difficult to ascertain, its justifiability is, however, 
intended to be increased – as was already mentioned – through the combination of the 
different factors included in this thesis. In other words, while the sample of media 
studies theses might not by itself produce reliable results about how education is being 
carried out in general – at different universities, countries, etc. – it would be, 
nonetheless, very difficult to explain it with a mere coincidence if the case example of 
education, the analysis of the field (albeit superficial), and the other examples of, say, 
the methodology of social sciences and/or the humanities would happen to correspond. I 
think that if taken as a part of a larger picture the educational case example is – or 
potentially can be – surprisingly accurate (not to mention, very important). 
 
The method, or methodology, of this thesis can be divided into two main parts: 1) the 
theoretical and 2) both theoretical and empirical. The analysis of the media studies 
theses can be said to belong to the latter category and that the rest belongs to the former. 
Then again, it is difficult to draw an absolute line between theoretical and empirical 
work. If we are precise, the various books that are read in order to help us to construct 
the argument are equally empirical as any other material which is referred to as 
“empirical” – in this case media studies theses. Both are intended to be used as sources 
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of information that go beyond the level of the strictly personal and subjective. One 
possible way of differentiation is by the purpose of the material. For instance, the books 
of the theoretical part can be intended as offering a proof of an existence of a certain 
idea, or some specific piece of information; it can also inspire to see things in a certain 
way. The empirical material, on the other hand, is mostly used to see if things are the 
way they are supposed to be, or to find a pattern, etc. This kind of differentiation, 
although in some cases useful, is in the end artificial, for at its core there is only one 
function: to see if there is something of a certain kind; that an object of certain qualities 
is either present or not. Nor will there be an attempt to keep the analysis of media 
studies theses “literature free”, i.e., without making any references to other literature. 
So, again, I want to emphasise that the way I differentiate between the theoretical and 
empirical part is an purely an instrumental, and subjective, step. 
 
I will discuss the methodology of theoretical research and continue with the 
methodology of empirical research in a later section of this thesis, the one which will 
deal about the analysis of media studies theses. Anyway, regarding the former (the 
theoretical), the existing literature offers tiny amount of description or explication of 
method(s). To put it more bluntly: there is no method involved when one does 
theoretical research. For instance Töttö (2005: 10, 12) writes that research is either 
theoretical or both theoretical and empirical which means that, firstly, the former is 
always present and, secondly, it is a combination of the researcher’s thinking and the 
use of references (literature). Even though Töttö’s description of theoretical research 
seems somewhat lean, it is actually one of the richest in this regard. Now, this doesn’t 
mean that theory is not discussed in the literature at all; it is, and quite extensively, 
however, not as a method. Theory, when one reads about it, is always assumed. It is 
there, it is important, for instance, as an “organiser” of scientific knowledge, as a guide 
that directs the research process, or as an explanation of causal connection (Eskola, 
1981: 164; Toivonen, 1999: 84). Sometimes some representatives of qualitative 
approach have a tendency to forget that theoretical research – especially the part about 
researcher’s own reasoning – is or can be independent activity and that there is no 
automatic equal sign between theoretical and qualitative research. An example of this 
activity can be found, for instance, in Robson and Foster (1989: 3) in the form of the 
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following: “Qualitative research is best used for problems requiring insight and 
understanding...”. (On a side note, based on this, a quantitative research must be then 
best fitted for problems that don’t require insight or understanding.)  
 
 
1.2 Theoretical framework 
 
Many “how to write a thesis”-guides, and method books do write about theoretical 
frameworks. The general idea here is that a theoretical framework is supposed to 
conceptualise the object of research, among others, by 1) limiting and specifying the 
researched object(s) and 2) by developing a specific, concept(s)-dependent research 
theme (Alkula, Pöntinen & Ylöstalo, 1994: 34). In qualitative research, there are 
grounded theory and its many variants that adopt a reversed stance; data first, theory 
second. The “theory first, data second”-model can be referred to as the traditional one. 
But is this model even possible; or even if this is the case, is it desirable? And should 
we choose a theoretical framework, what is it supposed to do? Rakitov (1978: 153, 160) 
writes that 
 
to be precise, sciences begins, as a matter of fact, with theory. A scientific theory contains the 
most precious substance of science. ... the decisive factor which separates a theory’s system of 
causal statements from mutually unrelated group of descriptions is that, in the former case, a 
theory enables the explanation and prediction of phenomena while, in the latter case, with 
descriptions [with singular or group of singular descriptions] this would be impossible to do. 
(brackets added) 
 
How can a theory have predictive or explanatory force? The only criterion, of course, is 
by being true. Philosophical arguments of the impossibility of proving a universal 
statement aside, a theory needs to contain a high level of plausibility, at least in a 
pragmatic sense, that its usage will “produce workable, non-random results”. To the 
extent that a theory is not yet “workable”, its usage will be a combination of theory 
testing – of those parts that are testable – and theory formation – correcting and 
improving those parts that the ongoing research shows should be corrected and how.  
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If a theory, or a part of it, is found to be true – in the sense, that it produces workable 
results, it is highly corroborated, and it is even widely accepted by the scientific 
community – it ceases to be “just a theory”, and it becomes a “first principle”. In other 
words, such theory becomes accepted truth and its inclusion in the theoretical 
framework becomes unnecessary; it will be used in the same way as the ability to walk, 
an “automated” routine. (We do not explain, for instance, the “theory” of subtracting 
and adding whenever we use them – it already has been tried and tested.) 
 
We are, then, left with – regarding theoretical frameworks – two things, namely that, 
accepted theories will not be really part of the explicitly formulated conceptual 
framework. They may provide much, if not most, of the terminology, concepts, and 
even guidance but this will not be specially introduced, it will be more or less assumed. 
The real object of research, the “unknown” part will be and can be conceptualised with 
any kind of terminology that will be “clear enough”, i.e., so that others can understand 
what is going on (what is research, the how part, etc.). Here, quite likely, everyday 
language might even prove more fruitful than the usage of the different “theories”, for 
instance, in the social sciences or the humanities, which seem to offer nothing more 
than an image of “being scientific”. Due to the onslaught of postmodernism, 
constructivism, simply put, all the different versions of strong relativism where there is 
no truth, only opinion (and all opinions are supposed to be equal), these so called 
theories are rarely more than a mere play with words; at best an exercise of giving old 
things new names. And they will never become more, since they lack (purposely) one of 
the basic criterions of science: testing. But if we become interested in the truth-value of 
a theory, it will have to be turned into a hypothesis (no matter how simple or complex) 
and, subsequently, tested. 
 
Nor does this mean, as the grounded theorists would like us to believe, that research can 
be “theoryless”. However, this is perhaps the crux of it all: what really is a theory? What 
are its limits? When are we justified in talking about theories instead of hypotheses, or a 
collection of ideas? It is obvious that Comte’s idea of theory guided observation as well 
as observation guided theory is true in the sense that every research is precluded by a 
some kind of guiding research idea; but when does an idea transform into a theory? The 
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concept of theory-laden observation is not really helpful here at all, for it does not 
explicate what theory, to what extent, or what combinations of theories “construct” the 
observation(s). The observation of white swans, for instance, can be considered to 
include the theories of “whiteness”, “swanness”, “birdness”, “the human perception 
apparatus”, “colours in general”, “reflection”, ad nauseam. I dare anyone to “explain” 
the theoretical framework behind the observation of white swans, although, again, we 
can talk about that there are some ideas involved; ideas that carry a certain meaning 
which is then connected with a feedback loop to the real object. 
 
I suppose a following distinction can be made: if by theory or theoretical framework we 
mean any kind of idea that leads the research process then it follows that any research 
will contain a theory or theoretical framework, for there cannot be research that wasn’t 
or isn’t guided by some kind of idea. However, to the extent that we don’t know if this 
or that idea is true, there cannot be any categorical distinction between a theory and an 
idea; the complexity of the idea can vary but that is all, and so far I am not aware of any 
authoritative sources that states at which complexity level an idea transforms into a 
theory. Furthermore, the guiding idea doesn’t need to be strictly “interpretive”, it can 
direct the inquiry through questions, certain curiosity, etc., and take the results (the 
different empirical and non-empirical material) at more or less their face value. For 
instance, a logical fallacy, if or when we find one, doesn’t need to be subsumed under a 
specific theoretical framework, it is what it is because we happen to recognise one based 
on our everyday experience; we happen to live in a world where things have their order. 
If theory is understood like this, then firstly, this thesis contains one and, secondly, its 
clarification cannot be anything else than making explicit the interests and aims that are 
guiding the research. And the aim is simply to see what this or that is like, to write 
down some of the things that happen to occupy one’s mind. 
 
If, on the other hand, we mean by theory or theoretical framework something else, for 
example, a systematised (or axiomatised) body of knowledge, i.e., a collection of claims 
whose truth-value is already established (otherwise it wouldn’t be knowledge), then 
such a framework is not to be found in this thesis; it would be impossible. There simply 
aren’t any such “theories” available for the “interpretation” of, say, the epistemological 
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state of media studies, or the humanities. There are ideas, claims, statements that, for 
example, academic feminism is non-science, which are then backed up by an actual 
examination of such literature. However, we are talking about an extremely simple idea. 
In fact, it could be also understood as a hypothesis. And to the extent that we don’t 
know yet; if we are supposed to know only after the analysis (as is usually the case), 
then, regarding this thesis, we can say that insofar as it contains a leading idea or ideas, 
this or these can be described as having a hypothetical nature. (More about an actual 
hypothesis in chapter 4, where media theses are going to be analysed.) 
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2 SOME NOTIONS ABOUT SCIENCE 
 
As noted earlier, this chapter is not about what, precisely, science is about; all its 
concepts, and their meticulous explanation. In this sense, this chapter can be accused of 
being incomplete, fragmentary, or something similar. The included concepts should, 
firstly, give some kind of idea about science – or rather, necessary conditions for doing 
science, etc. – and, secondly, they should help us understand why or what problems 
trouble, say, the so-called alternatives to traditional science, whether in themselves or as 
parts of media studies. 
 
 
2.1 Science and the problem of knowing 
 
Explanations to “what is science?” are always in some way misleading, even if they 
managed to capture the bulk of the issue. There is always some point with which we 
disagree or that we would wish to see clarified more. The situation is no different with, 
for instance, Wynn and Wiggins’ (2001: 2) simplified version, according to which 
“science can seem mysterious, especially when presented in great detail. In essence, 
however, it is remarkably straightforward. Scientists simply try to gain a fundamental 
understanding of natural phenomena.” 
 
For positivists or traditional scientists – sometimes to be also found among the 
representatives of the humanities and social sciences – the above description probably 
will not sound categorically problematic. In other words, for them there is no 
fundamental difference between “nature” and “culture”, and, therefore, “understanding 
of natural phenomena” is an all-encompassing term that refers to the “reality”, “world, 
or “universe” around and including us. 
 
The meaning of the word “understand” needs to be slightly expanded. I think it should 
be quite obvious that this word is closely connected to the word “knowing” or “to 
know”, i.e., that it would be difficult to understand something without knowing what it 
is that we are supposed to understand. (By understanding I don’t mean some kind of 
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“empathic act” where we “relate” to how someone else might feel. Though even in this 
sense we “understand” better when we have experienced similar events ourselves: we 
“know” how this or that event makes us feel.) We can now slightly re-formulate the 
description of science: Scientists simply try to know what certain natural phenomena 
are like, how they behave, and why they are the way they are. 
 
The central issue, then, resolves around knowing; what can be known and how. (Some, 
or even many, feminists (for instance, Harding 1987: 3; Ronkainen 1998) have also 
asked the question “who can know” which from a scientific point of view is a pseudo-
problem that will be clarified later.) A fitting and simple way – at least not any worse 
than others – to approach the problem of knowing can be done with the help of the 
“classical conditions of knowledge”. These conditions are in themselves very simple 
and, for example, according to Lammenranta (1993: 79) the “formula” is as follows: 
Someone (S) knows something (P), if and only if 1) P is true (i.e., the proposition 
corresponds to reality and, hence, its truth-value is true); 2) S believes that P (i.e., the 
proposition is given in good faith; there is no intentional lie involved); 3) S is 
(epistemically) justified in believing P (i.e., in addition to that the proposition is true and 
that the person believes in it, there should also be some compelling reason as to why the 
proposition is true and why it should be believed. This will usually take the form of an 
explanation.) 
 
Points 1 and 3 are particularly important. The former simply emphasises the 
correspondence between an object (phenomenon) and the statement (or theory perhaps) 
about that object. Some philosophers, humanists, etc., have argued that correspondence, 
as a criterion, is flawed and unusable. However, this is a mistaken opinion and I will 
mention two ways how it can be countered. Firstly, (and this is the “common sense” 
approach) how can something be true, i.e., how can we honestly claim to know some 
part (phenomenon) of reality if that part of reality differs from our statements; if for 
instance the phenomenon doesn’t even exist? This is so common sense that even court 
proceedings have adopted such a view – even though sometimes in practice this 
principle is violated. (If we are sending someone to prison, it would only seem fair that 
the accusation matches – corresponds – with reality; that the sentenced murderer, for 
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instance, really committed that murder.) Not only is the claim against correspondence 
counter-intuitive in a general sense, it also violates, in particular, our sense of justice 
and morality. Second example comes from Bonjour (2002: 36), who writes that  
 
the mistake that is made ... is thinking that the intelligibility of the correspondence theory 
requires a generally applicable specification of the relation of correspondence ..., at least if such 
a specification is supposed to be more than utterly straightforward and trivial. Any intelligible 
proposition, after all, says that reality ... is a certain way or has certain features that the content 
of the proposition specifies. And the best way to understand the correspondence theory ... is to 
construe it as saying no more than that such a proposition is true if reality is whatever way or has 
whatever features the proposition describes it as having. In some cases, the content of a supposed 
proposition may be less than fully clear or intelligible, but that is a problem for that supposed 
proposition and not for the correspondence theory. 
 
The main issues, then, are the following: 1) no “higher” philosophical or other kind of 
proof for correspondence can be given other than the trivial “X is Y if and only if X is 
Y”. It is similar to the proof that reality exists: no more can be given than demonstrating 
that a case is such and such – if more is expected than this then, perhaps, one should 
devote his energies to religion rather than science; 2) the difficulties of propositional 
content are caused by, firstly, hypothetical nature of that content and, secondly, of 
linguistic limitations, which means that, although we are interested in a correspondence 
relation, it can never be ultimately achieved because that relation is between a collection 
of words and a phenomenon; 3) because the linguistic component refers to reality only 
through actual use, a test of correspondence – that of demonstration - becomes 
necessary; 4) a test of correspondence cannot be of analytic character, it must be 
synthetic which means that insofar as science is interested in understanding (knowing) 
reality, it must produce empirical evidence in support of its knowledge-claims, 
hypothesis, or theories. (Some have argued that, for instance, the truths in mathematics 
are analytical, i.e., not empirical but rather logical and that in this sense it differs from 
the natural sciences. Even though there is no pure consensus on mathematics as being 
purely tautological system, to explain this further would be sidetracking the issue here. 
Fortunately the humanities and social sciences try to tell us something about reality. 
Hence, we don’t need to deal with the required evidence of tautological systems.) 
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At this point, the pseudo-problem of “who can know” or rather “who can be the 
knower”, as the feminists ask, becomes utterly inconsequential: anyone who satisfies 
the conditions of knowledge can be the “knower”. And because this is directly 
dependent on or equal to the conditions, the issue of the “knower” can be dropped 
altogether. Either the conditions are satisfied or they are not. 
 
We can, then, sum this up by saying that the problem of science is the problem of 
knowing. The legitimacy of a knowledge-claim rests principally on two things: a 
correspondence between the claim and reality and the empirical evidence for that claim. 
Empirical evidence doesn’t appear magically by itself, it needs to be actively pursued 
and produced. 
 
 
2.2 Causality 
 
Hempel (1965: 297) writes that 
 
empirical science, in all its major branches, seeks not only to describe the phenomena in the 
world of our experience, but also to explain or understand them. In physical sciences all 
explanation is achieved ultimately by reference to causal or correlational antecedents, while 
some argue that, for example, in social sciences, psychology, or even in biology the 
establishment of causal or correlational connections is not enough. 
 
Empirical science here refers to all those non-tautological (scientific) fields that make 
claims about the reality, hence, including the humanities and the social sciences as well. 
When, for example, Jameson writes about the logic of late capitalism, he is making an 
empirical claim about the reality even though the reader might have not the foggiest 
idea what he is actually saying. The part where Hempel writes that “some argue that, for 
example, in social sciences, psychology, or even in biology the establishment of causal 
or correlational connections is not enough” can be interpreted at least in two ways. 
 
The first interpretation is the idea of generative theory of causality which 
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holds that there is a real connection between causes and their effects, and that in many cases this 
can be identified with a causal mechanism which on being stimulated by the cause produces the 
effect.. 
 
On the other hand, the succession theory of causality “finds nothing empirical to answer 
to the connection between cause and effect.” (Harré 1972: 116.) “Science follows the 
generative rather than the successionist theory of causality”, Harré continues (ibid.: 
118). This simply means that it is not enough to establish “A causes B” but, in addition, 
why it causes, i.e., what is the causal mechanism connecting A and B. Similar criticism 
– explicitly directed at Hempel – is presented by George and Bennett (2005: 132) who 
write that “the first flaw of the D-N model is that it does not distinguish between 
regularities that might be considered causal and those that clearly are not.” (The D-N 
model refers to the covering law model of explanation.)  
 
The flaw of these criticisms is that they assume a working scientist to be a complete 
idiot who claims victory if or when B follows A. (Such a “scientist” would claim that 
cranes deliver babies if cranes were spotted with regularity before a new child appeared 
in the house. This is another non-issue, and even basic statistics says that correlation 
(succession) is not causation.) It would have been nice if, for example, Harré could have 
pointed to some serious research where only succession (A -> B) model of causality 
was followed. However, no examples were given which means that science (those that 
actually do it) follows the generative model in one way or another. Why George and 
Bennett are wrong is because they have plainly misunderstood Hempel. The D-N 
(Deductive-Nomological) model of explanation simply tries to describe the logical 
structure of any causal explanation (Hempel 1965: 412). The concrete content of an 
explanation is based on the laws and/or theories used in that particular case (theories of 
a particular field and of a particular phenomenon). This first interpretation of what has 
been directed against Hempel’s model turns out to be ineffective. The claim that 
“explanation is achieved ultimately by reference to causal or correlational antecedents” 
still stands: Hempel’s model is not successionist nor is it generative, it is a logical 
model of causal explanation where the concrete causal model is supplied by the actual 
laws/theories used. And although Harré is right in criticising the succession model of 
causality, he has failed to demonstrate that there exist rigorous scientific endeavour that 
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is successionist – of course, other than a brief phase which basically can be 
successionist, for, instance, when research about a phenomenon is in its infancy. 
 
The second interpretation (or rather type of criticism), why referencing causal and/or 
correlational connections is not enough, is based on the idea of two worlds or two basic 
sciences, as already mentioned in the introduction. We are, of course, talking about the 
world of nature and culture, or natural sciences on the one hand and humanities with the 
social sciences on the other. For some bizarre reason – which is never really explained, 
let alone demonstrated – there is supposed to be a categorical difference between the 
two. But just as the feminists have failed to produce evidence in favour of the supposed 
“woman’s way of knowing”, the defenders of the two-world argument have ended up in 
the same situation: strong claims yes, evidence (of any kind) no. The idea of the two 
worlds (or two sciences) rests on the assumption that nature and man are qualitatively 
so diverse that it warrants a completely different scientific approach; methods, 
necessary conditions, and interpretation. This claim is, in many cases, taken as its own 
proof; no more than poor argumentation then. It has the following form (especially in 
the two-world case) “qualitative difference = ontological difference, therefore 
methodological difference” (For example, Routila (1986: 10-11) uses the words 
“different ontological structure” even though he is, as far as I can understand, talking 
about a qualitative difference. On the other hand, and strangely so, Routila (ibid.: 10) 
believes the contrast between the natural and “human” sciences “is based on many 
preconceptions, a stance which shouldn’t be considered as a healthy one”.) 
 
But even if we ignored the words “ontological difference”, it is trivial to show that 
qualitative difference doesn’t automatically lead to a different methodology: chemistry 
and physics (or biology) are essentially interested in an area of phenomena and qualities 
that are “uniquely” theirs. Despite the qualitative differences of their scientific interest, 
i.e., what phenomena or which of their qualities are researched, there is no basic 
difference in their approach; the “logic” of science remains the same. Now, there is 
probably no-one who would deny that the there are qualitative differences between the 
objects of chemistry and objects of, say, sociology. However, because a qualitative 
difference does not equal a methodological difference (the logic of doing science), it 
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must be shown why these or those particular differences justify a categorical 
methodological difference between sciences, let alone two ontologically different 
worlds. Then there are the results, or lack of them: whether we are talking about 
“verstehen”, empathy, women’s way of knowing, etc., these have remained at the 
programmatical level only, failing to produce single credible piece of satisfactory 
research. Or to put it differently: when the alternatives produce credible results, they do 
so based on the logic of traditional conception of science – regardless of rhetorical 
burdens to the contrary. So far, then, Hempel’s basic idea is generally applicable. 
 
When we say “A causes B”, we usually refer to causa efficiens (efficient cause) and not 
the other three (causa formalis, materialis, and finalis) of Aristotle’s four causalities for 
the simple reason that over time the other three’s explanatory power has suffered from 
severe inflation. Causa finalis basically means teleology or teleological explanation 
which, for a long time, hasn’t really been popular in the sciences. If or when it still 
occurs, it does so mostly in the humanities and social sciences, because of the two-
worlds idea (or even extreme relativism). It has been suggested that teleological 
explanations are being used even elsewhere, for instance, in physics, the idea of heat 
“death” of the universe is thought of being a teleological explanation, the ultimate 
thermodynamic state. But before undue rejoicing commences, it should be emphasised 
that not all teleological explanations are created equal. The world of difference lies in 
the way the explanation handles the first and third classical conditions of knowing. 
 
First of all, the case of thermodynamics, for example, is backed up by empirical 
evidence and logical consistency, i.e., the requirement of correspondence and evidence 
are met. Secondly, many causal laws, or let’s say natural laws, can be reformulated in a 
teleological ways. In fact, any natural law states that this or that thing “ultimately” 
happens in certain way. For instance, we can say of gravitation that ultimately dispersed 
matter will coalesce (again, we have the empirical proof and logical consistency); we 
irrefutably know that, on earth, dropped objects fall down, they don’t levitate up. 
Thirdly, teleological explanations of this sort are not really explanations, they merely re-
state what is already known; we don’t say things fall down because things fall down. A 
real teleological explanation of gravity would be Aristotle’s idea that “all bodies move 
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toward their natural place”. Not to delve into this too deeply, we can notice the 
problematic nature of this explanation; what is, exactly, the “natural place of bodies”? 
The gravitational model is quite straightforward, yet statements like the “natural place 
of bodies” do not fit to it at all, how could they do so in more complex systems, with 
higher level of contingency (like human activity)? 
 
There have been attempts to make causa formalis meaningful in studying art (see 
Routila 1986: 12–16). Routila refers to causa formalis as structure law or style, say, that 
of Baroque. For some reason, according to Routila, structure law ought not to be 
confused with causal law, even though he writes that “within a certain stylistic 
framework, it is impossible to see just any kind of solutions; that the solutions are 
determined by style” (ibid.: 16). What this means is that during the Baroque era the 
architecture, for example, was what it was because it was determined by the Baroque 
style. (The only thing needed to make this argument purely circular is to say that the 
Baroque style is what it is because that is how things are done.) Then again, Routila 
contradicts himself when he states that the style isn’t so deterministic after all (ibid.: 16, 
19). It is apparent that the problem of structure law, or style, is very similar to Kuhn’s 
idea of normal science, or the dominant paradigm. The problem, then, is this: if a style 
(or a paradigm) is supposed to be deterministic, how can it be explained that there have 
been both different artistic styles and “prevailing” scientific notions? Well, the only 
possible explanation is that: because such a thing is not causal or deterministic in the 
real sense. It certainly can affect but it doesn’t cause, which is a case of the basic tenets 
of statistics, i.e., that correlation is not causation. This means that style is comparable to 
a fashion – a certain kind of social norm – which we, justifiably so, think of affecting 
our behaviour, such as artistic choices. But simply as that, as a correlation – that A 
affects B – it is exactly what Hempel wrote about; that “explanation is achieved 
ultimately by reference to causal or correlational antecedents”. The idea of style 
certainly fits in the latter category (not causal but correlational). 
 
There are different criteria for establishing causality. Töttö (2005: 120), for instance, 
lists four criteria: 1) contingency, 2) temporal succession, 3) eliminating seeming 
correlational effect from a real one, and 4) mechanism. In actuality, it is not merely 
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causality that Töttö writes about, we find that with the inclusion of mechanism comes 
also an explanatory element, i.e., it is about causal explanation. (Establishing a causal 
connection is possible without knowledge about underlying mechanism if it can be 
shown that from the various possibilities only A causes B – that without A there is no B 
– then a causal connection is established.) 
 
The requirement of contingency means that B doesn’t follow logically from A, that the 
connection is not definitional. For example, there is no causal connection between “a 
bachelor” and “being unmarried”, the latter is already included in the concept of a 
bachelor. Contingency is therefore an empirical matter, which can be theorised and 
hypothised about, but one ultimately needing a verification, a test. Furthermore, such 
empirical tests increase our knowledge over that of what is included in a definition. 
Again, some say that in the realm of culture, contingency doesn’t work or that it should 
not be required. However, this can be easily shown to be a wrong opinion: without 
contingency we are, as a result, left with logical necessity which should mean that the 
world of culture should be predictable; for instance, it should be child’s play to tell in 
what kind of state the economy will be in, say, two years – economy is, after all, a 
“cultural product”. But no such prediction is possible. Contingency can be understood 
as the possibility of being wrong and regarding human action this is certainly the case. 
Since there is no logical necessity in human action, and if we would still want to cling 
to the no contingency idea, then the only solution would be to claim that there is no 
need to seek causality in human action at all – which in humanities and social sciences 
many times happens. But this denial is constantly broken by references to norms, other 
societal effects, and so on. The only possible way to avoid causality regarding human 
action is to completely refrain from asking why we do what we do and, instead, 
concentrate on making such authoritative insights as “people do what they do”. While 
some academics are happy to do exactly this – of course camouflaged with the right 
jargon – it is still in our nature to be curious; to want to know why. This is, by the way, 
what separates a scientist from an “academic worker”: the former wants to know, the 
latter wants tenure. 
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Temporal succession is a straightforward idea; a cause has to preclude its effect. It is 
possible that there can be a feedback loop from B back to A but the process must be 
started by A first then B (ibid.: 125). Moving along with the third point then. Even 
though correlation is not causation, the latter presupposes the former. However, what is 
visible to us is the correlational part as causation doesn’t wander around in nature, 
waiting for us to point at it. The scientist must find out – as best as he can – whether the 
correlation between A and B is real or if it is a case of third factor C affecting both A 
and B. This latter case is when there is a seeming correlation. Needless to say, if a 
seeming correlation is not recognised, the results of research can be pretty much thrown 
out of the window. A lax or even hostile attitude towards causal analysis can become 
downright dangerous – not to mention unethical – when wide ranging policies are 
planned and implemented. Examples of this can be found in nursing, childcare, etc., 
where if “research” is based on “in-depth” interviews, and other qualitative “methods” 
then the results are in danger of being most bizarre and misleading. A default no-thank-
you attitude towards causal analysis might score points among like-minded ideologues 
but I dare not speculate to what extent it helps the patient who has told some researcher 
his life story – the researcher tries to “understand” how the patient feels – and as a result 
receives treatment which might make him feel “happier” but in reality, in a medical 
sense, causes a deterioration of health – should such a researcher ever be taken 
seriously. 
 
A typical basic attitude of this “oh let’s not bother ourselves with this thing called 
science” can be found, for example, in Eskola (2001: 146-147) where he praises Freud’s 
ideas of the origin of society; apparently these ideas cannot be taken as historical facts 
or causal explanation of something that really happened; a “fruitful” delving into what 
culture might mean and/or to forget empiricism and substitute it with going on a 
walkabout in fantasy land seems to be more than enough. And lastly, the third point, 
mechanism adds to the credibility of causal explanation by reducing the likelihood of a 
seeming correlation. But again, causation (or correlation really) can be shown to exist 
even without an underlying mechanism, although, the explanation is nicer with it. It 
should be further emphasised that much of the elaboration (the attempt of finding a real 
causal or correlational connection, including the evaluation of a mechanism’s fit) is the 
 38  
bread and butter of empirical science which cannot be solved based on statistic criteria 
alone; a theory and assumptions of the real world – external to the tested model – are 
needed (Töttö 2005: 130-131). 
 
We can, then, think of causality and causal analysis as the most important element on 
which both correspondence and evidence rest. In this sense, correspondence and 
evidence are strongly interconnected: because the search for causality is an actual 
activity, demanding empirical research, testing, etc., the two conditions of knowledge 
“grow” simultaneously. When a better mechanism is discovered, the better or stronger 
is correspondence. On the other hand, the more accurately we can show that there is a 
causal or correlational connection (a correspondence), the better we can devise 
mechanisms for this connection. Any empirical scientific field that wants to be taken 
seriously – where scientific claims exceed the trivial “what is, is” – must resort to causal 
analysis. Granted, the analysis can fail but the attempt must be made. Even in the 
human sciences we are more interested in the causes of the way we feel rather than just 
simply saying that we feel the way we feel. Especially in the human sciences there are 
attempts and claims in favour of rejection of causal analysis which not only grinds these 
fields to a halt but it still leaves them with the obligation to produce correspondence and 
evidence; even a so-called descriptive “science” must show that the claim of “what is, 
is” really is. I will end this chapter with a lengthier example of what kind of monster is 
created when causal analysis, and more generally the classical conditions of knowledge, 
i.e., the basic tenets of traditional science are dropped. The example comes from the 
“visionary” Marshall McLuhan (1994: 267): 
 
The telephone demands complete participation, unlike the written and printed page. Any literate 
man resents such a heavy demand for his total attention, because he has long been accustomed to 
fragmentary attention. On the other hand, our habit of visualising renders the literate Westerner 
helpless in the nonvisual world of advanced physics. Only the visceral and audile-tactile Teuton 
and Slav have the needed immunity to visualisation for work in the non-Euclidean math and 
quantum physics. Were we to teach our math and physics by telephone, even a highly literate 
and abstract Westerner could eventually compete with the European physicists. This fact does 
not interest the Bell Telephone research department, for like any other book-oriented group they 
are oblivious to the telephone as a  form, and study only the content aspect of wire service. As 
already mentioned, the Shanner [maybe a print error, but should be “Shannon”] and Weaver 
hypothesis about Information Theory, like the Morgenstern Game Theory, tends to ignore the 
function of the form as form. Thus both Information Theory and Game Theory have bogged 
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down into sterile banalities, but the psychic and social changes resulting from these forms have 
altered the whole of our lives. (brackets added) 
 
(The text would be probably more accurate if pronouns were replaced by references to 
self; that, for instance, “My habit of visualising renders the literate me helpless in the 
nonvisual world of advanced physics”.) 
 
 
2.3 Monism, reductionism, and determinism 
 
Raatikainen (2004: 11-12) separates monism into two categories: ontological and 
methodological. Both of these contain some amount of confusion. According to 
Raatikainen (ibid.: 11) the central question regarding the “sameness” or difference 
between natural and “human” sciences is the existence and nature of the research 
objects of these fields. He asks (ibid.) if 
 
human sciences have their own distinguished object. Are, for instance, social relations, societal 
structures, human culture, mental states and feelings, or meanings in themselves real, or can they 
be fully reduced to natural sciences (reductionism)? Positions that wish to deny the real 
existence the research objects like these of human sciences, and to reduce reality to how natural 
sciences see it, represent ontological monism. 
 
There are two problems that should be sorted out. Firstly, ontological monism doesn’t 
deny the existence of research objects of any fields. The mistake made is comparable to 
that of Routila’s (who wrote of ontologically different worlds, although he apparently 
only meant qualitative differences, or rather, emphasising that this object may have 
these interesting qualities while that object might have other interesting qualities.) 
When it comes to positivism, Comte, for instance, didn’t deny the variety of qualities of 
reality, he only denied that reality could be divided into two worlds, where one is law-
like (nature) and the other is not (culture) (Töttö 1997: 38-39). The same can be said of 
the Vienna Circle: whatever can be known, conforms to the basic conditions, that it is 
one way or another observable; that it is material in nature - whether one wants to 
research “the mind” or something else. Research objects of the non-natural sciences do 
not require ontological dualism or pluralism; they can have – and they do have – a 
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distinguished objects based on difference of interest, i.e., which qualities of an objects 
happen to be interesting. 
 
The second error that Raatikainen makes is the assumption that ontological monism 
leads to reductionism. It doesn’t, at least if by reductionism we mean an absolute 
version of it where, for example, human feelings are explained through subatomic 
particles. (Considering that Raatikainen wrote “...fully reduced to natural sciences”, I 
take it that he meant an absolute version of reductionism.) The ontological monism of 
Comte, for instance, presupposed only a partial reductionism where the different 
sciences form a continuum. Mill (1973: 37) wrote of Comte’s idea that 
 
the relation which really subsists between different kinds of phaenomena, enables the sciences to 
be arranged in such an order, that in travelling through them we do not pass out of the sphere of 
any laws, but merely take up additional ones at each step. ... that each science depends on the 
truths of all those which precede it, with the addition of peculiar truths of its own. 
 
If by reductionism we mean what Comte had in mind, then it would be quite difficult to 
deny its accuracy. We can summarise this line of thought in the words of Levitt (1999: 
20), who gives the following example: 
 
Zoologists, after all, study zebras, not the quarks and leptons of which zebras are presumably 
composed. The laws and regularities they observe are laws and regularities of zebra anatomy and 
behaviour, not laws of physics. No sane person would suggest that it should be otherwise. 
Nonetheless, I venture that there are few zoologists who won’t cheerfully concede that zebras 
are, in fact, constituted of quarks and leptons, and that their properties, including those of most 
interest to zoologists, are ultimately determined by what goes on at the quark-lepton level (or 
whatever level might turn out to be even more fundamental). 
 
While it would seem strange that there are academics who deny the “lower” level truths 
and make claims totally incompatible with them, it is, nonetheless, exactly what is 
happening. Granted, they are not to be found among zoologists, however, there seems to 
be an unlimited supply of them in the “human” sciences. Let’s take an example from 
feminism – for it is an extremely bountiful source of all that is done wrong in science, 
which doesn’t mean that other fields have anything to be happy about. Hartsock (1987: 
163) has written the following gem: “Thus, the fact that women and not men bear 
children is not (yet) a social choice, but that women and not men rear children in a 
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society structured by compulsory heterosexuality and male dominance is clearly a 
societal choice.” (Just a small observation here: where would we, as species, be if it 
wasn’t for heterosexuality? And if heterosexuality for us is – or at least was – a 
necessary prerequisite for existence (we are mammals, after all) then isn’t it only logical 
that society is structured by it?) I have no idea why universities shelter “scientist” who 
think that their claims can be in total contradiction with other (empirically well 
supported) sciences. Ultimately, of course, the conditions of knowledge decide who is 
justified in saying what and at this point the “hard” sciences have the supporting results 
and theories while the “soft” sciences do not – and never had, as far as “alternative” 
methodologies go. Then again, as long as nonsense will be academically supported and 
awarded, nonsense will continue to be produced, in the guise of feminism, 
postmodernism, or any other fashion trend. 
 
From ontological monism, then, follows methodological monism; if there is one reality 
with a certain set of underlying laws – which doesn’t mean that all of them are known – 
the methods, or the “logic” of science, must be essentially the same no matter what parts 
or qualities of the one reality are being studied. (Methodological monism really leads us 
back to Comte’s “method of science”, i.e., observation and reasoning which is, 
commendably, the “main method” even in Routila’s (1986: 20) approach of how to 
study art.) On the other hand, according to Raatikainen (2004: 12), it is possible to 
accept methodological monism while, at the same time, rejecting ontological monism; 
“to allow the real existence of the research objects of human sciences, but also to 
demand that they be approached as the natural sciences approaches their objects.” But 
this raises a difficult question, namely that why on earth should we have same 
methodology for ontologically different objects; why, despite a categorical difference, 
they should be approached the same way? Raatikainen (ibid.) talks of “similar goal” that 
is the unificatory element, although this doesn’t solve the difficulty in the least: there 
must be something same if “similar goal” – which I presume is the goal of knowing – is 
to be achieved. It simply doesn’t make sense to have one kind of monism without the 
other. The most intuitive, economic, straightforward, etc., similarity is the ontological 
one. But if this isn’t enough then, again, we can ask what results has been produced by 
monistic science compared to the alternative, and it must be concluded that “monistic” 
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science has been doing quite well, while the alternative has been producing at best only 
promises. 
 
Regarding determinism, the mistake – well, at least I think it’s a mistake – made in 
scientific discussions now, as well as in the past, is that it is an extreme position; that 
either it is 100 per cent or none whatsoever. Instead of what seems almost to be an 
ideologically heated discussion, an example of the approach of a working scientist 
might be the best solution: to take into consideration those aspects that obviously are 
deterministic and leave out those that aren’t or of which we have no knowledge. Of 
course, determinism in the sense of the zebra example above is total determinism, but 
the main question for a scientist is that of fit, not necessarily that of philosophical 
principle. Especially when we are dealing with causal explanation in science, the only 
thing required is that it actually works, whether or not the world is deterministic or 
some other “–istic” (Töttö 2005: 90). Reformulated differently: the question of 
determinism is an ontological question, while causal explanation is an epistemological 
issue (ibid.). Naturally, epistemological questions are not entirely autonomous from the 
ontological nature of the world, for instance, causal explanation works as long as the 
constitution of the world makes this possible. But once that level of “workability” has 
been reached, everything that goes on or might go on beyond that is unnecessary. 
 
If we necessarily want to problematise determinism, it should happen by mapping 
where it is to be found and/or to what degree and how it could help science – if at all. 
The problem can be separated into two levels. (This is just for conceptual clarity.) If we 
think of physical systems, where determinism is the equivalent to a time evolution of 
that system, then the underlying mechanism or principle is the following: once we know 
the position of points (of matter), their velocity, and the forces affecting those matter-
points, then we should be able to predict the future state of that system. This is an ideal 
case of a deterministic system. In reality we don’t really know with absolute precision 
the initial state of the system. And the more sensitive the system is to its initial state, the 
stronger will be the effect of the lack of precision on the possible future state. 
Furthermore, the more complex the system, the more difficult it will be to estimate the 
effect of the lack of precision. (Ruelle 1991.) One reason, then, not really against 
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determinism but against a strict philosophical stance regarding it, is that the necessary 
precision of measurements, etc., is beyond that of what we are capable. This doesn’t 
mean that every physical system is beyond our capability of prediction, only that some 
are. And the fact that some systems are predictable is evidenced by our everyday life: 
cars, for example, are possible to be manufactured and used only insofar as the system 
of manufacture and the workings of a car (as a system) are predictable.  
 
Some of Popper’s (1982: 4-11, 28) arguments against determinism can be summarised 
in the following way: 1) metaphysical notion of determinism doesn’t assert that the 
events “are known to anybody, or predictable by scientific means”; 2) the fact that we 
can ask why-questions does not depend on determinism but (same argument as Töttö 
made), rather, on the fact that satisfactory causal chain can be produced. Not only 
determinism requires the possibility of absolute precision – which Popper, like Ruelle, 
rules out – such precision, in causal explanations, is not even necessary. In fact, beyond 
certain point, precision doesn’t really add anything to explanatory power. This is one 
thing why Popper considers causality and determinism as separate things: the former is 
about fit and purpose which accommodates ± tolerances, while the latter is about 
absolute precision. Since the former works as it is, it cannot be the same as the latter; 3) 
the indeterminancy of human action (including the issue of free will) of which Popper 
(ibid.: 28) writes: 
 
If determinism is true, it should in principle be possible for a physicist or a physiologist who 
knows nothing of music to predict, by studying Mozart’s brain, the spots on the paper on which 
he will put down his pen. Beyond this, the physicist or physiologist should be able to anticipate 
Mozart’s action and write his symphony even before it is consciously conceived by Mozart. 
Analogous results would hold for mathematical discoveries, and all other additions to our 
knowledge. 
 
Empirically and intuitively speaking, we have no reason to believe that, in fact, it should 
be possible to “predict” the next invention before it is invented – even if it was possible 
to measure the mass-point with absolute precision. Popper’s Mozart example is not only 
intuitively acceptable, it can also be explained by the “law of conservation of 
information”, at least, as formulated by Medawar (1984: 79): “No process of logical 
reasoning – no mere act of mind or computer-programmable operation – can enlarge the 
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information content of the axioms and premises or observation statements from which it 
proceeds.” This simply means that we cannot “deduce” more information out what is 
already included in this or that information set. Yet determinism, in an absolute sense, 
demands precisely that. Compared to the positions and velocities of certain mass-points 
(and the forces affecting those), the creation of a symphony is an increase of 
information, impossible to predict based on purely physical data. But, most importantly, 
the creation of a symphony doesn’t require determinism in the same sense that causality 
doesn’t require determinism or other ontological commitments for it to work. The 
question of fit or purposefulness applies here as well: when interested in a physical 
system from the classical mechanics point of view – as the motion of physical objects – 
it makes sense to consider it as deterministic because it happens to work. In other cases 
determinism is a non-issue and to force philosophical discussion that direction would be 
detrimental to science – this is evidenced by the methodological debate between 
sciences where, say, the fields of the humanities claim they don’t need to conduct causal 
analyses because the human mind is not deterministic. 
 
We can conclude, then, few things. First, to say that there is one reality, or that the 
world is ontologically monistic, in no way contradicts the existence and fruitfulness of 
studying particular (limited) objects of that reality. In other words, the objects of, say, 
sociology or media studies are there and justified. What separates these objects is not 
ontological difference but, as Comte noted, our interest in certain aspects or qualities of 
certain objects. For instance, both chemistry and sociology can study human beings; the 
former is interested in the chemical constitution of people while the latter studies how 
those “combinations of matter” actually act. Second, although we can think of sociology 
– at least in this case – as a “higher” order analysis, it cannot contradict what goes on at, 
say, the chemical level (or even more constitutive level). Applied to reductionism, this 
means that research objects at least partly can be “reduced” to lower level phenomena. 
Third, the question of reductionism (or determinism) in science is that of fit and 
purpose, not a philosophical standpoint; i.e., that if there are good reasons to think that 
some phenomenon is reducible to or can be explained by a lower level phenomenon (or 
elements) – when, for example, some human behaviour can be explained through 
biological factors – then it simply makes sense to direct research that way – it would be 
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totally antiscientific to discourage that kind of endeavour just because it could endanger 
our philosophical stance. Fourth, determinism, as the enabling or disabling element of 
science, is a straw man argument. Scientific explanation, causal analysis, etc., goes on 
quite happily without any need whatsoever to first establish whether the world is 
deterministic or not. It is like saying: “Before we can do science, we must establish 
whether or not Bob’s car is green”, and this is nonsense. Fifth, what really matters is 
that this or that activity works. If it is in-line with some philosophical notion then all the 
better, but if these two contradict each other then that what works must win. Traditional 
science does have the results and they do happen to support its philosophical thoughts – 
determinism, however, is not one of them – while alternative claims have nothing 
except for those claims themselves. Sixth, if it is reasonable to think that there is one 
reality (it certainly is intuitive to think so) and if certain requirements can be shown to 
be universal, like causality, the need for evidence, correspondence – again, there can be 
“philosophical” differences of opinion, although, they are trumped by the actual work of 
real scientists and, yet again, by the results – then it makes sense to assume that 
methodology will also be monistic. However, methodological monism should not be 
confused with one highly particular and concrete method, it is about the basic “logic” of 
science. 
 
 
2.4 Craftsmanship 
 
This topic is not necessarily more important than any other significant element of 
science, however, it is – I think – grossly overlooked, not only in science but in other 
spheres of life as well. We have come a long way from the times when the results of 
one’s work were the source of pride for the craftsman. It was dishonourable to do “a bad 
job”. Today “a bad job” or lack of quality is “normal”. Not only is this tolerated more 
and more, the ability to even recognise quality – in those rare cases where it still exists – 
seems to have all but disappeared. To think that higher levels of learning would be safe 
from this general deterioration of standards is highly naive. Not only higher levels of 
learning can become affected, they have already. We have people like Chomsky (1976, 
5th Ch.) essentially saying that university has basically become a sausage-factory – and 
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producing mediocre sausages at that – or Lakatos’ (1980: 216, 1. fn.) remark that during 
Newton’s time less than stellar manuscripts were put aside to “wastepaper-baskets” 
where they awaited for further work, yet in today’s publication frenzy the function of 
these baskets is taken over by scientific journals. Levitt (1999: 44) refers to this as “the 
abandonment of intellectual craftsmanship”. 
 
Although it is contestable to what extent it is true, I, nonetheless, think that Riesman’s 
et al. (1961) concept of inner-directed vs. other-directed person, or rather, the change 
from the former to modern day’s latter, is quite fitting. Strongly simplified, the former is 
a highly individualistic person, striving for technical excellence (whether in art, science, 
in everything one does). Whereas the latter is a “peoples-oriented” person, whose 
actions are guided, to a large extent, by group approval; that it is not the content of the 
actions, products, etc., that are decisive; worth is decided by what others think. Riesman 
et al. also refer to this change in character – and societal structuring – as the change 
from the invisible hand (of the market) to the glad hand of modernity’s entanglement of 
work and pleasure. Instead of personal effort, dedication, and, simply put, personal 
sacrifice, the other-directed person, above all, expects things to be “fun”. (Ibid.) This  
“fun” mind-set manifests itself with the countless variations of “You can do it!” 
attitude. It’s not that “You cannot do it!” (although frequently this is the case), it is 
rather that a slogan of positive support misses the other half of the full expression: “You 
can do it if you have the talent and are prepared to work hard!” Confusion like this can 
be found, among others, in Eskola (1966: 325-330) who, on the one hand writes that 
being a scientist is basically just a profession that deals with facts, i.e., that the 
traditionally expected exceptionality of the person who becomes a scientist is highly 
exaggerated, but, on the other hand, continues to list certain qualities (creativity among 
others) that seem to be typical of a scientist and which diverge from other “professions”. 
He essentially writes, then, that a scientist is really “just a regular guy” (or guyette) who 
just happens to have such personal qualities that are considerably different from the 
other regular guys of the society – not really different but different after all.  
 
It really isn’t the case that anyone (or everyone) can be a good scientist (and not merely 
employed as one), or a great artist for that matter. (Nor do we even need that many, 
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which is the total opposite of the higher educational policy of Finland, for example, 
which seeks to “produce” researchers by the metric tons, even if such a “scientific 
greenhorn” is manufactured only to decorate the unemployment figures.) In music, for 
instance, there was only one Mozart or Beethoven, and for a very good reason: they 
were simply miles ahead in talent and competency than the rest of the population. But it 
was not only talent; all these greats (exceptional scientists included) put hard work into 
their particular disciplines. Niccolo Paganini was forced to practice for hours and hours 
by his despotic father and, although, we can (and should) disagree with the morality of 
such an action, it would be difficult to claim that Niccolo would have become what he 
was without such strict work. Then again, these examples are from a time when real 
virtuosity and genius were strived for; as opposed to present day’s celebration of 
ignorance and diluted dilettantism. A less than a flattering account of the “mood of the 
times”, of the sphere of academia, is given by Levitt (1999: 44): 
 
First of all, there is the current claim, widely echoed in literature departments, the Modern 
Language Association, and so forth, that literature criticism, once a dilettantish, impressionistic, 
low-key enterprise, has been transformed by the advent of what postmodernists are pleased to 
call “theory” into a deeply serious discipline, fraught with rigor, intellectual density, and 
philosophical complexity. The claim rests on the fallacy that verbal clutter and the interminable 
jangle of empty neologisms signify intellectual exactitude and authentic insight. My own 
experience in wading through this stuff is not extensive, but I have scrutinized enough examples 
to verify that this is a world where raw nonsense is more often rewarded than punished, provided 
it be presented in sufficiently jargonistic form. Praise, prestige, and perquisites have been 
lavished on the creators of work that, when examined coldly, dissolves into a slurry of errors and 
confusion. As it turns out, what has been widely touted as scintillating intellectual fireworks 
consists largely of damp, pathetic squibs. This is evidence not of resurrected virtuosity in 
thought and argument but of its dismal opposite.  
 
The result of all of this is that, on the one hand, people who have zero competency to 
write about certain topic choose to do so anyway, and with the claims of authority for 
that matter. Levitt (ibid.: 45) continues that “these days academics have discovered that 
significant brownie points can be had by writing tomes on quantum mechanics  and 
chaos theory (for instance), despite having less grasp of those matters than a freshman 
physics major.” And it’s not that people without formal credentials should be barred 
from writing about this or that topic; stating opinions, for example, should be possible 
to anyone, regardless of “competence”. But the products of human sciences are not 
intended as opinions – or even more fittingly, literature in general – they are intended as 
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products of “science”, as something more than literature; something more credible. But 
not only is most or even all credibility missing, it simply cannot be present or even 
aimed at. Whether we call the modus operandi of the human sciences (though found 
also in philosophy) as relativist, post-modernist, qualitative, etc., it clearly is against all 
the aspects and requirements that make science what it is and what it has been the last 
three hundred years or so. 
 
No wonder, then, that humanists frequently end up writing nonsense when the field(s) is 
ripe with ideas of science like Ang’s (1996), for example, who not only attacks 
positivism with straw-man, or other completely baseless arguments; she is even 
unhappy about qualitative approaches if or when they aspire to produce legitimate (read: 
scientific) results. Apparently this is a big no-no and, instead, science – qualitative kind, 
that is, since positivism is by definition some kind of horrible monster – should be about 
politics rather than facts or truth (ibid.: 2nd Ch.). Of course, this approach is nothing 
more than a plea for the right to produce nonsense under the heading of science as long 
as one remembers to include the disclaimer like Ang (ibid., p. 21) did, namely, by 
saying that “much of what I am to say will not be more than (theoretically informed) 
speculation, which will need further refinement.” 
 
Ang is not alone in this “not only anything goes, everything is acceptable” approach. 
Pietilä (1996: 13) in his interpretation of television news writes that he has proceeded 
along the lines of literature research where the aim is to uncover “the message that is not 
visible to the eye”. He continues (ibid.: 15) that this kind of interpretation has 
traditionally been treated with suspicion and that “it is true that it would be a miracle if 
two researchers would reach the same interpretation.” In this kind of research, then, 
there can be no discussion about correspondence, and the question of reliability will 
remain that, a question. At least these scholars are upfront about the fact that their works 
don’t need to be taken seriously. No wonder, then, that equipped with this kind of 
attitude, one can write truly anything, like referring to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem 
à la Jameson (1991: xi-xii) like this: 
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Whether, as with Gödel’s proof, one can demonstrate the logical impossibility of any internally 
self-coherent theory of the postmodern – an antifoundationalism that really eschews all 
foundation altogether, a nonessentialism without the last shred of an essence in it – is a 
speculative question 
 
First of all, I am only guessing that Jameson is referring to Gödel’s incompletness 
theorem; it isn’t clear what is being referred to by the term “proof”, nor do I have the 
slightest idea what Jameson actually means in general – perhaps I am just simply 
missing that which is invisible to the eye. 
 
A progress was made by the recognition that there are no absolutes in science; after all 
the history of science is the proof of this. We simply cannot know beforehand how long 
the results of science will last. Some are changing, some have changed recently, but it 
should not be forgotten that some have remained the same for a long time and it would 
be difficult to even imagine that we have had it wrong all this time. It has been a healthy 
and self-critical sign to acknowledge that it is not only this or that method through 
which we can reach the ultimate truths; that chance (or luck) plays a vital role (see, for 
instance, Beveridge 1980: 18-20; Medawar 1984: 49-51). But as both Beveridge and 
Medawar point out, chance (or luck) happen only to those that have made themselves 
“discovery prone”. This means, and on the contrary to what some or many humanists 
may believe, that having zero idea about a topic while making strong claims about it or 
gathering material without knowing what to gather in the first place, is not what counts 
as making oneself “discovery prone”. Nor is the grounded theory approach, in the strict 
sense, any better, for if the mind is purged from the effects of any previous theory (the 
mind turned into tabula rasa so to speak), then how is the researcher supposed to even 
recognise a (favourable) chance event. 
 
Craftsmanship is where everything what makes scientist a scientist comes together. It is 
the realisation that there are limits to knowing, yet it doesn’t become its total opposite; 
that of finding refuge in the safety (both from the intellectual and radical point of view) 
of the human sciences, where the correctly formulated, and quite meaningless, jargon is 
the cheap way out. Likewise it is not radicalism at all. For instance, academic feminism 
with charges of androcentrism, oppression by only white male’s, etc., are really quite 
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harmless, I mean to those who utter them. The society tolerates and has tolerated (some 
even celebrate it) for quite some time now. Radicalism is something where the one 
being radical risks of losing everything, life included. The academic feminist or 
postmodernist doesn’t really risk anything. On the contrary, he or she is even rewarded 
by “research” positions and professorships. In this present age, it is actually the 
traditional scientist who is being a radical. A craftsman strives for what is right 
(methodologically speaking) and not what is fashionable, or politically correct. 
Although a craftsman knows the limits to knowing, he realises nonetheless that knowing 
is possible and that there are certain conditions that have to be met – there are no 
alternatives. He is also consistent; for instance, a question or a claim of causality is 
followed by an attempted causal analysis, not by some obscurantist nonsense. And as 
was mention earlier, though human sciences are not completely void of being scientific 
(really good work is being done there), it is, however, above all in those fields, that not 
only nonsense is tolerated, it is even supported – future charlatanism is reproduced by 
the present one. 
 
 
2.5 An extremely short overview of postmodernism and its faults 
 
Because this is a highly abused and ambiguous concept, it is difficult to say what is the 
“core” of it. Therefore, the aspects or approaches that I will mention can be accused of 
being “handpicked”. Nevertheless, their inclusion will hopefully clarify certain “ideas” 
that are present in “postmodern” discussion. Bignell (2000: 3, 5-6) offers three 
dimensions to the question “What is postmodernity?”: it is, firstly, a term that denotes a 
historical continuation with separable segments; secondly, it is a contrasting point to the 
modern (a comparative aspect); thirdly, 
 
it is a loose set of ideas critiquing Enlightenment reason, and having a Neitzchean flavour, 
combining Nietzsche's questioning of the categories of thought and of the status of theory itself, 
with a legacy of Marxian political engagement that stresses the relationship between cultural 
activity (or the lack of it) and politico-economic power structures.   
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Bignell also makes the reference to Lyotard’s “grand narratives” which can be 
categorised as the opposition to the modern. Although this tells us very little, there is 
nonetheless a “hint” that can propel us further in the methodological direction. The hint 
is, of course, the critique of Enlightenment reason, i.e., truth, materialist philosophy, 
and the scientific knowledge as the highest or most reliable form of knowledge. A 
following summary of the critique is given by Ronkainen (1998: 237, 239-240): 
 
Postmodern thinking and critique of knowledge break two central assumptions of modern 
epistemology. Firstly, the realist assumption of knowledge is abandoned. No-one and nothing 
has the possibility to present statements that represent reality because there is no reality that is 
separable from its representation. Statements of reality do not describe it, they constitute it. At 
the same time truth-statements in general also become impossible, as well as the idea that 
scientifically gathered knowledge could better reach the truth about reality than knowledge 
acquired in some other way. To speak of knowledge means to speak inside a particular 
discourse, renewing and legitimising it. Scientific knowledge is but one possible local discourse 
about truth and reality. … Survey research is a form of practice which constructs reality. The 
way the data is gathered and the accepted conduct of analysis condition what can be asked… 
Postmodern critique prefers to examine knowledge as rhetoric or a discursive construct rather 
than knowledge of reality. 
 
We can pick two main themes from this: 1) relativism and 2) linguistic (social) 
constructivism. We can dispose of the previous right away by, firstly, mentioning that it 
is an age-old issue traceable to Greek philosophy (not to all philosophers but to some) 
and, hence, there is nothing “postmodern” about it; secondly, we dismiss it by asking 
“Whether or not it is so, what particular effects it has or it should have on the actual 
conduct of science?” This is the main thing, after all, it is science we are interested in. 
Two possibilities emerge: a) science continues along merrily as it has done so far with 
all of its concepts of truth, knowledge etc. as legitimate courses of inquiry – this, by the 
way, seems to be Lyotard’s (1985) view, after all, according to him “it is not obsolete to 
ask what is true or just; what is obsolete is to present science as positivistic and to 
condemn it as illegitimate knowledge, half-knowledge as the German idealists did” 
(ibid.: 86); b) we deny that science was ever possible, is, or will be, and, as a result, stop 
doing it altogether – maybe settle somewhere in the mountains and begin writing 
poetry. Sane people choose the previous (despite any potential difficulty contained in it) 
while, well, I am not sure at all that even the “postmodernist” themselves are choosing 
the latter, despite all the talk. 
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We can, rather easily, define relativism of the “postmodern” science as epistemological 
scepticism. It denies, according to Lammenranta (1993: 14), 
 
the possibility of “knowledge, justified beliefs, or some other knowledge-attitude about 
something. Scepticism of this kind can be local (concerning particular thing(s)) or global. If a 
weak form of global scepticism means the denial of absolute guarantees of truth, we call it 
fallibilism. It says that all believes can be erroneous, not that knowledge and justified beliefs are 
categorically impossible. 
  
It seems that when some of the postmodernist are denying the basic premises of science, 
they are, in fact, talking about fallibilism – again, not a particularly postmodern 
invention – which, if this would be the case, is being and has been recognised in even 
such abominations of science as positivism. For instance Neurath (1997: 98) writes: 
 
The process of change of the sciences consists of the fact that at some particular time, certain 
sentences [but we could, in the postmodern sense, even use the term “discourses”] are often 
erased and substituted with other. Sometimes the form remains the same while the definition 
changes. Every law and every physicalist statement, in unified science or its real sciences, can be 
subject to this kind of change. The same holds true even for every protocol-sentence [which can 
also be understood as atomic-statement]. (brackets added) 
 
This merely says, and it is difficult not to believe it, that there are no a priori guarantees 
of truth. On the other hand, if some of the postmodernists would actually be referring to 
the strong version of global (epistemological) scepticism, it would lead to impossibility 
of any form of science or even its critique because, if such a case is justified, the glasses 
used by both scientists and postmodernists would work only randomly, not any better 
than, say, stone pebbles. But not only glasses work every time, they work because the 
science of optics works to the extent that we are justified to refer to its results as being 
true. In a world where every “narrative” is equal, i.e., if nothing was true or, at least, 
truer, it wouldn’t make any sense to go to the doctor. After all, in a postmodernist 
conception of the world the science of medicine and self-medication by eating only 
cookies should produce equally valid a remedy. If a postmodernist was truly practising 
what he preaches, the only reason he would go to the doctor should be random, for 
example, based on a coin toss. However, I suspect that the connection between a 
postmodernist’s visit to a doctor and a real or perceived decline in health is closer to 
certainty than being random. And is it faith that compels us to go to the doctors, or is 
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there something more to it? Certainly the element of faith cannot be excluded but this 
wouldn’t explain the results of medicine which, after all, give much higher level of 
confidence than faith alone. And, the only reason the results are there – despite a 
healthy dose of charlatanism going on in medicine – is that they work by being true or 
truer than others. Transportation is another example. If what postmodernists say is true, 
it simply wouldn’t make any sense to use a car or a train, for instance, since a 
broomstick should produce equal transportative potential. We should see 
postmodernists fly to work on a broomstick, or why not even on a carpet, rather than 
using a bicycle. But we don’t. Why is it that some of the equal discourses of 
transportation are to be found only in fairy tales and some others have been actually put 
to use? A hint: the answer doesn’t lie in Foucaultian powerstruggle over discourse 
dominance. 
 
The fact that bicycles, cars, and trains work is that there is sufficient body of scientific 
knowledge underlying these modern day conveniences. Although Newtonian mechanics 
cannot explain everything – from large objects to subatomic particles - it is adequate 
now and will remain so in the future for the purpose it is being used. Certainly it 
explains better and gives working knowledge for transportational needs than, say, One 
Thousand and One Nights with its flying carpets. Considering that the postmodernist 
hardliners do, with a high probability, go to the doctor, use mechanised transportation, 
and read with the help of glasses, they must believe that something is not 100% relative, 
that something can be true and that we can have knowledge of this; that there is a very 
good reason to connect an expected functionality (theory) with empirical events such 
that they correspond and thus give us justification to call that relation as “being true”. 
 
Since there really are no hardcore postmodernists (relativists or skeptics) in the wild – 
personal claims of being one don’t count if the person’s concrete and empirical actions 
speak differently – and since they have not committed themselves to writing poetry, it 
must be concluded that they 1) conduct some kind of “research” which can only happen 
if 2) certain kind of unchanging and objective reality (in the sense that we can have 
knowledge about it) is assumed. I call this approach to science “the fake way” – and it 
can be considered as the c option. This “fake way” of doing things is a combination of 
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options a and b, i.e., doing science as before and not doing science at all, only with a 
twist. This twist can be found in the following sentence: “Postmodern critique prefers to 
examine knowledge as rhetoric or a discursive construct rather than knowledge of 
reality.” So, the postmodernists – of course, not all of them – begin by denying the 
possibility of doing science (b); but reality, truth and knowledge are not really 
abandoned, for to claim how “statements constitute reality” implies, rather strongly, that 
there is a reality (created by god, nature, speech, postmodernists themselves, etc.), that it 
is true how this reality is created, and that through examining this process of creation 
(the discourse), we can have knowledge about it; what actually then happens, is that the 
traditional conception of science (a), is “sneaked” back into the “postmodern” 
conception while hoping that no-one will notice; the result, then, is the third way of 
doing science (c) which, after the dust has settled, is really science as before – at least at 
the level of basic assumptions – with only one change, or more rightly, one limitation: 
where traditional science sets no bounds on what can be researched (impossibilities like 
“the world spirit” don’t count) , postmodernism wants to, so it seems, limit research 
only to discourse, speech, or language, hence the term “linguistic” shift. 
 
Of course, I am not the first one to notice this. The same or similar problem was 
observed already (in ancient Greece) by, at least, Plato and, in contemporary Finnish 
methodology discussion, by Töttö, who deals with this issue quite extensively. Both 
offer the same counter argument(s) that I formulated previously, namely, that by 
denying truth you assume that this is the true state of things (Plato); and that “if you 
claim that objectivity is but a mere illusion, does this mean that your belief is just a 
subjective opinion that doesn’t need to be taken seriously?” (Töttö 1997: 37). This is 
really a case of “talking about new things while really discussing the old” and is 
subsumable under the more general methodological discussion, the basic (socially 
constructed) dichotomies of quantitative vs. qualitative or positivism vs. hermeneutics. 
 
It seems, then, that the issue of postmodern science revolves around the same division 
between the two worlds, which was present in the 100-year-old German philosophical 
discussion, i.e., that “we explain nature” and “we understand people”. It further seems 
that it is possible to locate a basic divide inside postmodernism on this issue. I am afraid 
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that none of them are really new or unique. Firstly, there is the camp – I suspect that this 
is the “mainstream” – that has sworn allegiance to this dichotomous worldview. 
Whether we are dealing with the “general malaise” or “moody attitude”, for instance, as 
a form of art criticism inside the humanities, or the “quali-people” emphasising “rich 
thick descriptions” of personal narratives gathered, without the contaminating positivist 
thinking, we are dealing with the believers of the basic dichotomy. The second camp 
adopts an opposite view: that this separation is ill-founded. However, we can see that, as 
a scientific attitude, this has been done already by the positivists, whether we are talking 
about Comte or the later Vienna Circle.  
 
This second way, then, is the rejection that it is possible to separate the two worlds now 
or that it ever was before. I think that we can count Lyotard as belonging to this 
category. (I say “can” because Lyotard, as a true French intellectual, writes in a highly 
confusing manner. From the combination of the lost of legitimacy, Brownian motion, 
and derivative functions, it is sometimes difficult to extract what is actually meant.) 
Husa (1997: 56) writes, drawing on Latour, that “the central idea of modernity’s 
foundation is the separation of nature and society [culture] so that the only possible 
entity classes are human and non-human” (brackets added). Now, when Husa or even 
Latour write about modernity, they are, in fact, writing about the Enlightenment. When 
Lyotard, then, speaks of Enlightenment as a narrative that has lost its legitimacy, it must 
be interpreted that Lyotard is also rejecting the accompanying concept of the two 
worlds. The way Latour dismisses the division, according to Husa (ibid.: 55), is through 
the recognition of “hybrids”, entities that are no more purely human than they are non-
human. Latour (2006: 13-14) gives some examples of these hybrids: these are, among 
other, “the ominous growth of the ozone hole”, “the accusation of Monsanto’s and 
Atomchem’s CEOs from committing crimes against the humanity”, “the right to keep 
frozen human embryos”, etc. It is the entanglement of politics with science (or vice 
versa) that makes these examples “hybrids” (ibid.). This line of thought is a 
continuation on his previous work(s), most notably Laboratory Life which he co-
authored with Woolgar. In that work, the dysfunctionality of the division is already 
explicitly formulated. According to Latour & Woolgar (1986: 281), the term “social” 
(as in social construction) 
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no longer has any meaning. "Social" retained meaning when used by Mertonians to define a 
realm of study which excluded consideration of "scientific" content. It also had meaning in the 
Edinburgh school's attempts to explain the technical content of science (by contrast with 
internalist explanations of technical content). In all such uses, "social" was primarily a term of 
antagonism, one part of a binary opposition. But how useful is it once we accept that all 
interactions are social? What does the term "social" convey when it refers equally to a pen's 
inscription on graph paper, to the construction of a text and to the gradual elaboration of an 
amino-acid chain? Not a lot. By demonstrating its pervasive applicability, the social study of 
science has rendered "social" devoid of any meaning… 
  
According to Husa (1997: 58) Latour “doesn’t accept the semiotic or linguistic attempt 
to solve the basic problems of modernity” because these attempts end up renewing the 
basic dichotomy that is or was the result of modernity (Enlightenment). The basic 
classes of human and non-human are, then, idealised extremes of the same continuum. 
Husa (ibid.: 59) continues – still referring to Latour – that explanations of nature and 
society must rest on the same ontological assumptions. How does this differ from 
“traditional science” or from positivism, if at all? If we are talking about the basic 
ontology, then there is no difference. 
  
We can, thus, see that unification between the two worlds, or, say, the denial that there 
ever was a separation in the first place, predates similar thoughts presented as part of 
postmodernism (at least if compared to Latour and Lyotard). And now, we should ask, 
what implications postmodernism, in any form, might have for science. The line of 
thought that subscribes to the view of strong global scepticism (relativism) makes 
science, in any form, impossible. This counterproductive approach can be scratched 
because, obviously, science has been possible, it is being carried out now, and it has 
given us reliable knowledge. The second approach, i.e., the “fake way” where all the 
denied premises are nonetheless “sneaked” back in, and which is after all only about 
directing attention at certain part of reality, can be scratched as well. Because it is 
internally confused about even the basic premises, whether methodological or 
ontological, it cannot serve as a reasonable guide for conducting science. Those that 
support “unified ontology” end up repeating, as new perhaps, the same principles that 
have already guided “traditional” science. Husa (1997: 57) writes that this new situation 
can be solved by adding a reflective dimension to (natural) science(s). Anyone can 
decide for themselves whether even this “new” reflective dimension is really that new. 
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To evaluate what postmodernism might mean – a little bit more concretely – or how it 
can impact the field of media studies, we need to partly start from the beginning, i.e., 
what is postmodernism. In addition to Bignell’s rather meaningless categorisation we 
can add Jensen’s (2002) views on how he sees the central elements of postmodernism. 
According to him (ibid.: 33) the term postmodernism was originally “introduced into 
literary and cultural research to refer to an antimodernist style in various arts.” Although 
it can be found in literature, “it has been particularly associated with architecture” 
(ibid.). Postmodernism as a stylistic difference – a real one, of course, and not imagined 
– poses no principal problem; not for media studies, nor for science as such. A study of 
styles in art is actually exactly what Routila’s book is about, i.e., how to study art, of 
which stylistic aspects form the most important issue. Scientifically it follows the basic 
logic of “observation and reasoning” in the sense that if or when claims about a distinct 
style are being made, there simply must be a correspondence between the two (claims 
and a style in the real world). Claims of a distinct style are, in principle, the same as, for 
instance, the claim that the moon is made of cheese: whether it is or it isn’t must be 
decided empirically, armchair philosophising is no substitute here. 
 
The two other elements of postmodernism, mentioned by Jensen (ibid.), are comparable 
to what already has been mentioned: that is, the so called crisis of Enlightenment with 
its loss of “grand narrative” and the stance that (scientific) knowledge is impossible. 
The former is or can be considered as having two dimensions, sceptical and moral. To 
deny the possibility or reason, rationality, or rational science is the sceptical stance, one 
that, hopefully, I have managed to show as totally baseless. (After all, making an error 
doesn’t equate, logically and/or empirically, that only erring is possible.) This sceptical 
part affects science insofar as the claim of no possibility of knowledge is applied to 
research which is, at its core, quite paradoxical: something is researched without really 
being able to know anything through this research, or otherwise. 
 
Moral overtones of the modern/postmodern discussion are visible when the questions of 
ought, should, could, etc., are being discussed. In this sense, the dimension of morality 
is not particular to postmodernism only, the object of discussion is that of the promises 
of Enlightenment, whether or not it has succeeded, and where are we heading or should 
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be heading. Habermas (1984, 1989) defends “the project of Enlightenment” in the sense 
that, first of all, it is not yet over and, secondly, the rationality promised by 
Enlightenment can still be, in principal, achieved. For science in general and media 
studies in particular, the moral question of “ought this or that be done...” is beyond their 
reach. As Hume argued, we cannot infer how things ought to be from what they are 
now; science (of any kind) cannot give solutions to moral questions. 
 
However, even this moral part of the postmodern discussion contains a part that is more 
or less scientific, and particularly central to both sociology and media studies: that is, 
the historical evolution of society regarding rationality. To the extent, then, that tracing 
this evolution is basically a fact based research, it will be compatible with scientific 
principles. (We can, for example, agree or disagree about the morality of witch-hunts, 
but insofar as they happened, is an empirical question answerable by empirical science.) 
So, for instance, Habermas (2004) traces the evolution from the old monarchy to the 
present (unfinished) modernity in three phases: 1) during monarchy private was public 
and public was private. This meant that the private life of the monarch was transformed 
into a public spectacle, while the real issues concerning the country were dealt behind 
closed doors and out of the reach of those it affected; 2) Enlightenment brought a 
change to this, private became private and public was opened to the discussing public – 
in principle that is. This change was never completed though because 3) during 
modernity, the spheres were again turned to resemble the situation of the old monarchy. 
Only this time, the responsible forces are commercialisation, mass culture, and 
basically, more or less, what the critical theory calls “culture industry”. Or as Curran 
(2002: 34) puts it: “the new mass media encouraged consumer apathy, presented politics 
as a spectacle and provided pre-packaged, convenience thought. The media, in short, 
managed the public rather than expressed the public will.” In The Theory of 
Communicative Action, Habermas (1984, 1989) can be seen as continuing on the same 
topic, for the idea of extending rationality (a promise of Enlightenment) to all spheres of 
life – and not only a particular version found in the systems of economics and law 
which force their “ways” onto the “lifeworld” (or habitus in a more Bourdieuan sense) – 
is the old idea of “enlighted” public discussing rationally about public matters. 
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According to Jensen (2002: 33-34) scepticism finds its theoretical foundation in the 
third element of postmodernism, “poststructuralism” or “deconstruction”: 
 
The analytical strategy is to expose internal contradictions in texts and to undermine their 
apparent intentions. The theoretical premise is that no textual meaning is stable, nor is any 
genuine human insight into oneself or others a possibility. ...the poststructuralist agenda is an 
emphatic scepticism and relativism. The aim is not merely to show that knowledge is uncertain 
... knowledge as traditionally understood is said to be literally impossible. 
 
At the risk of excess repetition, this theoretical part of postmodernism is a simple 
impossibility. It, like the denialist stance on the possibility of reason, are in the same 
way paradoxical at the core of their arguments and approaches. It is the same difficulty 
that was countered by Plato, i.e., that when one denies truth, one happens to assert “it is 
true that there is no truth”. How can it be possible to research texts and undermine their 
“apparent intentions” if we can have no knowledge of basically anything? Likewise, if 
no textual meaning is stable – or let’s say, stable enough – then there is simply no 
meaning to be found and all attempts must end in futility. But if there is no meaning 
then communication would be impossible, yet we seem to understand each other 
reasonably well which means that the postmodernist denial of everything must be 
wrong. In fact, the only unstable meaning is to be found in the texts produced by the 
scholars who continue to insist that the theoretical mess that is postmodernism is 
somehow correct. It is ironical that instead of “the world”, it is the academic jargon that 
has become meaningless. But as has already been mentioned, any kind of science based 
on strict postmodern thinking would be impossible. Some or many scholars in the 
human sciences, rather than fully admitting this, have taken the dishonourable way out 
of this difficulty by “sneaking” elements of traditional science back into “postmodernist 
research”. Unfortunately in media studies, as well as other human sciences, this attitude 
can go on unsanctioned – and it does. 
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2.6 Feminism 
 
Feminism is, in many respects, equally problematic a concept as is postmodernism. But 
as there is a certain core to postmodern “thinking”, the same can be said about 
feminism: under the many variations of feminism lurk identical principles. To the extent 
that this is not the case, it ceases to make sense to speak about feminism as something 
distinct. For instance, it makes no sense to speak of feminism, as an academic field at 
least, if the only thing that is supposed to make it different is that women are being 
studied; if we study the physiology of women it will still be “regular” medicine, or if we 
are interested in women’s role in society, then it will be the same sociology, 
psychology, and the like., as always before. Made by a woman about women is not 
feminism. There is, additionally, a strong overlap between postmodernism and 
feminism, in their structuralist, contructivist, etc., orientations which result in the same 
things: denying reason and truth, support of total relativity, pushing ideology in the 
disguise of science, and, ultimately, leading to nonsensical claims. 
 
We can find the answer to “What is feminism?” from Niemelä & Tammisalo (2006: 10-
11), according to whom, feminism, at its core, is based on political and utopian 
ideologies fulfilling all the features of pseudoscience. Although their work is highly 
critical of feminism, the issues they have raised are not only difficult to counter, it 
would be impossible to do so. Instead of supplying the arguments with facts, 
objectivity, and other good scientific practices, feminism finds the power of legitimacy 
in moralising: once oppressed people must be from hereafter not only heard, they are 
necessarily right, in whatever they do or say (ibid.: 16). (This is where, from the outset, 
feminism collapses: it succumbs to the Humean ought-to impossibility, only in reverse. 
If Hume wrote that it is impossible to infer what ought to be from what is, the feminists 
are essentially trying to infer what is from what ought to be. One has to wonder, why 
such a disaster is cultivated in the echelons of academia.) 
 
They continue that feminism is based on four pillars or main strategies (ibid.: 19–22): 1) 
full denial which simply “sweeps under the rug the patriarchal culture and science 
created by white heterosexual Western male, and substitutes it with brave new woman-
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science”; 2) word magic which is based on the belief that we can make disappear or 
solve difficult phenomena by simply renaming them. The authors give as an example 
the concept of socially constructed gender which is supposed to replace the biological 
concept of sex and, thus, solve the problems that biological factors might have on our 
behaviour, society, and so on. An obscurantist postmodern conceptual system is created 
which, should the need arise, can always be substituted with something equally 
obscurantist; 3) ideological control which aims at securing special privileges and 
treatments for “once oppressed people”. It not only demands that feminist work is 
accepted by simply being feminist, but to achieve the aims various “dirty” manoeuvres 
are used, such as ad-hominem attacks, indoctrination, making threats, and 
discrimination; 4) bio-denial is to fully ignore all biological knowledge which results in 
the claim that behaviour and sex-differences of people are completely “socially 
constructed”. To change those, one only needs to create other constructs (changing 
social conditions). But there is a fifth strategy that should be included – which isn’t 
explicitly listed by the authors, though it is pointed out on many occasions – and that is 
the “women’s way of knowing”. As if, for instance, the classical conditions of 
knowledge work differently depending on what sex the “knower” might be. I suppose 
that since white males have formulated these classical conditions, women must have 
some other set of conditions. So far, unfortunately, no alternative set has been created – 
at least not one that wouldn’t collapse due to its own impossibility. 
 
Similar praise of feminism is to be found in Gross & Levitt (1994: 5th Ch.). The articles 
and books they analysed are equally nauseating, so any example of the articles will give 
a good idea why Gross & Levitt have such warm feelings for feminism. One would 
think that, for instance, the world of numbers is as neutral as anything can be. But, 
apparently, it isn’t, at least according to an article, “Toward a feminist algebra” by Mary 
Ann Campbell and Randall K. Campbell-Wright. (This was the first of the more 
thorough analyses conducted by Gross & Levitt.) According to the authors (ibid.: 113): 
 
What passes for the idea behind this piece is that women and other disempowered groups are 
discouraged in the study of mathematics because most of the concrete problems they encounter – 
“word problems” or “narrative problems” of the “if-a-man-and-a-half-makes-a-dollar-and-a-half-
in-a-day-and-a-half” variety – refer to situations that are sexist, racist, class-bound stereotypes. 
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...[Campbell & Campbell-Wright] disapprove of a particular problem in which a girl and her 
boyfriend run toward each other (even though the girl’s slower speed is carefully explained by 
the fact that she is carrying luggage) because it portrays a heterosexual involvement. [Campbell 
& Campbell-Wright] object to a problem about a contractor and the contractor’s workers (sex 
undeclared), because they assume that the student will envision the workers as male. On the 
other hand, they offer for our approval a problem about Sue and Debbie, “a couple financing 
their $70,000 home.” Their general maxims call for problems “presenting female heroes and 
breaking gender stereotypes” and “analyzing sex similarities and differences intentionally” and 
“affirming women’s experiences.” All this, mind, is to be done in an algebra class. (brackets 
added) 
 
The authors continue (ibid.: 114–115): 
 
The empirical basis for such an assumption is, as we say, dubious in the extreme. Generations of 
Jewish kids have done quite well at these problems, despite having to concern themselves with 
Johnny’s Christmas money, rather than Menachem’s Chanukah gelt; and in recent decades, an 
even greater cultural dissonance has done little to trip up vast numbers of young algebraists of 
Chinese, Korean, or East Indian background. ... However, even if we grant the pedagogical 
efficiency of feminist-approved terminology, and concede that it might help some reluctant 
young women to handle simple algebra [the article is supposed to deal with college algebra], the 
fact remains – and it is a fact – that anyone beyond the age of twelve or thirteen who has real 
difficulty with such problems, no matter what the social connotations of their wording, is simply 
not destined to be any kind of mathematician. A young lady who makes a game stab at “Maude 
and Mabel” problems but balks at “Joe and Johnny” versions of the same is almost certainly 
without the knack for abstraction that is an indispensable ingredient of mathematical talent. 
(brackets added) 
 
It is not only these particular examples that are the target for criticism, it is the whole 
underlying premise that mathematics is “saturated with sexist ideology” that is so 
disheartening. Although further examples – dare I say “mind-blowing” – could be given 
but, nonetheless, it is best to close with Gross & Levitt’s (ibid.: 116) summary of 
“Toward a feminist algebra” which, by the way, is an accurate judgment of feminism in 
general:  
 
Metaphor mongering is the principal strategy of much feminist criticism of science. It is invoked 
to accomplish what analysis of actual ideas will not. “Toward a Feminist Algebra” is a 
particularly childish example of this... The worst thing about this paper, however, is not its 
shoddy theory of mathematical epistemology. It lies, rather, in the fact that the ultimate aim of 
the authors is not really to advocate devices for improving the mathematical education of women 
and other disempowered classes. Rather, one finally discovers, the purpose is to justify the use of 
mathematics classrooms as chapels of feminist orthodoxy. The purpose of the carefully tailored 
feminist language and imagery is not primarily to build self-confidence of woman students, but 
rather to convert problems and examples into parables of feminist rectitude. It is, at bottom, not 
different from an imaginary Christian fundamentalist pedagogy requiring that all mathematics 
problems illustrate biblical episodes and preach evangelical sermons. Campbell and Campbell-
Wright really want mathematics instructors to act as missionaries for a narrow, self-righteous 
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feminism. Sermonizing – Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, or feminist – is not the function of 
science instruction.  
 
It is, of course, easy to dismiss certain idea or theory by presenting only the critique of 
that idea or theory – though this doesn’t mean that the examples presented by Gross & 
Levitt aren’t despicable. A critique can always be accused of “handpicking”, i.e., 
choosing only the bad examples while ignoring the rest, which can be even the large 
majority. If bad examples are particularly chosen, while knowing that they are not 
representative, a more or less any different sample should show different results – that 
is, unless ideologically motivated charlatanism accuses every bad example, even if it 
meant a whole field, as “handpicked”. Because this thesis is not about feminism, I will 
have to keep the amount of my examples, and their scope, to a minimum. The first 
example is Helen Roberts’ (1988) article “Women and their doctors: power and 
powerlessness in the research process”. It can be said that the central point of this 
article is “the problem of the invisibility of women in sociological inquiry”. 
 
Now, I will admit, directly and openly, that I am not quite sure what Roberts is talking 
about; there are different streams of “thought” that are partly overlapping each other and 
partly make very little sense when taken together. It is basically written in such a way as 
to enable the disposing of any critique by saying: “Well yes, I meant something else...” I 
will, therefore, pick some things that I consider sensible (there is very little of this 
though) and those that are mostly, well, less sensible. Roberts (ibid.:  9–10, 28) begins 
by stating that women basically visit the doctor more often than men; that, it is assumed, 
what ails these women is “sociosomatic” (refers to physical conditions which are 
attributable to social determinants rather than to psychological states in origin); and that 
the doctor is, to a large extent, used as the “source of attention and sympathy as well as 
a source of compensation for the frustrations and inadequacies of their daily lives.” 
 
The disadvantaged state of women – the sociosomatic ailments – is based on the 
following statement (ibid.: 9): 
 
We held that the social and economic structure of modern industrial society systematically 
causes women to be disadvantaged educationally, occupationally, and in other ways. This 
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disadvantaged position ... may have as its result vague feelings of dissatisfaction and minor 
worries and complaints. 
 
Unfortunately, the claim that the “economic structure ... systematically causes women to 
be disadvantaged” is not evidenced in any way. This is extremely important because 
whether women were exploited in the 19th century has very little bearing on the working 
of contemporary society. It is an example of the “once a victim, always a victim” 
argument which may work in political rallies but not in science. When I say that the 
argument is not evidenced doesn’t mean that Roberts did not try to legitimise it in any 
way, just that what she did is not even close enough. She basically tried to add 
credibility to the argument by (ibid.: 11–12, 14): 1) conducting a limited number of 
interviews with some women; 2) doing content analysis on medical literature (i.e., how 
that literature portrays women); 3) by comparing that claim with other feminists’ similar 
claims – but, as we all know, such a comparison can only establish a matter of 
coherence, not a matter of fact. With the claims like “All men are bastards” one should 
be above all interested in a matter of fact, i.e., that of correspondence between the claim 
and reality. 
 
From here a jump is made to the claim that sociology is patriarchal which means that it 
is saturated with male sexism which begins by male experience and tries to generalise 
that experience to the women population without actually bothering to find out about 
the experience of the “disadvantaged” (ibid.: 14–15). Roberts continues (ibid.: 15): 
 
The ideology is pervasive and largely unarticulated, but it is expressed within sociology by 
methodologies which ignore sexual divisions and do not 'see' the experience or situation of 
women. The symptoms of this are familiar, such as the assumption that statements about social 
class can be made on the basis of male occupations, and that generalisations can be made about 
all participants from an all-male sample. 
 
This statement exhibits the same fallacy as was the case with “feminist algebra” 
example: namely, that as mathematics is not about Joe and Susan or Mabel and 
Margaret but about sexless numerical abstractions, similarly in sociology the different 
methods are meant to be used in a “sexless” way, to study what all people share rather 
than what separates them. But even if we were interested in the particulars of some 
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group, women or men, what would be the methodologies that do not ignore “sexual 
divisions”. Frankly speaking, I cannot think of any and neither, for that matter, can 
Roberts. For some mysterious reason, the methods of traditional science are equally 
usable no matter how large, small, similar, or distinct group(s) – any object really – we 
are trying to study. 
 
However, not everything Roberts writes is nonsense. For instance, she may be partly or 
even fully right by claiming that it would be a mistake to make generalisations about a 
population (men and women) based only on the sample of men. She would be right in 
the sense that if we were interested in certain qualities in which men and women differ 
then it would be necessary to study both the sexes. This is the sensible part. 
Unfortunately, there is nothing “alternative” or “feministic” in this proclamation. The 
requirement that a sample should represent a certain population is a basic principle of 
empirical science; there is nothing new, revolutionary, or alternative about this notion. 
And if a study fails in this respect, then it is simply an example of bad science, which is 
fully criticisable and solvable through traditional science. Furthermore, Roberts is 
wrong if she thinks that we cannot generalise based on only male or female sample. She 
seems to forget that actual process of research is one of fit, i.e., that whatever is being 
done, must fit the purpose or goals. In this sense, then, it is perfectly legitimate to 
“generalise” from a strictly male or female sample as long as we can show, in any way, 
that we are justified in doing this. 
 
Considering that Roberts, already at this point, has nothing much to stand on doesn’t 
come as a surprise. Simply put: this article is a perfect example of what is wrong with 
feminism, as a science that is. At least Roberts makes it perfectly clear that her article, 
or feminism, has really nothing common with science (ibid.: 15, 17): 
 
Feminism is in the first place an attempt to insist upon the experience and very existence of 
women. To this extent it is most importantly a feature of an ideological conflict, and does not of 
itself attempt an 'un-biased' or Value-free' methodology. ...we may as feminists allow ourselves 
to criticise as biased those sociologists who continue to produce work which is sexist in its 
theories, its methodology, its practice and its application 
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And because the bulk of sociology – or any other science apparently – is sexist in, well, 
everything, feminists are allowed to attack it in any way whatsoever. Of course, the all 
present sexism is not really shown, it is alleged. But because once oppressed is always 
right, there is no need of actual evidence. Once the requirement of evidence is disposed 
of – after all, it is probably also patriarchal, phallic, sexist, you name it – what we are 
left with is a default situation where sociology (or any other science) is sexist and 
feminist writers are allowed to write any kind of nonsense that they manage to dream 
of. 
 
The end of the article sums up nicely the goulash of what is feminism (ibid.: 27): 
“feminist sociologists, in arguing that gender should be taken into account in theory and 
in practice, are arguing for more and not less vigorous methods.” As was already 
mentioned, inclusion of gender (or sex, really) is not a sign of a more or less vigorous 
methodology or science, it is a question of fit: included where it makes sense, omitted 
where sex is not an issue. It may come as shock but not everything is about “gender”. 
To see gender everywhere is a bit like seeing a communist everywhere; a fixation like 
that can easily lead to concrete human suffering, as was the case of McCarthyism and as 
is the case of, for instance, sex-quotas in educational, administrative, or corporate 
positions which is nothing else than a return to the old aristocratic birthright and 
disregard of personal achievement. 
 
The second example is an article written by Rolin (2006) – a female philosopher of 
science, who has mostly written about gender issues in science – which was a “review” 
and critique of Niemelä & Tammisalo’s book. This was not so much a review as it was 
an attempt at refuting the presented evidence for and the arguments of Niemelä & 
Tammisalo. However, instead of successfully refuting the critique directed at feminism, 
Rolin’s article ends up more or less conforming with the kind of feminist literature that 
fuelled the disagreement in the first place. 
 
Rolin (ibid.: 57) tries to refute two points of criticism raised against feminism: 1) that it 
is contradictory with established natural science(s) and that 2) it is pseudoscientific. 
What Rolin has in mind with the contradictory status is the issue of “bio denial”, i.e., 
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that feminism, allegedly, totally disregards the effect of biological factors and thus, 
simultaneously, the fields of biology, medicine, etc., and claims instead that “gender is 
socially constructed”. As to the first point, Rolin’s counterargument is divisible to 
subparts of which the first one is basically the claim that Niemelä & Tammisalo are 
essentially wrong because some of their examples didn’t contain an explicit and word 
for word content that would have claimed sex being entirely a socially constructed 
phenomenon, or that biological factors do not at all affect behaviour (ibid.: 58). 
 
As a true feminist, Rolin’s argument is a perfect example of obscurantism and “word 
magic”. Why is this? Well, Rolin, as a philosopher of science, must be familiar with the 
fact that language contains both words and combinations of words that are synonymous; 
that, simply put, we can say the same thing by using different words. If we say 2 + 3 or 
3 + 2, we are saying the same thing since both will result in 5. Similarly, if two or more 
sentences or larger combinations of words will lead to the same result, whether as 
another combination of words or as a particular action, then they must be considered as 
having the same meaning. Therefore, one doesn’t have to say explicitly that “sex is 
being entirely socially constructed”, it can be stated in any way that produces that same 
result. One of the examples that Niemelä & Tammisalo (2006) used – and with which 
Rolin didn’t agree – contained the following part (p. 25): 
 
Sex doesn’t ... particularly have an origin, nor does gendered being [unfortunately, I couldn’t 
come up with a better translation] express any core sex emanating from inside the subject. 
...heterosexuality, from this point of view, doesn’t represent any one and only natural sexuality, 
instead it is just one form that is being produced, reproduced, and normalised through enormous 
cultural resources. (brackets added) 
 
 Maybe Rolin has read a different book by the same title and by the same authors, but 
the above citation seems awfully lot like bio denial – and it is not the only example of 
its kind. Anyway, she continues that “studying gender as socially constructed is not 
contradictory with the fact that gender [sex] is also a biological phenomenon and that it 
affects behaviour in a certain amount.” What she means by gender, or being gendered, 
is all the meanings attached to, well, “gendered issues”; these are, among others, 
“physical features, clothes, profession, and sports. Rolin (2006) adds, rather 
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diplomatically, that “what meanings are attached to what, by whom, and in which 
contexts, is essentially a question for empirical research. (p. 58) 
 
It is remarkable that Rolin, who is interested in the different “gendered meanings”, is 
suddenly requiring a literal statement that “biology doesn’t matter”. What makes this 
remarkable is the fact that the “meaning-seekers” try to find meaning anywhere else but 
from the literal. This is not surprising, since the meaning-seeking journey would be 
somewhat short-lived if the scholars simply restated what is/was already written, said, 
or how this or that person acted. No, a true voyage for meaning is performed, in the 
postmodern spirit, in what is essentially a relativist and non-empirical sphere of pure 
conjecture. 
 
But the absolutely best bit is that Rolin basically performs a “denial of a denial of a 
denial”. So, first Niemelä & Tammisalo write that feminism commits a “bio denial” 
which Rolin denies, but then she denies this denial by the simple fact that she – as other 
feminists, postmodernists, etc. – separates a human being into two mutually 
independent spheres; in the end those of nature and culture where it is legitimate to 
study only the cultural which in reality must only happen at the expense and by denying 
the natural. If the natural or biological affects the cultural then by what bizarre logic 
shouldn’t it affect the different “gendered meanings”, or any meanings for that matter? 
Of course, biological factors may not be that important in everything cultural, as is the 
case in mathematics, for example, but to hand wave away the biological factors in such 
central issues as sex/gender is not only bad argumentation, it is precisely an example of 
“bio denial”. If heterosexuality is a “cultural product” then we must ask what produced 
it. Feminists would probably say something along the lines of “from or by oppressing 
patriarchy”. Biology would say something like “because without sexual reproduction, 
which is necessarily heterosexual, there would be, for instance, no mammals, including 
humans”. After what has already become a failed argument, Rolin muddies it even 
further by invoking von Wright’s concept of intentional action and the age old refuge of 
human scientists and philosophers, that of the worlds of “understanding and 
explaining”. When the human scientist gets into a difficult situation, her or she 
victoriously states that none of their mistakes are actually mistakes since they don’t try 
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to explain anything and that “understanding” doesn’t require any of those things 
anyway. Unfortunately, it is never really made clear what this “understanding” is 
supposed to mean concretely. 
 
As to the attempt at refuting that claim that feminism is, ultimately, pseudo-scientific, 
Rolin is not able to produce much better counterargument(s). First of all, she claims that 
Niemelä & Tammisalo have not produced any example of feminism being relativist. 
Either Rolin is, yet again, demanding a literal and explicit formulation of this – in which 
case she would probably be right, i.e., that no such explicit formulation was given – or 
she is reading some other book which, surprisingly, has the same name and authors but 
totally different content. Rolin is also trying to mystify the concept of “objectivity” by 
claiming that it is not clear what Niemelä & Tammisalo mean by it, since in feminism 
and epistemology there have been discussions about how this concept is to be 
understood (ibid.: 59). Although epistemology has been mentioned, the references are 
only about “feminist” writers which validates a further criticism of feminism: that it is 
by the feminists for the feminists. Furthermore, there is very little to be discussed about 
objectivity, considering that serious science has been conforming to it for quite some 
time now. There is no shortage of literature about what is objectivity. (The fact that we 
can find “philosophers” who are prepared to deny anything and everything does not 
give much support to arguments. But most importantly, the non-objectivists have not 
managed to explain how certain (confirmed) results in science could have been achieved 
through subjectivism. Although the choice of problem, qualities, metric, etc., maybe 
“subjective”, their repetition and establishment is not, which relativists of all sorts are 
only too eager to forget.) 
 
Although Rolin’s counterargument (against feminism being pseudo-scientific) is 
composed of five sub elements, I will mention, additionally to the already presented, the 
second one. Here Rolin tries to refute the claim that feminism, or the claims of 
feminism, are in principle untestable. Niemelä & Tammisalo (2006,: 109) have written, 
for example, that 
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the field’s untestability, uncritical approach, and stagnation is easily noticeable from the fact that 
[feminism] continuously holds on to the same claims disregarding counterevidence and 
criticism. Some of the claims are formulated in such obscurantist fashion that is impossible to 
test or even refute them. 
 
Rolin argues against the claim of untestability by stating that Niemelä & Tammisalo do 
not present evidence (or example) what so ever, where a feminist writer would stick to 
her claims even in the face of counterevidence and criticism (2006: 59-60). Again it has 
to be concluded that Rolin must have been reading some other book where, it is 
possible, there are no such examples. And, again, she expects the same strictly literal 
examples as before. It is a shame that she needs to resort to such tactics, though, on the 
other hand, it verifies the anti-feminist critique. 
 
Of course, one reason why there will be not much explicit and literal counterevidence 
from natural scientist is the fact that feminist-articles are not really published in the 
spheres of natural sciences – for the simple reason that feminism, in all its incarnations, 
doesn’t correspond to any of these fields of natural sciences. Therefore, not only the 
natural scientist have no obligation to read feminist material – and comment it – they 
don’t even come into contact with it. To the natural scientist feminism is as a distant 
thing as is, say, geography to a music historian. Furthermore, Rolin is mistaken if she 
expects that feminist writers can write anything they want, i.e., making claims that 
contradict established scientific knowledge, and that it is the duty of others to react to 
this (preferably favourably of course); that first the feminist does something and then, 
second, comes to reaction from natural sciences. The counterevidence is not coming 
after for the simple fact that it exists already before the feminist output. If a feminist 
makes a claim that contradicts or refutes, say, an established biological fact, it is the 
responsibility of the feminist to produce necessary evidence, not the other way around. 
So far, however, feminist writers have not produced any credible evidence, though 
moralising and sermonising has come in abundance. In this sense, then, Niemelä & 
Tammisalo’s book is full of examples that show how feminist thinking “sticks to its 
guns” despite available counterevidence.  
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As to the part of feminist claims being untestable in principle, Rolin (2006) offers the 
following “defence” (p. 60): “obscurantist claims may be found in feminist research but 
this is not, according to my experience, a problem only in feminism.” Not only Rolin 
leaves the accusation of untestability more or less unchallenged, but one has to ask, 
what or why does it matter if something similar is happening elsewhere too. This is 
basically the case of the “two wrongs make a right” argument. However, such an 
argument does not work in the court of law, nor does it work in science – and for a very 
good reason. Also Niemelä & Tammisalo specifically critiqued feminism and, whether 
they are right or wrong, it is completely irrelevant if they didn’t condemn, say, literal 
criticism with the same vehemence as was the case with feminism. So, in a nutshell, 
Rolin’s article is not much of a book review; it is, however, a good example of what 
feminist writing is about. The positive thing, though, is the fact that there are much 
more horrible examples than her article. 
 
The third example – representing communication research and, hence, media studies – 
is an article by Rush & Grubb-Swetnam (1996), titled “Feminist approaches to 
communication”. As the title promises, the article should be about an alternative 
approach to what already exist out there. If anything, one hopes to find out something 
about communication. So lets see whether it is your “typical” feminist action pack with 
the compulsory phrases and jargon, while at the same time managing to completely 
avoid the actual topic, namely communication research. Although one shouldn’t “judge 
a book by its cover”, or an article by its beginning, it is difficult to keep one’s mind 
“open and neutral” when the article opens like this (pp. 497-498): 
 
The thesis of this chapter is that the integration of theory and research ... may have large parts of 
the scholarship missing, distorted, or coopted—and that it is our responsibility, all of us, as 
scholars to have the awareness, knowledge, and ethics to at least note, as in footnote, that this 
may be the case. We have made a conscious decision ... to use women's full names rather than 
initials, when possible, as a first mention in the text. Women's voices are silenced in ways that 
are covert and overt: In this small way, we want to indicate that we are trying our best to get out 
of that black hole of nonrecognition through gendered lack of acknowledgement. 
 
The opening of the article jumps, commendably, to the point: that women are oppressed 
by nothing else than the great evil of patriarchy in science, and it is their responsibility 
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to change the situation. They continue that the primary purpose of feminists “is to add 
to and enhance an academic discipline by contributing and establishing new, inclusive, 
and different perspectives and approaches” (ibid., p. 498). It is difficult to take this 
seriously when the authors have already established without any evidence that there is a 
categorical oppression of women going on in science. It would be strange to think that 
the wrong doing of men didn’t reach the androcentric methodologies as well. Because if 
it didn’t, there would be very little point in creating “new, inclusive, and different 
perspectives and approaches.” Naturally, then, the overthrow of male oppression also 
includes the overthrow of male epistemology. The best bit of the article must certainly 
be the following (ibid.): 
 
Myths, philosophies, theories, and research have perpetuated male standpoints for some time. 
Marija Gimbutas (1989) and other archeomythologists note that the repeated disturbances and 
incursions by the Kurgan people (who Gimbutas views as proto-Indo-European) put an end to 
Old European culture between 4300 and 2800 BC, changing it from gylanic to androcratic, and 
from matrilineal to patrilineal. "The Aegean and Mediterannean region and western Europe 
escaped the process the longest. . . . Old European culture flourished in an enviably peaceful and 
creative civilization until 1500 BC, a thousand to 1500 years after central Europe had been 
thoroughly transformed" (p. xx). Gimbutas summarized, "We are still living under the sway of 
that aggressive male invasion and only beginning to discover our long alienation from our 
authentic European Heritage—gylanic, nonviolent, earth-centered culture" (p. xxi). Attitudinal 
and behavioral adjustments take time, and the swing back to a gylanic culture, a social structure 
in which both sexes were equal, has begun. But that change will be difficult if particular areas of 
scholarship are silenced, ignored, or disregarded. 
 
Not only the beginning of this quote is a repetition – more explicit – of the same dogma 
with which one is usually greeted in feminist writing, but what on earth have the 
Kurgan people to do with contemporary communications research? Of course, the 
“Kurgan people” have nothing to do with communications research what so ever, 
though, they have very much to do with the myth of “ancient matriarchal society”. It is 
a shame, really, that the authors have failed to mention that Gimbutas’ claim according 
to which Europe was matriarchal, or “goddess-centred” has not been much supported 
beyond those already with the desire to believe in such myths, e.g., feminists. Hence, 
there is no “swing back” to the “good old days” as the authors wish. On the other hand, 
the fact that, at least Western society, has become “more inclusive”, which means that 
despite the “androcentric” past of human kind, there is a trend to greater equality, means 
that men are “not as evil as feminists portray”. Ironically, the situation has, in some 
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cases, become the total opposite: it is the man who is oppressed. But it is, of course, 
impossible for a feminist to admit that a positive change could have come from men as 
that would demolish the categorical claim that “men are despots and women are the 
victims” and which is used as holy water to crush all dissent. Anyway, the argument of 
the authors so far is based on the “the victim is always right due to being a victim” 
fallacy, that the only reason some women science is disregarded is because of male 
oppression. But since, obviously, some women science is accepted one has to wonder, 
couldn’t it simply be that the rejected science deserved to be rejected in the first place? 
Today that evaluation is difficult to be made since the human sciences accept 
everything, and it is particularly here where “women science” takes place. 
 
The remedy, according to the authors (ibid.), is that the students “must not be put off or 
put out by the terms feminist, feminist theory, feminist research, or women's issues.” 
But this raises more than one question. First of all, if the students are “put off” by 
feminist thought, could it be, even slightly, possible that it is not necessarily because of 
male oppression but, rather, that feminist thinking hasn’t been able to produce the kind 
of content that ought to be taken seriously as scientific input. Despite what feminists 
might think of themselves – which is obviously that they can do no wrong – in the field 
of science, only the content should decide the worth of it, not who wrote it. Secondly, if 
the content is “scientific” and that the only thing which holds women back is “male 
oppression”, then two things must be shown: 1) that the content is scientific which 
means that political propaganda or purely faith-based proclamations (no matter how 
politically correct they might be) simply will not do. But feminism depends on the 
ideological and even fraudulent, otherwise it wouldn’t be feminism. If it was really 
about, say, criticism of science, i.e., what has been done wrong or something similar, it 
would simply be science as it would rest on the established principles that not only 
enable science to exist but also to criticise it when these principles have been abandoned 
in this or that particular research; 2) even if the content would be scientific, the 
obligation to show evidence in support of “male oppression” would still stand. And no, 
referring to other feminist’s damnation of androcentric science – based on equally non-
existent proof, mind you – will not pass for evidence, at all. High-fiving each other can 
be fun, at a political committee meeting, for example, but science doesn’t work or isn’t 
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improved by mutual agreement alone, no matter how emotional that agreement might 
be. 
 
If this was the case, then we would still be drilling people’s heads as a remedy to 
demonic possession, in order to release the evil spirit. Fortunately for science, but 
especially for ordinary people, there were physicians who, eventually, disagreed with 
such “medication”. To repeat myself: a claim is not valid just because it is coherent with 
other similar claims, nor does the validity of a claim depend on its popularity; science is 
not a democracy. Because, then, feminism lacks substance – purposefully it seems – it 
can only find support through popularity. However, that can be only achieved among 
those whose political zeal clouds their judgement, or those who have no real idea about 
science in the first place and who show great talent at suppressing their common sense.  
 
But let us move to another inspiring point of this particular feminist creation. The 
authors continue that (ibid.: 498–499): 
 
Reading or conducting research about how women and men "are portrayed in stereotypical ways 
that reflect and sustain socially endorsed views of gender" (Wood, 1994, p. 234) is not only 
interesting but necessary to an enlightened social scientist in a world where women and men are 
transforming gender roles. The mass media, for example, distort reality by underrepresenting 
women in ratios to white males by 3:1 in prime-time television and 2:1 in children's 
programming, or including men in newscast stories 10 times more often than women... 
 
What do the authors mean exactly by stating that men and women are “transforming 
gender roles”? Are fathers, in fact, transforming into mothers? Or does it mean that we 
have reached a higher level of “gender equality” where it is “okay for men to bake pies 
at home while the women work in coalmines and steelworks”? But all this is really 
irrelevant from the scientific point of view: science will be what it is even if men gave 
birth to children and women grew thick beards for the simple reason that science is 
asexual or “gender-neutral” if one likes to use newer terms. The fact that this or that 
particular female scientist’s work was overlooked doesn’t make science sexist or 
discriminatory against women; male scientists overlook, degrade, and ridicule, even 
other men’s works. Of course, the authors, like many other feminists, are not really 
interested in science as such, it is the political call to arms, to change society, to make it 
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pure according to the feminist image. And this image has, in many place, already taken 
its first steps, for instance, in the form of women-quotas which seems to be the desire of 
the authors as well. After all, they are unhappy that women are “underrepresented” in 
the mass media. Considering that much of the mass media are private businesses, isn’t it 
their right to choose as employees – actors and news anchors are exactly that – 
whomever they like? Or that if “guy-shows” bring revenue, why should they be 
changed to “women or women-and-guys shows”; by whose moral superiority? I 
suppose that to truly achieve “gender-equality” old literary works are to be rewritten 
since, for example, they contained too many male characters: The Good Soldier Švejk 
obviously misrepresents all the female soldiers of the first World War which will be 
remedied by a new version called Loretta Bravely Dismantles Male Chauvinism in the 
Bleak World of European Patriarchy. 
 
After five pages of your typical feminist “thought”, the authors finally seem to have 
something to say about communication research. They open with strong confidence 
when they say that “contributions to the communication discipline by feminist thinking 
are extensive” (ibid.: 504). I suppose it will be an exercise in male oppression when I 
say that “feminism having brought extensive contributions to communication research” 
is a total surprise to me as it is, quite likely, to actual communications/media researchers 
– for instance, a feminist manifesto is not a contribution to any particular scientific 
field, no matter what scientific field is included in the title. The writing of these authors 
is a case in point; the same article could have been published in any field of science. But 
why stop there, the same could be done in art as well under the title: Feminist 
Approaches to Art. Of course, there would be nothing about art (or anything else) really, 
just the same tirade about how oppressed women are. To continue, the authors now 
invoke the power of the high priestess of feminism, Sandra Harding, when they write 
that (ibid.) 
 
Theories of feminism and feminist research have provided communication scholars insight about 
how the scientific model has figuratively and literally paled through comparison with other 
frameworks which indicate sexist, racist, homophobic, classist social projects (Harding, 1991). 
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What are, exactly, these “alternative” frameworks compared to which the scientific 
model pales; and what exactly is supposed to be the scientific model? These are, of 
course, pointless questions because they aren’t and never have been intended to be 
actually answered. (It is clear what is meant by the scientific model: androcentrism, 
white male oppression, and the likes. Naturally, then, such evil pales in comparison with 
the alternatives.) The problem with ideology is that once one tries to seek answers and 
explanations – no obscurant “understanding” – the empty machinery of sloganeering 
will turn out to be just that, empty. This fabulous article can be summed up with the 
following (ibid.): 
 
Through three decades of current feminist scholarship, we have learned that women's 
communication, along with minorities of both gender, have been "othered" or silenced in 
mainstream research. Gender theories and feminist research in communication have helped to 
reveal that we must be mindful in future research of actively refusing to continue the silencing, 
drawing out instead and making visible those who have been silenced, revealing their voices in 
social and historical context. 
 
As a lesson in propaganda, this article is perfect. So what if it actually doesn’t say 
anything useful about feminist approaches to communication. 
 
What these articles have, hopefully, shown is what utter failure they are scientifically. 
Although a further analysis of the different mistakes could be carried out, I will point 
only one which, coincidentally, covers the rest: lack of professionalism. And it is not 
that only absolutely perfect results will do; everyone makes mistakes – even the best. 
But there is a huge difference between a genuine attempt at learning from one’s 
mistakes – and in a long term science’s ability to correct itself seems to have been 
happening – and not bothering at all with all the pesky requirements of science, just 
because moralising, sermonising, and politicising has been successful in diverting and 
suppressing genuine criticism and concern for the future of science. Furthermore, if 
obscurantism and, simply put, all out bad science has been able to bring “recognition”, 
fame, and a position in the ranks of academia, why should the “scholars” even try? 
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3 MEDIA STUDIES 
 
I will admit from the start that this, a sort of review of media studies, is going to be 
superficial, and it should be not too difficult to point out that “if only you would have 
read this or that book or article you would have known...” and present similar counter 
arguments. While a feminist text, or even postmodernist, will show surprisingly little 
deviation from their underlying assumptions, styles, etc., such is not the case in media 
studies. This doesn’t mean that it has managed to get rid of these counterproductive 
influences – which presently can be even considered as the dominant ones – but that in 
addition to these, no matter how little, there are alternatives. Ironically, by “alternatives” 
I mean either remnants or “conversions” to that of traditional science. 
 
A problem for a review like this – even if it was more thorough – is that of 
categorisation. This doesn’t mean whether or not any kind of categorisation is possible 
in the first place but whether it suits the purposes. It is, then, a question of fit. For 
instance, we can divide the different works by the sex of the author which would make 
sense if we were interested in the amount (in percentage) of works written either by men 
or women. But the same categorisation would be completely useless if we were 
interested in what kind of arguments in favour of or against positivism are being made. 
 
The standard way of classifying media studies – if, indeed, it can be called a standard – 
is usually presented in a historical form, i.e., what questions have occupied researchers 
during, say, the last hundred years or so. This also includes the mentioning of shifts in 
philosophical arguments, or if one wants, the paradigm changes in philosophical 
assumptions – and accompanying actual research. A historical development like this 
could be presented as a change from positivism to postmodernism or even from 
hermeneutics to positivism to postmodernism. The “point of origin” depends on 
whether one counts the field as already established, its precursors, or if one wants to 
start with, say, the beginnings of modern science in general, and so on. Then again, no 
historical analysis is necessary if one is interested in what is going on now or in the last 
30 years or so. But even a mix of both, a little bit of history combined with 
contemporary situation can also be done. A success here is not and cannot be prefixed 
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beforehand; only based on the results can we say if the choice of approach was justified 
or not – providing, of course, that the aim and approach have been “connected” in some 
sensible way already. 
 
I will start the overview of the field by 1) sketching, on a very basic level, the main 
themes or evolutive steps of the field; 2) giving some examples of what has been done. 
This will, mainly, include work about newsgathering and publication. Now, there are 
categorisations even about news research. For instance, according to Hjarvard (2002: 
91–92), news research can be divided into four types: a) gatekeeper tradition which is 
about what is selected and by whom; b) news flow analysis; c) empirical studies of 
news content such as researching the coverage of some event by different news outlets 
(newspaper, television, radio). Such work is, then, strongly comparative; d) more 
theoretically laden approaches. The examples that I will be using, in my view, do not fit 
well in any of these categories. One reason is that there are strong normative and moral 
overtones present in such works – Chomsky is a perfect example. These are a mixture 
of all four approaches, and, perhaps, to consider them simply as continuation in 
Lippmann’s footsteps might be better; 3) but it is the scientific nature and status of the 
field that is most important here, and nothing speaks more clearly than the explicitly 
philosophical and methodological contributions written; for instance, works dealing 
with the methodological side of communications research (or media studies). (I use 
“communications research” and “media studies” interchangeably.)   
 
 
3.1 The main phases and central ideas of the field 
 
There is something that can be considered as a “school book” categorisation of media 
studies. Naturally this comes in endless permutations where each author or a group of 
authors give a “new spin” to what is essentially the same thing. This is, by the way, one 
of the dilemmas of science: a new researcher must publish; but to publish what already 
has been said doesn’t make sense; only a few have something truly new or important to 
say; therefore whatever is being published must at least give the appearance of being 
new or important. Unfortunately the endless stream of “new” has the habit of silencing 
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the old and in many cases higher quality publications. The re-spinning is certainly 
evident in media studies – as in any other field – and when the layers of novelty are 
peeled away what remains is essentially the “same old, same old”. Additionally, a lot of 
the differences are due to taste rather than anything else. Below I will mention some 
examples of the different approaches to what is, essentially, the same thing, namely the 
temporal evolution of media and thusly what media studies have been and are about.  
 
So, for instance, there are some introductions (categorisations) to media studies which 
start the historical tracing from Aristotle’s rhetoric (see, for example, Nordenstreng 
1975: 237–238) while many do not. Curran (2002), on the other hand starts from the 
17th century press, its subsequent evolution, and ending with radio and television. 
Although Curran’s “twist” on the matters is the democratically enabling potential of 
media or, conversely, its use in an exercise of power, it corresponds to the media-effect 
type of literature – despite the fact that Curran concentrates on earlier periods, a lot of 
what he writes about overlaps with many other sources, i.e., that the same or similar 
categorisation is to be found. One of the themes that join Both Nordenstreng and Curran 
to other sources, is Marxism. The former incorporates it in a modified version, i.e., 
Marxism-Leninism as an argument in favour of the possibility that media studies (or 
communications research) can and should be objective. The latter (Curran) incorporates 
Marxism from the class-struggle and political economy point of view, i.e., media as 
potentially a weapon used by those in power exacerbating the class-conflict and, on the 
other hand, to what extent the question of money (profit, required start-up cost, etc.) 
affected the possibilities of establishing competing news outlets – not necessarily 
competition in the sense of revenue, but as offering an alternative to the mainstream (or, 
if we want, an alternative to the “ruling ideas”). 
 
Perhaps one of the most neutral overview – or as close to “school book” version as 
possible - of media studies (or more widely, communications research) is offered by 
Pietilä (1997), who divides the field into three main phases; three in the sense that it is 
possible to speak of them as not completely heterogeneous. During the first phase one 
of the leading ideas for theorising and research was the question of propaganda in the 
media and by the media. Names such as Lippmann and Lasswell belong to this era. The 
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second phase, known as mcr-tradition (mcr = mass communication research), 
distinguishes itself with names such as Katz and Lazarsfeld. During that time two 
themes emerge: firstly, a shift from theorising (perhaps even unsubstantiated) to 
empirical and scientifically more rigorous research; secondly, this “scientific approach” 
was intended to show that the old “hypodermic needle” model of media was incorrect, 
i.e., that the idea where media unilaterally and directly “dictated” what its consumers 
ought to do and think simply didn’t work; that the situation was more complex. Critical 
theory (and theorists) paralleled this in some ways and diverged in others. The idea of 
mass society was central for the critical theorists, though more from the Marxist point of 
view. Main elements were those of class struggle, the effect of capital, and deterioration 
of “high culture” as it is being substituted more and more with mass produced “low 
cost” pop-culture. 
 
If the idea of mass society was to be found in both – though the origins of that idea 
might have come from different sources – the general “method” of research was 
completely different: critical theorists favoured, well, theory over actual empirical 
science. This is not a surprise as one of the major components of critical theory was the 
critique of Enlightenment, especially by Adorno and Horkheimer. In this sense 
Habermas, also categorised as a critical theorist, is different: he doesn’t condemn 
Enlightenment. For him it is a sound ideal that has a possibility to happen. Adorno is a 
cultural pessimist while Habermas is an optimist. But where Habermas continues the 
tradition is in the critique of postivism, especially its epistemological notions. The third 
phase began as an opposition to the mcr-tradition, although not necessarily to the 
Marxist critical theory. Again two trends are discernible: 1) a re-emergence of Marxist 
thinking and 2) cultural studies approaches which included also such influences as 
feminism and postmodernism. (It should be pointed out that these things didn’t happen 
strictly one after another; for instance, semiotic analysis – whether or not explicitly 
connected to hermeneutics – was not only already visible in the cultural critique of 
critical theory, but also the different cultural approaches including postmodernism.) 
Similarly, relativist notions can be found in the works of different thinkers and during 
different times. The Marxist side of the matter still can make sense if or when research 
deals with the “effect” of media as a tool for hegemony or renewal of class differences, 
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or the political economy side of the matter (to what extent money influences the 
creation of news, for example). As to the culturalist trend, it is difficult to say much. 
This is due to, as was mentioned earlier in relation to feminism and postmodernism, the 
basic obscurantist and contradictory nature of those approaches. 
 
During these three examples the word Marxism was strongly present which is not 
surprising as Corner (1998: 11–12), for instance, identifies three central elements in 
development in media studies: Marxist, linguistic, and ethnographic perspectives. In this 
sense, Marxism in media studies is the result of influences by newer thinkers, such as 
Althusser, as well as the “rediscovery” of critical theory (ibid.: 12). One of the two main 
questions of Marxist approach, that of political and cultural power, is often formulated 
as the question of ideology. Corner (ibid.: 13) writes that 
 
the most developed form in  which the ‘ideology’ question was posed, that of Marxist 
structuralism as exemplified in the writings of Louis Althusser...,  quite quickly became 
established as canonical within the new field, both in teaching and in research. This influence 
was part of a more general structuralist influence, most notably that of a Semiotic analysis of 
images and of language, coming through from writings such as those of Roland Barthes ... and 
Umberto Eco..., which themselves referred back to the ... writings of the linguist Ferdinand  de 
Saussure. ...the ‘Marxist-structuralist’ focus became the guiding paradigm in the broad sector, in 
different ratios of mix... 
 
The above already shows that Marxism was closely collaborating with the linguistic 
tradition. To the extent that the linguistic part has been pushed into the front, especially 
in its strong social constructivist and relativist form, we can speak of a “linguistic shift” 
not only in media studies but in the human sciences as a whole. The questions about 
language 
 
were not simply questions of applied linguistics, asking how the media used language, they were 
questions of a much broader kind about the linguistic ordering of society and consciousness. The 
structuralist anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, neo-Marxian concepts of ideology, Freudian analysis 
of the unconscious and, more directly still, the Semiotics of Barthes and Eco, all posed question 
about language structures or language-like structures. Language was seen as a key, perhaps the 
key, to the understanding of cultural and social organisation. Semiotics ... fitted into this 
intellectual perspective as a practical analytic system which could be immediately brought to 
bear on the products of the media and a wide range of contemporary cultural expression... (ibid., 
p. 14) 
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Although semiotics seemed to provide a flexible analytic tool even for the analysis of 
images, its results were not particularly convincing – which is exactly the case even 
today. Corner gives an example of this in the form of Barthes’ essay on the photograph: 
 
the difficulty with images was that of finding an analytic unit equivalent to words and a 
combinatory convention equivalent to the sentence. ...analysis, far from achieving scientific 
precision, was hard put to get beyond the socially impressionistic... These problems were 
compounded by the extent to which Semiotics was put to the service of ideological analysis, 
revealing the political and social shapings and purposes of a text in ways not made explicit in the 
text itself. The identification of ‘myth’ stems not so much from close attention to the levels 
beneath it as from the analyst’s own political sense of what constitutes the ‘mythic’ in 
contemporary culture. The procedure is dangerously circular, and whatever results by way of 
political insight is more a result of the prior political knowledge and intelligence of the writer 
than of any method or procedure of textual study. (ibid.: 15-16) 
 
Related criticism is given by Barrat (1986: 118), according to whom 
 
Semiologists, anxious to uncover the complex coding of media messages, suggested that certain 
audience interpretations were more likely, certain readings of the text were 'preferred'. From the 
first phase of media research they took the view that the media played a prominent role in 
shaping ideas, while recognizing the criticism, raised by the later 'two-step flow' [the second 
phase] researchers, that audiences were capable of putting forward alternative readings. Even so, 
the question of how certain members of audiences are able to produce alternative interpretations 
of media texts remains unanswered. What evidence is there that the 'preferred reading', carefully 
unravelled by the semiologist, is indeed the view that audiences actually take? (brackets added) 
 
A concrete example of the difficulties inherent in the “semiotic method” is Danesi’s 
(2002: 25) analysis of a “magazine ad for Airoldi men's watches that was common in 
Italian lifestyle magazines published in the early 1990s.” Danesi states these properties 
of the ad: 1) An Airoldi watch has apparently been 'stabbed' by a woman's hand holding 
a dagger; 2) the woman's fingernails are painted with nail polish; 3) she is wearing a 
man's ring on her thumb; 4) a finger-less leather glove covers the woman's palm; 5) a 
diamond-studded handcuff is discernible on her wrist. These are then followed by their 
“interpretations”, in cultural forms: a) The stabbing suggests some form of violence, 
perhaps of the 'prey hunting' variety; b) the woman's painted fingernails suggest 
sensuality; c) the man's ring is probably that of her lover; wearing it on the thumb 
suggests that it is one of the spoils of the 'hunt'; d) the finger-less leather glove is 
suggestive of sadomasochism; e) the diamond-studded handcuff reinforces the 
sadomasochism imagery, implying 'capture' and 'captivity'. 
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The first part of Danesi’s argument in favour of his interpretation is that “the 'female-as-
huntress' image that this ad generates has a mythic etiology in Western culture”. He 
continues that “the image of a fierce and sexually powerful female surfaces in all kinds 
of popular narratives - from ancient myths such as that of the Greek goddess Diana to 
contemporary female movie characters seen in Hollywood films such as Fatal Attraction 
(1987).” (ibid.: 25-26.) 
 
Now, should semiotic analysis work, as a functional tool of science, it should be 
possible for anyone who uses it correctly to arrive at the same conclusion like Danesi. 
Provided, of course, that semiotic analysis is an analytic tool and not merely a 
euphemism for projecting the researchers own emotions at the picture. But semiotic 
analysis is not a tool; there are no steps to be followed, just as Corner mentioned. There 
are no units to be combined nor is there a method (or methods) how these units should 
be combined. This is evident in the different books or articles where semiotics is 
presented as a method or part of it – especially when intended as something particular, 
and not as some vague truism like “semiotic analysis demands a strong intellectual 
effort from the researcher” as if there are ways of doing science without this effort. (It 
should be emphasised that the “preferred” reading, or a reading that is as close to a 
universal one, is a compulsory requirement if semiotic analysis is to be even remotely 
regarded as a method. If texts, pictures, etc., are something which anyone will, 
eventually, “interpret” in any way whatsoever – that one “symbol” could have a never 
ending stream of meanings – then not only will it be an euphemism for one’s own 
mental projections, it will also be a term void of any actual content.) 
 
Anyway, Danesi’s first part of the argument, the etiology of the “female-as-huntress” 
image, is, I guess, supposed to be a “Well, everybody knows that...” type of argument. 
Unfortunately everybody does not know. Furthermore, it is a complete mystery how the 
Airoldi ad can be connected, in such an obvious way as Danesi writes, to, for example, 
the Greek goddess Diana. (It certainly didn’t emerge in my thoughts in any obvious 
way.) Not surprisingly, then, Danesi (2002: 26) offers the second part of his argument 
(in favour of his interpretation), according to which 
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In order to establish the above interpretation of the ad as a plausible one, clearly, the context in 
which it has been fashioned is a key factor. The term context in semiotics refers to the real-world 
conditions - physical, psychological, historical, social, etc. - that ultimately determine how a sign 
is made and what it means. The interpretation that I fleshed out of the Airoldi ad was made 
possible by my own knowledge of the fact that it was directed towards a female audience, and by 
my knowledge of the mythic themes that were available to the ad-maker. 
 
The only thing that is missing is the piece of information where Danesi would have 
written that the ad-maker actually said what was the intention of the ad. I mean, what 
Danesi refers here to as “contextual information” is something that people do not 
necessarily have while “interpreting” images, for instance. There is very little semiotic 
interpretation going on when the interpreter has virtually all available information about 
the symbol. 
 
Since the linguistic approach where only the researcher does the interpreting part – 
followed by a hefty chunk of theorising – it was only natural to extend it in the 
ethnographic direction. Although ethnography is usually connected to anthropologic 
research, there is no reason why it couldn’t be used in communications research. It is, 
after all, about observing (participatory or not), interviewing, etc., human beings as 
individuals and larger groups. The emphasis is on the cultural side of individuals and 
societies. One thing that makes the ethnographic approach sensible – in principle, not 
necessarily in practice - is that it goes beyond the interpretations of a single person, the 
researcher. David Morley is said to have produced one of the pioneering works of 
ethnographic research with his study of the audience for the British news magazine 
programme “Nationwide”. According to Barrat (1986: 125) Morley initially conducted 
a semiotic analysis which was then followed “up by field research by interview in 
which Morley tried to establish whether audiences did in fact read the programme in 
this way.” Unfortunately, at least based on Barrat’s description, Morley’s research, 
although better than wild “interpretations” of single scholars, raises as many questions 
as it may have provided answers. First of all, there were only four groups doing their 
alternative interpretations which cannot be considered as a representative sample of the 
society. Therefore, this would only say that there can be, indeed, other interpretations – 
which is not necessarily a breakthrough result. Secondly, a considerable amount of the 
difference in interpretation was actually a difference in agreement; that the groups 
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“understood the message” in more or less the same way, just that some agreed with that 
message while others did not. 
 
A shift towards ethnographic type of research has, as already mentioned, certain 
advantages. But in the end, even ethnography – especially its modern day variants 
emphasising meaning and which, ultimately, shares the shortcomings of the 
incorporated hermeneutic core – has its severe weaknesses. It is not so much a question 
of ethnography as such, rather, the issue is what, mostly artificial, limitations are thrown 
upon it in the name of postmodernism, anti-positivism, “understanding”, and the like. 
Thus, what plagues the single interpretation paradigm is to be found in the multiple 
interpretations paradigm as well. By this I mean the relationship between an 
interpretation and how or with what purpose it is being used. If a researcher is interested 
in meanings, and nothing else, then there is not much cause for complaint. However, 
almost every work that supposedly deals about meanings, i.e., those that try to 
“understand” and not “explain”, slip into making claims that demand much more than 
mere interpretations or what meanings these or those people might have constructed.  
 
The problem can be illustrated by the following imaginary example: if we were 
interested in what meanings different patients attach to, say, their medical treatments, 
then the hermeneutically oriented ethnography can be useful. It will offer, naturally, less 
dependent results than a large-scale questionnaire-based study because nowadays 
“quality” with “thick descriptions” and “deep interviews” are preferred. As time-
consuming procedures, they have to be limited to what is usually only a handful of 
people. On the other hand, if we were actually interested in how effective, if at all, the 
treatment is, the meaning-creations of the patients will turn out to be a very poor source 
of evidence indeed. This is because, say, cancer, its mechanism, and possible treatment 
have nothing to do with the meaning-constructs of the patients; they involve different 
questions and different ways in how these are answered. The point is then that 
ethnography as a universal ideology, where voice is given to the voiceless – where the 
objects of research “are finally allowed to speak” – is simply unsuitable for the many 
questions and claims that demand much more robust, more “scientific” approaches. We 
will return to this matter in chapter 3.3. 
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3.2 News research 
 
This chapter is intended as something of an interlude, though not in spirit. Again 
methodological (or scientific) interest prevails here. News research serves as a “case” 
example of certain methodological choices, whether explicit or implicit (though mostly 
it is implicit), made in that kind of research. Although news research can be divided in 
different ways, I like to divide it into, firstly, a “plain vanilla” or common sense 
approach. This can, and in many cases does, contain normative, moral, etc. overtones 
though the core lies in the empirical investigation of news. It can be considered as 
combination of historical and comparative approach were news articles are 
chronologically listed and compared to other news articles but also to any other sources, 
such as monographies, statistical information, and so on. There is or can be a question 
such as “Is the news media lying?” or “How war influences what is supposed to be non-
partisan news reporting” which is then evaluated through the empirical findings of what 
the media have actually done. The second way of doing news research, although it has 
quite a lot in common with the first, is one that is much more affected by 
constructivism, relativism, or, what can be generally regarded as postmodern leanings. 
These are not necessarily completely bad studies but, unfortunately, they tend to go 
overboard in the sense that the claims are simply not matched by the proposed evidence 
– a phenomenon that troubles all the human sciences. My interest lies primarily in the 
common sense approach. 
 
I would like to start the case-examples with Lippmann. He is relevant even today not 
necessarily for his scientific insights – a fact-oriented attitude was not special, for 
instance, when he wrote Liberty and the News, in 1920, though that same attitude might 
be today, in human sciences, something of a novelty – but for pointing out what an 
important role is played by news outlets which for many are the opinion-forming 
sources. And, of course, opinion – whether based on facts or wishful thinking – 
underlies (public) action. His concern was the safeguarding of democracy which would 
be impossible in a world where people are being fed lies. He wrote (2008: 2) that 
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Everywhere today men are conscious that somehow they must deal with questions more intricate 
than any that church or school had prepared them to understand. Increasingly they know that 
they cannot understand them if the facts are not quickly and steadily available. Increasingly they 
are baffled because the facts are not available; and they are wondering whether government by 
consent can survive in a time when the manufacture of consent is an unregulated private 
enterprise. For in an exact sense the present crisis of western democracy is a crisis in journalism. 
 
(It should be added that though he was speaking about private enterprise, history has 
shown that state-governed/owned news outlets have not fared any better of which the 
former eastern block is concrete evidence.) It wasn’t only corruption that was seen as 
the underlying reason. Additionally, and perhaps even more,  
 
Since the war, especially, editors have come to believe that their highest duty is not to report but 
to instruct, not to print news but to save civilization, to keep the nation on the straight and 
narrow path. Like the Kings of England, they have elected themselves Defenders of the Faith. 
(ibid.: 2–3.) 
 
Moralising of all sorts, then, is one of the most important factors, according to 
Lippmann, that erodes the factuality of that information on which, eventually, we build 
our worldviews. It is at its worst when it happens from top to bottom; when an 
“enlightened” elite thinks it knows what is best for the rest, or as Lippmann puts it 
(ibid.: 4): 
 
It sometimes seems that after the armistice was signed, millions of Americans must have taken a 
vow that they would never again do any thinking for themselves. They were willing to die for 
their country, but not willing to think for it." That minority, which is proudly prepared to think 
for it, and not only prepared, but cocksure that it alone knows how to think for it, has adopted the 
theory that the public should know what is good for it. The work of reporters has thus become 
confused with the work of preachers, revivalists, prophets and agitators. The current theory of 
American newspaperdom is that an abstraction like the truth and a grace like fairness must be 
sacrificed whenever anyone thinks the necessities of civilization require the sacrifice. 
 
The importance of this is, then, the following: “The news columns are common carriers. 
When those who control them arrogate to themselves the right to determine by their 
own consciences what shall be reported and for what purpose, democracy is 
unworkable” (ibid.: 5–6). 
 
Compared to, say, present day feminists or postmodernists, Lippmann was (and still is) 
a visionary, representing the same androcentric “evil” that feminists are hell-bent on 
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fighting, or the kind of basic “positivist” attitude that postmodernists would eagerly like 
to see go away. Feminism, actually, is the same kind of moralism to which Lippmann 
was opposed; one that happily sacrifices truth and fact as long as it serves the “higher 
purpose”, no doubt the only true purpose, at least in the minds of its supporters. As 
Lippmann (ibid.: 5) observed, this is just another “the end justifies the means” doctrine; 
It is nothing but the doctrine that I want what I want when I want it. Its monuments are 
the Inquisition and the invasion of Belgium [here Lippmann is talking about the first 
world war]” (brackets added). The postmodernists are seemingly in a better position 
than their feminist counterparts because there is, on the whole, less moralising. 
However, it is equally destructive in its approach due to extreme relativism and the 
claims that there is no truth or validity outside, or course, these claims themselves. But 
if there is no truth, there cannot be facts, and in such a case there is no need to report 
them or in any other way mention them. In such a case, news reporting would be 
indistinguishable from fiction and fantasy. But as Lippmann (ibid.: 6) noted, “no one 
can manage anything on pap. Neither can a people. Statesmen may devise policies; they 
will end in futility, as so many have recently ended, if the propagandists and censors can 
put a painted screen where there should be a window to the world.” 
 
To correct the situation, Lippmann suggested certain things that should be done. Above 
all lies factuality or, at least, the aim to reach it. Because reporting is not easy – facts 
don’t drop readily from the sky – it is imperative for the journalist to adopt a scientific 
attitude for his work. To put it differently, journalists should adopt exactly the same 
basic “logic”, basic approach to how things are being done which is the method of 
“observation and reasoning”. For the scientist as well as the journalist this means that 
things are critically searched and questioned. (Lippmann’s suggestions were more 
concrete than this, but for our purposes their underlying core idea suffices.) This leads 
us to Lippmann’s epistemological principles, which were never explicitly mentioned. 
However, they are easily extrapolated from his critique of journalism and the proposed 
remedies. But not only this, further evidence can be found even in his following work, 
Public Opinion (1965), originally published in 1922, where his tone was considerably 
more pessimistic. Anyway, the four main epistemological assumptions of Lippmann’s 
work are: 1) empiricism. The journalist, like a scientist, works in the field, digging up 
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information, and not by arm-chair conjectures; 2) facts. At the end of the day what 
decides quality of reporting are the obtained facts. The present day “objectivism” of 
journalistic process where “both sides of the quarrel” should be heard is really no 
substitute at all. Although it is nice if those involved can voice their “story” but it 
doesn’t do much if that story is a false one; 3) objectivity. This goes hand in hand with 
the previous point: it is simply impossible to have a non-objective fact. On the other 
hand, it is quite possible to have a subjective conjecture. People can and do act on both 
but it is much better and honest to act on the former rather than the latter. (It is worth 
repeating that, for example, a national policy which is based on fables has no chance 
whatsoever of doing any good. Policies in the name of made up security threats are 
oppressive whereas economic measures that rest on “information and estimates” 
obtained from the private banking sector end up, in the long run, being even more 
damaging than their many alternatives.); 4) the common sense notion that there is an 
independent real world. For instance, in Public Opinion, Lippmann (1965) writes about 
“the two worlds”: the real one and the one that exists as a distorted image we created in 
our heads. This is not intended in a Kantian sense where we cannot have knowledge 
about the real world; we certainly can. But there are certain reasons why the picture 
inside doesn’t correspond with the world outside (ibid.: 18): 
 
artificial censorship, the limitations of social contact, the comparatively meager time available in 
each day for paying attention to public affairs, the distortion arising because events have to be 
compressed into very short messages, the difficulty of making a small vocabulary express a 
complicated world, and finally the fear of facing those facts which would seem to threaten the 
established routine of men’s lives. 
 
It was Lippmann’s thought (or a moral requirement) that the journalist – or basically 
anyone in a “fact-production” position – should bring these two worlds as close to each 
other as possible. Formulated like this, it is basically the same idea as modern science 
has: we may not know the “universal truth” but it is our responsibility getting as close to 
it as humanly possible. So far science has done exactly that. (What Lippmann became 
pessimistic about was whether the “common man” (anyone really) was competent and 
ready to sacrifice the dream world for the real one.) 
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I call this epistemology “plain vanilla” in the sense that it is not explicated, not by 
Lippmann nor by many others, yet it is clearly present in their work. (Though, 
scientifically speaking, a precise and robust explanation of one’s work is to be preferred 
to one where the reader must infer from the text the implicit methodological 
assumptions; it doesn’t mean that a somewhat unclear work should be automatically 
discarded. As long as the researcher or author has done the correct things, even if they 
have to be “dug up”, well, the researcher has done the correct things.) Below I will 
introduce some examples that, I think, can be thought of as a continuation of 
Lippmann’s work, in spirit rather than as a particular kind of content. 
 
Phillip Knightley’s (2003) The First Casualty, is a detailed exposition of how truth, 
especially during wartime, is the first thing under attack. Journalists, despite their code 
of “objectivity”, seem to end up doing everything except the kind of reporting that tries 
to uncover the truth. It is a sad story about what the combination of censorship, lack of 
journalistic principles, and partisan ideologies can do to news reporting. In Knightley’s 
work, many of the issues that Lippmann pointed out and criticised – and wanted to 
improve – are, not so much brought out to daylight, but re-established; that the same 
things that were done wrong before, are being done even today. This isn’t so much a 
case of the news consumer not being able to abandon his dreamworld as it is about the 
fact that news reporting is still filled with moralising, corruption, and the like; that men 
still cannot base their action and knowledge of the world on facts. 
 
Now, Knightley’s methodological solution was rather simple: compare what actually 
happened in history with what was reported (or purposely left out) in the newspapers (or 
radio, tv). Furthermore, there was no specific theoretical framework involved. Nor was 
the work “theoryless” in the extreme grounded theory sense, as there was a strong, 
though silent, idea-foundation without which the whole work would not have even 
started. There were the ideas, among others, that 1) truth is possible; 2) it is the 
journalist’s responsibility to write truthfully rather than deceivingly; 3) censorship has a 
strong effect on reporting; 4) reality exists and is principally knowable; 5) there is an 
adequate amount of existing evidence which can be used in reconstruction of historical 
events. Obviously Knightley also must have had the assumption – regardless what 
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might have influenced that assumption – that news reporting is far from the “tell it how 
things are”-notion. In fact, such is the general approach that it is possible, quite 
painlessly, to fit it into Hempel’s covering law model. After all, we have the 
observations (how events are reported and under what conditions); we have the law-
statements (that patriotic or any moralist notions tend to affect negatively factuality); 
and, finally, we have the result, the explanandum, that the factuality of news reporting 
is, in a general sense, going to be diminished especially whenever news reporting finds 
itself under the influence of moralims of any kind. Based on this we could proceed to 
make a prediction that whenever news reporting is going to be is similar situations, we 
are going to see misleading news. 
 
Now, if it was the case that there is no truth, no objective reality, etc. – or that if at least 
Knightley believed so – there would be no reason to write the book; it would simply 
have been impossible. But similar impossibility would have been reached if Knightley 
adopted the politicised moralising of the feminist or any other fashionable style of the 
human sciences: although there could be facts, these would have ended up being 
overlooked because they wouldn’t fit with the dogmas of the ideology. 
 
Andersen’s (2006) work is almost a mirror image of Knightley’s. The type of content, 
its spirit, and underlying assumptions are that same in both these works. We can also 
find the same problem of the two worlds as described by Lippmann, i.e., the objective 
one with factual events and our distorted images of it. For instance, Andersen (ibid.: 
xvi) writes that 
 
Most civilians experience military conflict through the signs and symbols of its depiction, their 
impressions derived not from the battles in distant lands but from the manner they are rendered 
at home (television, newspapers etc.). War stories are constructed from the bits and pieces of 
favoured myths and stories of past battlefield heroics. 
 
This leads to Andersen’s central theme of her work: propaganda and manufacture of 
consent or, in her own words, “how to make war, which at the most basic level is 
defined by suffering and death, an acceptable practice in contemporary democratic 
society” (ibid.: xvii). While the notion of “manufacture of consent” may point to a 
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constructivist/semiotic direction, such is really not the case. No-one denies that it is 
possible to substitute a factual world-view with a fake one. As Lippmann pointed out, it 
is impossible for us to personally gather all the information that exist and as such, we 
have to rely on (un)professionals who gather that information for us. We have no choice 
but to rely on the information which gathered, packaged, and presented by others. No 
wonder, then, that propagandist or otherwise inaccurate information is used as the 
building blocks of our world image. But this certainly doesn’t mean that all voices, 
discourses, etc., are equal. In Andersen’s work we can see the same emphasis on 
narrowing down the difference between the real and the imagined world by better 
journalism: “conventional news narratives that present one view, then another, all too 
often fail to provide enough background information so that viewers can understand the 
situation and evaluate both claims from an informed perspective” (ibid.: xiv). This is 
nothing else than the common sense approach according to which there is reality and we 
can have knowledge of it. The difference is that in Andersen’s work this notion is 
extended by the fact that not only can this be done, it ought to be done. 
 
Chomsky’s more politically oriented works, again, fall in the same category that are 
being dealt with. It can be said that the news research present in Chomsky’s writings is 
something of a sideshow rather than the main course. And it is not that the news 
research part is not voluminous or in other way detailed, it’s just that it serves to 
legitimise the key moral argument: that democracy ought to be protected. However, this 
cannot be done if our actions “rely on pap”. But it is not only the “trash reporting” that 
is problematic; regardless of the quality of news outlets, the democratic right of the 
people to act, to participate in the democratic process, has been denied. It is not only a 
question of national policy; there have been many “thinkers” whose opinion was that 
common people don’t know anything and their access to decision-making should be 
barred, rather than improving the matter so that they could know. According to 
Chomsky (1991: 359)  
 
The ideas that common people should be excluded from policy-making, ... have ample resonance 
until today. This doctrine remains a basic principle of modern democratic states, now 
implemented by a variety of means to protect the operations of the state from public scrutiny: 
classification of documents on the largely fraudulent pretext of national security… 
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We find, as already discovered by Lippmann, that censorship is one of the main 
obstacles of factual reporting and democratic process as well. And yes, when a 
government acts in secret, it immunises itself from scrutiny, legal proceedings, simply 
put, from all sorts of challenges directed against its domination. Other, equally 
detestable, means of public control is propaganda which has time and again come in the 
form of “it’s for the national security” argument. According to Chomsky (ibid.: 2, 5) 
 
As if by reflex, state managers plead ”security” to justify their programs. The plea rarely 
survives scrutiny. We regularly find that security threats are contrived – and, once contrived for 
other purposes, sometimes believed – to induce a reluctant public to accept overseas adventures 
or costly intervention in the domestic economy. The factors that have typically driven policy in 
the post-war period are the need to impose or maintain a global system that will serve state 
power and the closely linked interests of the masters of the private economy, and to ensure its 
viability by means of public subsidy and a state-guaranteed market. To a significant extent, the 
threat of Soviet Union and other enemies has risen or declined as these ends require. The tacit 
assumption is that the public welfare is to be identified with the welfare of the Western industrial 
powers, and particularly their domestic elite. 
 
This is quite evident, for example, in the economic “restructuring” of the former eastern 
block where foreign companies were given what only can be considered as completely 
ridiculous and unfair advantages; all, of course, supposedly serving the nations’ needs. 
But what about Chomsky’s epistemological assumptions? Well, it is certainly possible 
to infer them from his texts and they would correspond, more or less, with the tenets of 
traditional science, as was the case of the previous examples. However, in this case it is 
better to let Chomsky (2003: 93) himself formulate his own thoughts about science, 
especially of postmodernism, post-structuralism, post-everything: 
 
I have spent a lot of my life working on questions such as these, using the only methods I know 
of; those condemned here as "science", "rationality," "logic," and so on. I therefore read the 
papers with some hope that they would help me "transcend" these limitations, or perhaps suggest 
an entirely different course. I'm afraid I was disappointed. Admittedly, that may be my own 
limitation. Quite regularly, "my eyes glaze over" when I read polysyllabic discourse on the 
themes of poststructuralism and postmodernism what I understand is largely truism or error, but 
that is only a fraction of the total word count. True, there are lots of other things I don't 
understand: the articles in the current issues of math and physics journals, for example. But there 
is a difference. In the latter case, I know how to get to understand them, and have done so, in 
cases of particular interest to me; and I also know that people in these fields can explain the 
contents to me at my level, so that I can gain what (partial) understanding I may want. In 
contrast, no one seems to be able to explain to me why the latest post-this-and-that is (for the 
most part) other than truism, error, or gibberish, and I do not know how to proceed 
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As a last example, we can mention McManus (1994), whose work represents the 
political economy approach. The concern for democracy is present in the work, as well 
as a certain kind of “the common man vs. financial elite” struggle, but it is the former 
combined with an empirical study of how market factors, i.e., the “bottom line”, affect 
the accepted journalistic standards, those of objectivity and factuality. McManus’ 
concerns for democracy, for the possibility of knowledgeable public who can act upon 
that knowledge, etc., are more or less the same that already Lippmann wrote about, and 
what the previous examples also exhibited. We do not repeat them again. There is also 
very little difference in underlying “basic logic” of how things are done, though, on a 
more detailed level, McManus’ work represents a more “scientific” approach in the 
sense that he tries to actually explain the methodological part of his research. This is the 
more interesting part and it also serves as a transitioning device between this and the 
next chapter. 
 
As any “real” research, McManus’ work can be divided into two main parts: 1) what has 
been actually done (methodologically) and 2) how this has been explained to the reader, 
i.e., what methods were chosen, why, and how they were used. This latter part can delve 
more deeply into principal philosophical thoughts but it is not, strictly speaking, 
necessary. There are two main reasons why it makes sense to clarify methodological 
choices: a) so that the reader doesn’t have to guess what has been done and why and 2) 
to provide a schema or a “building plan” of the research so that anyone could try to 
replicate it and, thus, give more weight to the results. 
 
What McManus has done is, scientifically speaking, adequate – more of this later. 
However, some of the provided explanation could have been better. He states (ibid.: 
xiii), for instance, that the collected data was followed by 
 
the theory-building tactics of Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss ... in what they call the 
Constant Comparison Method. The approach is iterative. Research begins with a theory 
explaining some behaviour that’s available from past scholarship. The researcher tries to find the 
most likely point of breakdown of the theory and collects data there. The theory is amended over 
time with its weakest link continually subjected to test. When it has passed all of the “devil’s 
advocate” tests that the researcher can devise, the resulting theory may be offered to others. 
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Compared to the overall work this is really a minor issue but, I do feel that it represents 
quite many studies in the human sciences and, so, certain issues should be pointed out. 
First of all, grounded theory is, to use Chomsky’s words, a combination of “gibberish, 
truisms, and error”. What McManus refers to as “the constant comparison method” 
originates from Glaser and Strauss’ (1967: 103) who have this interesting bit to say: 
 
the constant comparative method is not designed (as methods of quantitative analysis are) to 
guarantee that two analysts working independently with the same data will achieve the same 
results; it is designed to allow, with discipline, for some of the vagueness and flexibility that aid 
the creative generation of theory.  
 
This raises several issues. Firstly, one has to ask, what kind of method allows x number 
of different researchers to arrive at x number of different results? For a scientific mind 
the answer is easy: a method that produces random results has nothing to do with being 
a method. For instance, it wouldn’t be much of a method if, say, adding 2 and 2 resulted 
in person A’s calculations as 4, person B’s as 5, person C’s as 78,2, etc. Either these 
people would be bad mathematicians or there would be no real method of addition. And 
the same applies to the “constant comparative method”. This part is clearly erroneous. 
Secondly, the claim that, on the one hand, this method has something to do with being 
“designed” and, on the other hand, to allow “disciplined vagueness and flexibility that 
aid the creative generation of theory” is clearly a contradiction in terms. What on earth 
can “disciplined vagueness” mean? How are we to proceed vaguely, though with a 
discipline? This part, then, falls under the category of “gibberish”. And thirdly, 
“creative” generation of theory. If anyone could have possibly devised a method for the 
generation of theory, they would probably get annually Nobel prizes for it, just as a 
show of appreciation. Although this may come as a shock to the supporters of grounded 
theory, there hasn’t been any method of discovery, there isn’t one now, and there won’t 
be in the future. (A side-effect of such a method would be that all scientists became 
unemployed; a computer could create all the theories, etc., simply by following the 
algorithm of this method.) This part is, again, erroneous. Now, obviously the generation 
of theory contains vagueness and flexibility but there is simply nothing methodological 
about it; it just happens, somehow, in favourable conditions. An additional issue, found 
in the excerpt from McManus, is that of a truism – though equally true for what Glaser 
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and Strauss wrote additionally about this so called method. What McManus writes, for 
example, that “research begins with a theory explaining some behaviour that’s available 
from past scholarship” or that “the theory is amended over time with its weakest link 
continually subjected to test”, he (or Glaser and Strauss) is merely stating how science 
works in general; this is in no way exclusive for “the method”. What Glaser and Strauss 
effectively did is comparative to feminists and many other non-natural scientists: the 
use of word magic. In this case it means to come up with a catchy name and “market” it 
as something new when, in fact, it is only repackaged ancient knowledge. 
 
Fortunately McManus manages to redeem himself with the help of his actual conduct of 
the research. In modern terms the approach could be referred to as “triangulation” or as 
“transgressing the boundaries between quantitative and qualitative research”. Yet, after 
closer examination, these terms turn out to be as hollow as the contemporary jargonistic 
nonsense tends to be. (Luckily, McManus doesn’t use these terms himself.) 
Triangulation simply means that instead of being a purist regarding the data set, method, 
or theory, the researcher combines these into a more robust framework (Eskola & 
Suoranta 1998: 68–69; Anttila 2005: 212). The idea behind triangulation is, quite 
straightforwardly, that by multiple X approach – where X can be a theory, method, and 
so on – the results will be more valid than, say, in a single method approach. But this is 
nothing new. Science has done this even before the term was coined. For instance, when 
people and their action is studied, an all-out eclecticism makes much more sense than an 
ideologically “pure” approach. This “purity” is more of a problem for qualitative 
research because quantitative science has never lacked those aspects of research that the 
“alternative knowers” try to deny from it. Especially if we refer to the quantitative 
approach as simply “traditional science” we find that such things as interviewing, 
observing, theorising, etc., are an internal part of it. In this sense traditional science 
uses, by nature, triangulation. 
 
McManus, then, is a traditional scientist because, in this work, he combined at least the 
following things: multiple case study, ethnography, interviewing, and journalistic as 
well as economic theories. The first of the list refers to the selection of “four local 
television stations located in the western United States, each affiliated with a major 
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network” (McManus 1994: xiii). As an example of the ethnographic part we can 
mention the following observation (ibid.: 100): 
 
[at the mid size station,] reporters were observed covering 16 stories. None involved such active 
and time-consuming processes as developing sources or searching documents, or sitting through 
government meetings. Taken as a whole, the case studies describe a minimal commitment to 
actively examining the doings of local government and business. The business model of news 
discovery prevailed. 
 
The interviewing part finds support, for instance, in McManus’ statements that “every 
television journalist interviewed said the ideal newscast should cover events in 
abbreviated form. Television’s job is to “boil down” the information available and 
capture the main points of a story. Secondary details should be left to other media.” 
(ibid.: 177.) And, lastly, the use of different theories can be exemplified by the uses of 
market model and journalistic model of news discovery where, according to the former, 
 
it’s reasonable to assume that passive discovery of events – when television journalists read 
about them in local and regional newspapers or wire services or in press releases – is less 
expensive than more active means, such as hiring and deploying reporters or field producers. So 
if a station acts rationally, a business model would predict largely passive discovery, or at least 
as passive as competing stations permit. [Where as according to the latter, to] maximise public 
understanding of its environment, the fundamental mission of journalism, news departments 
must actively and independently scrutinise their environments. A journalistic model would 
predict largely active discovery, or at least as active a discovery process as the station could 
afford. (ibid.: 96.) (brackets added) 
 
Such a “multimethod” approach, then, enables McManus to reach the conclusion (ibid.: 
197) that: 
 
in fact, rational market journalism must serve the market for investors, advertisers, and powerful 
sources before – and often at the expense of – the public market for readers and viewers. To 
think of it as truly reader- or viewer-driven is naïve. …the stations in this and other studies did 
not add entertainment to information creating “info-tainment” so much as they displaced and 
often distorted information in favour of whatever they believed would attract attention at the 
least production cost. Most of the time, market journalism is an oxymoron, a contradiction in 
terms. 
 
The point of this chapter was not to show what is the dominant type of research done in 
media studies (or communications research) but, rather, to give an example that, firstly, 
things can be done right, and also how. This doesn’t mean that the mentioned examples 
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are perfect; that they represent the absolute best scientific research. They do not. But 
they do represent the same common sense approach to doing research as is the case in 
traditional science. Above all what separates these examples from many of their 
fashionable contemporary counterparts is the “connectedness” between claims, 
statements, or questions and how these are, subsequently, supported. For instance, both 
good and, well, worse research can write about Gramscian hegemony but by being an 
empirical claim, it simply must be supported empirically; personal beliefs and strong 
“feelings” are no substitute. But in addition to being empirical, the support must also fit. 
Many works fail because, while being “empirical”, it turns out to be wrong kind of 
material; one that might support something, though, not what has been claimed. 
 
 
3.3 Media studies (or communications research) methodology 
 
While different examples of particular studies can say a lot – and it does – about what 
goes on in a field, the most telling source of information is to be found in the form of 
actual books or articles that specifically deal with methodological issues (of the 
particular field). Of course, actual studies can offer equally illuminating collections of 
thought when or if they contain as explicit formulations of the issues as is to be found – 
one expects at least – in the methodologically oriented literature. This chapter will be 
written similarly to the previous ones in the sense multiple cases are going to be 
presented following with either praise or condemnation. 
 
Same kind of criticism can be directed against the chosen examples as with everything 
presented so far: that it is not representative of the field; that I have carefully hand-
picked the kind of examples which support the conclusion that I might have decided 
upon from the very beginning. Personal assurances are a cheap currency in science, so 
nothing of the sort will be offered. However, there are two things that add support to the 
possible conclusions, things that do not depend on subjectivity: 1) media studies (or 
communications research) methodology is not unique. There is nothing in the 
epistemology of this field that doesn’t have its origins – and, hence, the underlying idea 
of how this or that works – somewhere else, be it natural sciences of the last 300 years, 
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ancient Greek philosophers, or, say, the variations of hermeneutics. Thus, methodology 
of media studies represents a wider – or older – philosophical perspectives. If, then, 
there is a book on methodology that deals or recommends a “qualitative approach” in 
dealing with the “media messages”, my possible criticism of it is justified insofar as that 
work corresponds to a whole body of literature that deals with same problems. In theory 
the presented examples could be unique, however, what makes or could make them 
unique is not the words “media messages”. Beyond these words, what we are dealing 
with, is the world of empirical objects which has been discussed long before media 
studies emerged; 2) there is a world of difference between bad results and bad results. 
Bad results are justified when we don’t know any better, or that in that particular 
moment or era there wasn’t better information available, nor were there the means to 
produce such information. Ignorance is not when something is unknown. However, 
when the necessary information exists and we choose not to use it, that, then, is 
ignorance. Bad results are part of science; it is unavoidable due to the nature of 
scientific knowledge. The only way to correct this is if we had the necessary 
information always beforehand, always ready-made (and neatly catalogued). Obviously 
this is impossible. But ignorance – the intentional disregard of existing information – 
does not belong to science. When that happens it is politics, religion, or whatever, but it 
is not science. Therefore, even if my selection could be accused of not being 
representational, such examples shouldn’t have been published in the first place – or if 
yes, then at least not as scientific texts. 
 
I will begin the examples, perhaps unexpectedly, with a methodological work which, 
although attempting to cover the whole spectrum, concentrates mostly on quantitative 
research rather than qualitative or, equally both. The intention is not to write a repetition 
of the contents – for instance, to explain what is a median, etc. – rather, the aim is to 
point out what can be considered as crucial mistakes. These can be, for example, non-
critical attitude towards “methods” that clearly do not work or, say, a complete 
ignorance of the history and “schools” of philosophical thought. From the actual 
research point of view, the non-critical listing of the various dubious methods – as if 
they worked – is most unforgiving. Anyway, the first example, then, is that from Frey, 
 100  
Botan & Kreps (2000), Investigating Communication: An Introduction to Research 
Methods. 
 
The quantitative part of this work is “ok” in the sense that it offers a nice introduction to 
the basic concepts – for students – but in no way can it be considered a handbook on 
how to really set-up and carry through a research project. However, things begin to go 
haywire when they stray from this purely quantitative element and attempt to elucidate 
methodology from a wider perspective. This wider perspective begins by pointing to a 
methodological dualism where, on the one hand, there is positivism and, on the other 
hand, as an opposition to it, naturalism; or as the authors write “positivistic and 
naturalistic paradigms” (ibid.: 18). Yes, that’s right, not positivism and hermeneutics or 
quantitative and qualitative, but positivism and naturalism. The authors (ibid.) continue 
about the “naturalistic paradigm” that it 
 
can be defined as the family of philosophies that focus on the socially constructed nature of 
reality. The naturalistic paradigm, again as applied to the social sciences, is essentially 
concerned with the development of methods that capture the socially constructed and situated 
nature of human behaviour. Perhaps the best way to thing about the difference between these 
paradigms is that while the positivist paradigm stresses the word science in the term “social 
science”, the naturalistic paradigm stresses the word social. 
 
What the authors obviously mean by “naturalistic paradigm” is hermeneutics or 
qualitative approach to research – at least that is what one usually finds in the 
methodology literature. There is, of course, such a thing as “naturalistic observation” 
which refers to observing the object in its natural environment but this doesn’t mean or 
lead to a change of methodological paradigm. Naturalistic observation is fully 
compatible with positivism. However, it ceases to be so if it is claimed that only 
“naturalistic observation” is allowable. Furthermore, naturalism as such, i.e., as not only 
observation, can be considered being a part of positivism, or corresponding to it over 
the important parts. There are differences, of course, among the naturalists and, hence, 
between positivism and naturalism, but this is because none of the philosophical schools 
are monolithic structures; there is a certain shared hard core and a shifting cloud of fog 
surrounding it. 
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The book plunges into methodological mess in chapter 9 where it deals about “textual 
analysis”. According to the authors (ibid.: 225, 227), 
 
textual analysis is the method communication researchers use to describe and interpret the 
characteristics of a recorded or visual message [which can be anything, for instance, text, 
picture, sound, etc.]. Describing the communication embedded in a text is not as easy as it might 
seem because there isn’t a single meaning of a text, nor is there a single perspective from which 
to interpret it. Communication scholars also often function as qualified interpreters of texts. They 
are trained in the methodologies discussed in this chapter, which means they study texts using 
rigorous and systematic procedures. (brackets added) 
 
From a methodological perspective, not much is offered. Then again, there really isn’t 
much to be given anyway, other than the many variations on the same semiotic idea, 
i.e., the thousand and one different ways to search for meaning which, at the end of the 
day, boil down to the same one thing: the researchers subjective feelings about what 
might lie “hidden” beyond the immediately visible while not forgetting to remind the 
reader how that visible is positivistic and, hence, it should be disregarded. Not only is 
the listing of researchers feelings void of any methodology, if falls prey to the dangers 
Corner was talking about (the Barthes example). However, the interesting part is the 
contradiction contained in the above quote. So, on the one hand they say that “there 
isn’t a single meaning of a text” or an interpretative perspective but, on the other hand, 
somehow communication scholars are competent interpreters. Not only are they 
competent, they use rigorous and systematic procedures. But semiotic analyses are as 
close to being rigorous and systematic as fire is to water. What can be rigorous, is 
content analysis if understood as a simple counting exercise. Of course, content analysis 
as simply counting something is as methodological as counting pebbles or grains of 
sand, i.e., not at all. But this seems to be exactly what the authors have in mind, though 
even this ends up being contradictory. 
 
They divide content analysis into two categories: quantitative and qualitative where the 
former is to be understood as a mechanistic procedure. According to the authors (ibid.: 
237) 
 
most content analyses are quantitative in nature, which involves counting the particular instances 
of certain types of messages in texts. There are, however, qualitative content analyses, where 
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researchers are most interested in the meanings associated with messages than with the number 
of times message variables occur. 
 
Although I can only speak for myself but I have not yet seen content analysis as a 
method, quantitative or qualitative, where analysis (interpretation) was not somehow 
present. Deciding what to count necessarily involves interpretation. No one in his or her 
right mind would be interested only in how many times something occurs. Frequency is 
important when it is related to the leading idea which, by the way, triggers the whole 
activity of “counting”. So, yes, (quantitative) content analysis does involve counting but 
it also involves reasoning, interpreting, and so on. Quantitative content analysis is 
actually an unnecessarily confusing construct, for it is nothing else than applying 
statistics to media messages. The way it is being written about in a large body of 
methodology literature gives an impression as if it was something else, an autonomous 
method. (For instance, in Hansen (1998) we can find the same confusion. Perhaps even 
more, for he writes of it firstly (ibid.: 91) that “content analysis is [a] method for the 
systematic analysis of communications content” but, secondly (ibid.: 98) that 
 
much of the criticism which has been directed at content analysis touches on problems more to 
do with the potential and actual (mis)-uses and abuses of the method, than to do with any 
inherent weaknesses of this method as a method of data-collection. 
 
This gives an impression as if content analysis can be considered a data-collection 
method. However, there is, again, nothing particular in the way data is collected from 
media messages and, thus, no unique “data-collection method” is warranted. Every data-
collection is informed (guided) by some idea – theory, hypothesis, etc. – and as long as 
we want to have a representative sample – even one case if we are interested in that one 
case – certain rules have to be followed. (For example, if bias is to be reduced and so 
on.) These rules are of a general nature which means that they are used always when 
data is gathered. A new method is not created whenever the object of data-collection 
changes as long as the process remains the same. Content analysis hasn’t been shown to 
be predominantly different in this sense.)  
 
 103  
But the principal error is not that some used terms and concepts are unclear or even 
false, or that the statements are contradictory; the most serious offence is that a book 
that is intended to raise a new cohort of researchers does not really evaluate what works 
and what doesn’t, what is justified and what is totally unsupported. (For instance, in 
contemporary medical books one tends not to find prescriptions on how to tap a hole 
into a skull as a method to cure migraine for a very good reason: it doesn’t work.) It is 
one thing to write about what happens or exist in a world, but methodological debate 
should go beyond that, if we want to have science that is. 
 
As has been mentioned several times, in the methodology literature – no matter whether 
we mean that of human sciences as a whole or specifically communication research – 
positivism has been mostly considered as the designated negative comparison point; a 
methodological and philosophical punch bag without much consideration if those 
punches and kicks are justified. One of the most popular accusation directed at 
positivism is that it is “shallow”. Not only is this the result of misunderstanding 
positivism but also basic scientific principles. 
 
Tervonen & Hemánus’ (1980) Objektiivinen joukkotiedotus (Objective mass 
communication) is one such example – though this is a more philosophical than strictly 
methodological work. The basic structure of the book can be divided into four parts, 
either as units or underlying ideas: a philosophical contemplation of objectivity, 
whether objectivity could be reached, at least in principle, that objectivity ought to be a 
goal of the journalistic process, and what obstructions to and/or misconceptions about 
objectivity there have been. In principle, the underlying intention sounds good. The fact 
that there is an attempt at creating a sort of philosophical foundation makes this book 
quite distinctive, and in a very positive sense. However, the philosophical part falls 
somewhat flat, unable to produce that bedrock on which a further argument could be 
built; it remains disconnected and, quite frankly, pointless. The good part of it is that the 
writer (Tervonen) considers objectivity as correspondence between the message and 
reality, though not as identicality between the two (ibid.: 19). Although this connection 
(correspondence) is problematised further, without really producing a coherent solution, 
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the basic idea of correspondence, no matter how affected by subjectivity, etc., remains 
as the decisive quality of objectivity. 
 
As to why, say, journalism ought to be objective, we get more or less the same 
justification as given by Lippmann. Hemánus (ibid.: 135–136) writes that 
 
mass-communication should aim at objectivity because if it succeeds in this – as much as is 
possible – mass-communication has the potential to fulfil its noblest duty: to further maximally 
realistic, in an ideal situation, scientific worldview. Only based on the maximally scientific 
worldview can a man learn the laws of reality, use them where possible and otherwise adapt to 
them, and thus be better equipped to build the kind of society that can best satisfy his needs. 
  
But it is the misconceptions – supposedly positivistic for that matter – that are the most 
interesting here. They are interesting because they rest on nothing but air; a serious 
methodological/philosophical error that has become all too frequent in the human 
sciences. According to Hemánus (ibid.: 89–90) positivistic supposition of objectivity is 
wrong because of two main reasons: 
 
firstly, the underlying assumption of reality is shallow as is the case for positivism and, 
secondly, such suppositions [of objectivity] transform the concept of objectivity into a relatively 
easily operationisable and thus observable, even measurable phenomenon so that the concept of 
objectivity is distorted. These reasons are intertwined; because positivistic view of reality is 
positivistic it follows that observational methods and measures are developed which can be 
validly applied only to the surface of reality while they remain inadequate, even misleading if 
applied to the deeper, scientific examination of reality.  
 
Yes, according to the manifesto of the Vienna Circle (The Vienna Circle: 306), there are 
only surfaces in science, and not some metaphysically burdened nonsense about depth. 
It seems that Hemánus is a believer in the Kantian “things in themselves” and “things as 
they appear for us” where the former is unknowable for us, only the latter. But firstly, 
how can we know that we cannot know things in themselves and, secondly, even if this 
was somehow true, why bother with it in the first place? “Things in themselves” is an 
unnecessary metaphysical burden that the positivists wanted to get rid of – it doesn’t 
add anything to a scientific process. These “unfathomable” depths are comparable to 
concepts like the “spirit of history”; things that are unobservable in principle and, thus, 
there is no place for them in science. One would imagine that those who criticise 
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positivism for being interested only in surfaces would have suggested alternative 
methodology that allows us to go “deeper”. Unsurprisingly, no such methodology has 
been so far produced and neither does Hemánus – however, he does go on, with an 
admirable insistence, for several pages about how shallow positivism is. We do not have 
to repeat all the points that he lists, as a critique of positivistic assumptions, a couple 
will suffice. He writes (ibid.: 95) that positivism – in journalism – sees objectivity as 
fairness, i.e., that “both parties” can voice their “side of the story”. But this has nothing 
to do with positivism. It is not some political system that tries to establish a universal 
democratic and fair world order where everyone will have an equal say in the daily 
matters. Additionally, he says (ibid.: 102) that positivism sees objectivity as a 
presentation which doesn’t affect the receivers. Hemánus (ibid.) explains this by saying 
that positivism sees that only value-judgements can affect people while stating or 
relaying facts will not. Again, it would have been nice if Hemánus gave an example of a 
positivism that makes such claims. No such examples (not even one) were given. It is 
interesting that on the one hand positivism is seen as being simply wrong but on the 
other hand Hemánus & Tervonen sees objectivity as a correspondence between the 
statement (message) and reality, which happens to be one of the core features of 
positivism – even though there were, among positivists, leanings towards coherentism 
as well. 
 
Even the already mentioned Nordenstreng had his quarrels with positivism, against 
which Marxism was posited as the obviously correct position – then again, that book 
was written in the 70s, a time when Marxism-Leninism was more fashionable in the 
human sciences, in Finland. For Nordenstreng the big battle between philosophical 
approaches centred on the question which has more merit, materialism or idealism. 
Naturally, in the Marxist-Leninist spirit, Nordenstreng chose materialism as the basis 
for communications research. The choice of materialism is not what should be 
criticised, it is his categorisation of positivism as idealism and his stated arguments (or 
their lack of). (This was, actually, the first time I heard or read anyone speak or write of 
positivism as a form of idealism.) According to Nordenstreng (1975: 46) 
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a positivist does not cease to be, in the end, an idealist when he remembers, on the side of his 
linguistic-logical analyses, also to notice objective reality and societal practice. Positivism’s 
relation to philosophical traditions doesn’t become clear based only on to what extent thinking 
operates with material and to what extent with phenomena of the mind – from this point, many a 
positivist (behaviourist), using quantifying methods, would turn out to be “materialist”. But the 
real touchstone of positivism is its position on values: are values to be based on reality or is their 
origin somewhere else – such as in the human consciousness. 
 
Now, it can be that my translation to English is not necessarily the best one; I can only 
say that Nordenstreng’s original in Finnish makes as little sense as my translation of it. 
The argument is nonsense up to the point where the issue of values is raised, and that 
also turns out to be rather weak attempt. Considering what positivism was about, it 
doesn’t make sense to even ask whether positivism sees values as based on reality – if 
the origin was supposedly somewhere else, a positivist would dismiss that as a 
metaphysical and mostly meaningless statement that is impossible to verify even in 
principle. To speak of non-materialistic phenomena simply does not fit into the 
positivistic philosophy. The mistake in Nordenstreng’s thinking lies in the fact he sees 
human consciousness as not being based on reality. But if it is not based on reality, i.e., 
if it isn’t material or at least have material consequences, then in what sphere of 
existence or non-existence it is to be found? Is it, perhaps, also somewhere in the 
Kantian sphere of “das Ding an sich”? If that was the case, how is Nordenstreng 
qualified to talk about objects of that level? Of course, for a positivist it doesn’t make 
that much sense to speak of the mind’s origins. A positivist simply holds that 
“everything we can sensibly talk about is spatially and temporally ordered. What 
appears in statements as 'mental', 'personality', 'soul', must be expressible as something 
spatio-temporal or else vanish from science” (Neurath 1973: 325). According to Schlick 
to talk about whether or not something is real is pointless as that cannot be established 
through philosophical analysis. The only thing we can do, according to him, is to clarify 
what we mean by saying that something is real; and that, whether this is so or not, can 
be settled only through everyday life and the ordinary methods of science, i.e., through 
experience (Schlick 1997: 74). It must be said again: it is easy to construct straw-man 
arguments about positivism (or traditional science) – which demands that no actual 
examples of the evil philosophy can be offered in favour of the argument – and then 
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present one’s own insights as the clever solutions to a problem that never existed in the 
first place. 
 
Moving on to the more “linguistic” approaches. Bell & Garrett’s (1998: 2) introduction 
to critical discourse analysis points out that in media studies there 
 
has been [a] change in perspectives on where the meanings of texts reside. ‘... Text-as-meaning  
is produced at the moment of reading, not at the moment of writing ... [this] takes away from that 
text the status of being the originator of that meaning’ (Fiske, 1987: 305;...) Since meanings are 
now seen to be more a product of negotiation between readers and texts, text takes on more of 
the interactive qualities of discourse. (brackets added) 
 
The absurdity of the “linguistic shift” in human sciences is nothing short of bombastic; 
that is, if the principle of meaning as a sole result of reading is proposed seriously. Such 
a position could be defended only if the Saussurean separation between langue and 
reality was not utterly broken. As Giddens (1979: 16-17) writes: “The dam that 
Saussure established to protect the system of langue from semantic and referential ties 
to the world of objects and events is continually and necessarily breached”. Although 
the relation between, say, a word and its material counterpart is based on convention, 
once that convention becomes adequately established – and we do happen to live in a 
world where the majority of words or expressions are established – to treat those 
“signs” arbitrarily means that either a person deliberately tries to breach the linguistic 
system or that person is, in fact, someone who does not know the system in the first 
place. Texts, then, are written with a certain intended meaning. If not, why write 
meaningless texts? And as long as the receiver of that text masters the same linguistic 
system on which it is based, then the meaning cannot be arbitrary – at least without 
breaking all semantic and syntactic rules. This doesn’t mean that words have absolutely 
precise meaning; especially those of everyday language. (One reason scientific terms 
and vocabulary exists and is developed is to decrease the level of ambiguity as much as 
possible.) However, even if the boundaries (of the words) are somewhat foggy, there is 
a solid core that allows and directs communication (meaning) in a certain way rather 
than some other. Of course, the best evidence for the non-arbitrariness of language 
(even if based on convention) is the fact that at least most of the time people seem to 
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understand each other. In an arbitrary (random) environment understanding would be 
impossible. To put it differently, we may not be able to perfectly define a policeman – 
to the last atom – but we certainly point and say “this is a policeman” when we see one. 
 
According to Bell & Garrett (ibid.: 6) critical discourse analysis “has produced the 
majority of research into media discourse during the 1980s and 1990s, and has arguably  
become the standard framework for studying media texts within European linguistics 
and discourse studies.” Of course, what is meant by discourse analysis is nothing else 
than the semiotic analysis of various “texts”. Every now and then there comes a scholar 
who sees it as his or her duty to “invent” a new approach which, however, after some 
scrutiny, turns out to be the same thing in new clothes. Some use the word “story” or 
“narrative” instead of text, or they speak of narrative or conversation analyses, but in the 
end it is the same thing. Structural and/or formal analyses can potentially be different; if 
aimed at describing structure/form, they are different, otherwise they fall to the already 
mentioned category. The other problematic of the multitudes of semiotic analyses has 
also been dealt with. Bell & Garrett (ibid.) write that 
 
[critical discourse analysis] has an explicit sociopolitical agenda, a concern to discover and bear 
witness to unequal relations of power which underlie ways of talking in a society, and in 
particular to reveal the role of discourse in reproducing or challenging sociopolitical dominance. 
[critical discourse analysis] also offers the potential for applying theoretically sophisticated 
frameworks to important issues, so is a natural tool for those who wish to make their  research 
socially activist. (brackets added) 
 
It is the political nature of the “analysis” that raises concern. A researcher can certainly 
be an activist but when that activism overrides good scientific conduct then nothing else 
but propaganda remains. And in a case when a flawed methodology, or unfitting for the 
task, is being used, the results are everything but scientific. Then again, even the 
“politics” side becomes suspect, as there is a tendency for it to be supported with 
fairytales rather than facts. 
 
One of the variations on critical discourse analysis is Bell’s (1998) discourse structure 
analysis. As the name implies that aim of this approach is, well, to analyse structure of 
the text (although Bell insists a text in this case is a story). By structure is meant such 
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things as who, what, where, etc., their order, the source, time of event, and so on. It is 
really a deconstruction of the “story” into its constitutive elements. So far this would 
fall under the structural/formal category of analyses. Such an approach is relatively 
problem free, I mean if formal description, comparison, etc., is aimed at. And one 
would certainly expect that, especially when Bell (ibid.: 65) writes: “My approach to 
news discourse focuses on the question ‘what does this story actually say happened?’ It 
is not a question – at least initially – of whether these reports represent what ‘really’ 
happened.” But if we are not interested in reality, it becomes trivial to say what the 
story claims to have happened. Whether the piece starts with the who part or ends with 
it makes no difference. Such formal analysis and comparison can reveal, say, stylistic 
differences between eras, newspapers, or journalists – which can be interesting or even 
valuable – but not much else. However, this approach doesn’t lend itself to answer 
questions of much wider effect. For example, according to Bell (ibid.: 64–65) 
 
media ‘discourse’ is important both for what it reveals about a society and because it also itself 
contributes to the character of society. Linguistic research on the media has always emphasized 
this last concern, focusing where issues of ideology and power are closest to the surface. But 
prerequisite to all such questions is a sound discourse analysis...   
 
Sounds nice, but revelations about society are an empirical matter which belongs to the, 
as Bell puts it, “what really happened” category. Society cannot be reduced to news 
discourse, nor to the real facts newsmen supposedly report; it is much more. 
Unfortunately, instead of giving an explanation how it is possible – validly that is – to 
move seamlessly between the limited domain of news structure (while disregarding the 
actual facts) and the practically infinite sphere of society, Bell decided it is better to 
drown us in a sea of trivialities, for instance, that “only after we are clear what the story 
says will we be in a position to see what it does not say” (ibid.: 66). It is not that 
difficult to say what this or that story doesn’t say. In fact, those things that are not being 
said come in an endless stream. For example, news article about Gaddafi is not about a 
race-horse called Fred – one doesn’t need to be a media scholar to do that, nor is it 
necessary to use discourse structure analysis to reveal such deep insights. 
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Surely there must be better examples of discourse analysis (critical or not) – as a 
concrete and scientific methodology that is. According to Schrøder  (2002), one of the 
chief contributors to critical discourse analysis is Norman Fairclough. Schrøder  
continues that it (critical discourse analysis) “represents a significant theoretical as well 
as methodological contribution to the ... study of media discourse.” (ibid.: 106.) 
Considering how promising all this sounds, lets see, then, what Fairclough has to say. In 
one article Fairclough (1998: 142) describes a framework for studying political 
discourse; a variation on critical discourse analysis. (I presume that the variation will be 
minimal.) He continues that in his approach “political discourse is seen as an 'order of 
discourse' ... which is continuously changing within wider processes of social and 
cultural change affecting the media themselves and other social domains which are 
linked to them” (ibid.). We begin to see what Fairclough has in mind based on the 
intended wider scope of analysis (ibid.: 143): 
 
While I think that 'internal analysis' in the sense of close textual analysis is essential if we are 
really to develop an understanding of political discourse, Bourdieu is right to insist that internal 
analysis of political discourses or texts which does not place them with respect to the political 
field and its wider social frame is of limited value. I propose to partially meet this criticism by 
arguing that analysis of media political discourse ... should aim to simultaneously illuminate 
particular communicative events, and the constitution and transformation of the political order of 
discourse. By the political order of discourse, I mean the structured configuration of genres and 
discourses which constitutes political discourse, the system – albeit an open and shifting one – 
which defines and delimits political discourse, at a given point in time. ...discourse analysis also 
needs to be properly integrated with other forms of social analysis. 
 
The good thing is that a necessity to integrate discourse analysis with other types of 
analyses is recognised. However, it does not completely solve the problem if this wider 
analysis disregards research done based on the traditional science paradigm. What I 
mean is, insistence on a semiotic analysis only, is an unnecessarily restrictive approach, 
one that cannot solve the inherent limits of the semiotic “method”. From the above 
quote it is actually impossible to say what Fairclough concretely means, for instance, by 
genres and discourses which constitute political discourse ... which defines and delimits 
political discourse, etc. Though I take it that it is, in fact, the semiotic approach to which 
Fairclough’s words refer. Unfortunately, not much is offered what can be considered 
methodology proper. What started as a sensible idea – combining discourse analysis 
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with other forms of inquiries – quickly turns into a collection of trivialities, clad into the 
“correct” jargon. And so, Fairclough (ibid.: 145) writes that 
 
my focus here and more generally is on intertextuality: on how in the production and 
interpretation ... of a text people draw upon other texts and text types which are culturally 
available to them. The claim is that texts have a dual orientation to 'systems' in a broad sense: 
there are language systems, and there are orders of discourse. The text-system relationship in 
both cases is dialectical: texts draw upon but also constitute (and reconstitute) systems. An order 
of discourse is a structured configuration of genres and discourses (and maybe other elements, 
such as voices, registers, styles) associated with a given social domain - for example, the order of 
discourse of a school. In describing such an order of discourse, one identifies its constituent 
discursive practices (e.g. various sorts of classroom talk and writing, playground talk, staffroom 
talk, centrally produced documentation, etc.), and crucially the relationships and boundaries 
between them. The concern, however, is not just with the internal economy of various separate 
orders of discourse. It is with relationships of tension and flow across as well as within various 
local orders of discourse in an (open) system that we might call the 'societal order of discourse'. 
 
This is a perfect example of what is wrong with the “linguistic shift”; it is nonsensical, 
despite the sprinkled crumbs of trivialities. First of all, by invoking the sacred powers of 
dialectics nothing at all is explained. The fact that things affect each other is perfectly 
known in science: ultimately everything affects everything in the universe. But there is 
no actual research that can be based on such a truism. One has to be much more 
concrete. It is the what, where, and especially how that are decisive, not some 
uninformative notions that, say, objects are dimensional. Second, the given example of 
“an order of discourse as a structured configuration” of a school simply means “how 
people talk in a school”. Even laymen understand this latter aim while the previous 
needs a “professional” to decipher it. Again, it is obscurantism at work. Thirdly, it 
remains unanswered what is meant by “internal economy of various separate orders of 
discourse”. The same can be said even about the “relationships of tension and flow 
across and within local orders of discourse...” If it simply means the various interactions 
individuals and groups engage among each other, then it is a triviality, otherwise we are 
left in the dark as to what it could mean. 
 
When one reads Fairclough’s analytical framework, it is difficult to shake off the 
nagging feeling that it is an example of what Niemelä & Tammisalo coined as “word 
magic” – or obscurantism if one wishes, “word magic” just sounds better. For when 
Fairclough (ibid.: 146–147) proceeds with, say, concepts like the sphere of the political, 
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orders of discourse of the political system, and so on, we eventually find out that: 1) the 
political is not really delimited in any way; 2) but the political cannot even be delimited 
for it is, in the end, supposed to be the concatenation of all societal spheres, i.e., 
economy, politics, media, etc. Although the words like “economy” give an impression 
of something with boundaries – and on a conceptual level we can think so – in reality, 
such is not the case as it permeates all aspects of society. It is equally so with politics or 
any other just as wide a concept. This leaves us with two options: either a) one tries to 
do “holistic” research of the “totality” of the societal – which is really impossible and 
one usually ends up selecting, uninformatively and randomly, bits and pieces here or 
there – or b) an additional layer(s) of delimitation is added and, as in traditional science, 
the fact that everything affects everything is broken down to more constitutive elements. 
However, in Fairclough’s framework such steps and their justification is not given: it 
remains ambiguous and impressionistic. According to him  (ibid.: 150–151) “discourse 
analysis cannot simply focus upon the texts and talk of mediatized politics; it needs also 
to analyse the practices of political discourse both on the side of production, and on the 
side of reception/consumption.” Although this may sound as some concrete steps the 
researcher should follow, such is not the case. 
 
Ultimately, in Fairclough’s model, everything is discourse; what in older sociology was 
referred as simply “societal” is now transformed into “societal discourse”. But if by 
discourse is meant only that which is textual (written, spoken), then an act of reduction 
is performed which surpasses even the supposed evil “positivist reductionism”. On the 
other hand, if no such reductionism is aimed at – and this remains somewhat unclear – 
then Fairclough’s model has added absolutely nothing to what already is. If by 
discourse we simply end up adding a certain word after every other word (concept, or 
object), then it can be easily removed as it obviously has no concrete meaning. We can, 
for instance, say that everything is “boinky”, but if it doesn’t contain any specificity, or 
if our actions towards each other and the reality remain unchanged even after 
disregarding all “boinkiness”, then it is nothing but a gimmick. It could be interesting in 
poetry, political party documents, etc., but not in science. Fairclough (ibid.: 161) 
concludes that “the value of this approach is that it avoids particular discursive events 
and texts being treated in isolation from the orders of discourse and the wider social 
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fields and processes they are embedded within.” While this is true it, unfortunately, 
ends up at the other opposite so that one doesn’t really know what to study, how, or 
even why. But this is not all as, according to Schrøder (2002: 108), “Fairclough’s 
rejection of empirically studying audiences and other social agents of discourse tends to 
limit the applicability and explanatory value of the approach”. It is, then, the repetition 
of Barthes’ case, i.e., the subjective constructions of the analyst. 
 
Now, more examples could be given – about the different variants of discourse analysis, 
critical or not – but not much new could be offered. It all revolves around the question, 
how such methodology positions itself in relation to traditional science. If there is 
conformity between the two, then there is very little reason to treat discourse analysis 
differently, from traditional science that is; it simply would be an application of already 
existing scientific procedures which are the same in principle even though the situation 
of usage might vary. (Quantitative) content analysis is a case in point: it is not a unique 
method (or methodology), rather, it is an application of already existing methods of 
traditional science. On the other hand, if discourse analysis – and the whole semiotic 
approach for that matter – is intended as an alternative, or even an opposite, to 
traditional science, then even in this case to speak of methodology would not be fitting. 
Whether the “alternativists” like it or not, traditional science does have a pretty good 
idea of what ought to be done in science, what works and what doesn’t. The fact that the 
alternative approaches have produced “research” is meaningless when or if that research 
is based on ambiguity, triviality, and outright impossibility. If, say, medical research 
and medical researchers adopted similar approach, we would spare no words in their 
condemnation. Why should other ranks of the academia/science get a special treatment? 
So far, from the alternativists camp, we have got promises, substitution of fact-based 
research with ideological sentimentality that is comparable to religious dogmas, and 
studies that, when analysed based on merit rather than political fit – turn out to be more 
or less unsupported fluff. 
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4 WHAT THE STUDENTS HAVE LEARNED 
 
In this chapter we will take a brief overview of what the students do; where on the 
traditional science vs. hermeneutic-postmodernist-feminist-semiotic spectrum their 
work can be located and what is found as acceptable work. Also, a word or two will be 
given on evaluation of the situation, its consequences, and what ought to be done – if 
anything at all. 
 
 
4.1 What material is used, how it was selected, and hypothesis 
 
The used material (appendix 1, selected cases are marked with bold font) consists of 
accepted media studies master’s theses written at the university of Vaasa over the period 
2001-2009. Although the sample was selected roughly one year ago, the possible 
addition to that list will have only negligible effect to the overall results because the 
number of finished (and accepted) theses is rather low. Now, the reason why we choose 
samples is to eliminate the need to study the whole population. The central idea of a 
sample is representativeness: if it can be shown that the sample represents dependently 
the whole population, the need to study the latter is eliminated. (Sometimes it may be a 
question of resources, i.e., that due to financial reasons a sample over the whole 
population must be chosen whether we want or not.) A perfect representativeness is, 
perhaps, never reached 
 
 as two types of error are regularly encountered: those arising from biases in selection, etc., 
though avoidable, frequently occur, while those due to chance differences between the members 
of the population included and those not included are virtually certain to be present. The former 
is termed the error due to bias, and the latter the sampling error... (Madge 1953: 207.) 
 
A remedy – as close to one as possible – to this is the randomisation of sampling. But, 
as Wright (1979: 36) writes, “random does not mean capricious or haphazard; random 
assignment or randomization means that each subject or unit has an equal or known 
chance ... of being allocated ... and that the allocation of each unit is done independently 
of the others.” 
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This brings us to the size of the sample. As to the question “How much is enough?”, the 
answer depends on what is the purpose of the study. A research can be either extremely 
empirical, in theory or hypothesis testing sense, extremely theoretical (as is the case, for 
instance, with many themes of theoretical physics), or something in between. Töttö 
writes (2005: 52) that if we are interested in the first option, the empirical material 
should be as robust and representative as possible; theoretical research, as the second 
option, might not require any samples (here Töttö mentions Einstein’s theory of 
relativity), and the in between will be, well, somewhere in between. The question of size 
of the sample is similarly explained by Chalmers (1985: 16), that 
 
For example, based on the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima the understanding that 
atomic bombs cause widespread death and destruction needed only that one observation. [On the 
other hand] we would not ascribe supernatural powers to a fortune-teller on the basis of one 
correct prediction. (brackets added) 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, there are two aims: to describe the population and carry 
out a rudimentary hypothesis test. With these aims in mind, more “robust” material is to 
be preferred. But the initial question, of size, is still not answered. And, I am afraid, not 
much of a concrete answer will be given. For instance, Madge (1953: 213) writes that 
 
there are various common misconceptions about the necessary size of sample. One is that the 
sample should be a regular proportion (often put at 5 %) of the ‘population’, and another is that 
the sample should total about 2,000. No such rule-of-thumb method is adequate. The size of the 
sample is properly fixed by deciding what level of accuracy is required, and hence how large a 
sampling error is acceptable. 
 
And, according to Wright (1979: 30) 
 
[...that in addition to the limiting factor of available funding, or other resources] sample size 
depends on the nature of the analysis to be performed, the desired precision of the estimates one 
wishes to achieve, the kind and number of comparisons that will be made, the number of 
variables that have to be examined simultaneously, and how heterogenous a universe is sampled. 
(brackets added) 
 
But there is one more thing that should be realised: the size of the target population. The 
problem here, then, is that the smaller the population, the more difficult it is to calculate 
an estimate. This can be illustrated with an example of a population of two units; we can 
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choose randomly at minimum and maximum 1 unit; lets say that the selected unit is a 
white table-tennis ball (these come in either white or orange versions); how confident 
can we be that even the next ball will be white? Considering that we have a case of one 
or the other, the probability will be 50 % which is completely random chance. No 
mathematics can change the fact that based on one unit of two, the unknown unit’s 
quality may or may not be this or that at the 50 % level of probability. So, the smaller 
the population, the more will a statistical inference resemble a pure guess. This can be 
remedied by increasing the sample size but, again, in small populations this could mean 
including more and more samples until almost or indeed every unit gets sampled. 
 
In the end 7 cases ended up being selected. Originally the intention was to select 12 
theses but due to availability limitations at the library and “empirical saturation”, the 
sample was limited to 7. By empirical saturation I mean that the sample showed 
remarkable similarity of those aspects that are the objects of interest here, i.e., additional 
material was very unlikely to produce something “surprising”. The distribution of the 
theses’ grades is shown in the figure 1 (the grades are ordered from lowest to highest: a 
= lowest and l = highest. The frequency refers to the total amount of instances of a 
particular grade in the population.) 
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The graph in figure 1 is not that far away from a normal distribution which means, for 
instance, that the measures of central tendency (mean, median, and mode) are close to 
each other – which in this case are represented by the grade cl (in a normal distribution 
these measures would be exactly the same). Such a distribution is supposed to simply 
say that most students have written a thesis that was rewarded an average grade (cl in 
this case) and also that it is reasonable to assume that most theses in the future will fall 
into this category. It is expected that the further we get from the average, the smaller the 
frequency of such instances. Such common expectation certainly is supported at least in 
the case of the media studies theses. Lastly, a remark about the missing l-grade(s). 
There are several potential explanations why no-one has been granted the best grade: 1) 
common sense tells us that this is so simply because there were no theses worthy of that 
grade; 2) however, it is possible, in a more general sense, that the requirements are set 
too high – that no “mortal” student can achieve it; 3) (a variation on the previous point) 
some teachers, professors, supervisors, etc., don’t give the highest grade due to a 
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mistaken principle according to which they might think that a student should not receive 
the highest grade simply because a student is a student. 
 
These last three points differ from field to field, university to university, and supervisor 
to supervisor. And when one adds to this the fact that the formal thesis requirements – 
and how they are graded – are thoroughly subjective, it becomes difficult to pinpoint 
exactly why such and such grade has not been awarded, or why, exactly, the grade 
distribution is skewed one way or the other. There is no metric for how to evaluate, say, 
the overall level of l-grade thesis if or when the requirement goes something like this: 
“Overall, the work is distinctive; it shows the writer’s own judgment, the results are 
interesting and novel.” Intuitively this makes sense, however, the evaluation procedure 
is ambiguous at best. For instance, what does novel in this case mean? Is it novelty from 
the viewpoint of what students generally write, for the supervisor, or, perhaps, a 
completely new discovery in the whole field? The same can be asked of everything and 
the answer will be equally vague. In this sense, I think, it would be better to mostly 
evaluate the “scientific attitude” of a thesis. Although still this would remain vague at 
the positive end of the scale but, at the lower end, it would not be that difficult to 
ascertain whether these and those requirements have been met. For example, it is not 
that difficult to find out whether a research aim that requires a causal analysis actually 
does contain one. This analysis could be better or worse but at least it shows that the 
student grasps the basic logic of science. Unfortunately, these days, there are strong 
stylistic requirements of the faculty and individual supervisor which seem to take higher 
priority than actual content – with the faculty requirements this is certainly the case. 
 
Furthermore, it is, I think, safe to assume that the grades have not been issued 
randomly; that the actual content correlates with the grades so that the better the grade, 
the better the content (or the other way around). Considering that the content of a thesis 
is not standardisable in the same sense as, say, some hardware product, the evaluation 
by the thesis supervisor will contain an element of subjectivity which may have a 
considerable effect the closer to or further away from the supervisors “pet theory”, 
whims, etc., the to be evaluated thesis happens to be. At minimum, however, one 
expects that even the lowest grades will show at least a basic scientific competency; that 
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the aim and intended evidential support match in principle, that the methodological 
choices are basically correct, logically coherent, and so on. There shouldn’t be a 
categorical difference in basic scientific competency between the best and worst, only 
that the better works should show more skill, higher comprehensiveness, attention to 
detail, and, well, higher quantity of all the things that are considered as evidence of 
good science. Why, for instance, stylistic issues shouldn’t matter much? Because, after 
all, these works are created and evaluated at a university and not at a summer camp for 
writing poetry. Again, the evaluation of a final test at a vocational training centre would 
most likely concentrate on other things than “matters of scientific importance”. A 
university can be, of course, changed into anything at all, for example, a cooking 
school, but since officially a university is still supposed to offer scientific education and 
conduct scientific research, I take it that the deciding factor in thesis evaluation ought to 
be the scientific competency, or the lack of it. 
 
Keeping this in mind we can formulate our hypothesis: if even the lower graded theses 
should show at least a basic scientific competency then the higher graded theses should 
be even better in this regard. By conducting the sample selection in such a way as to 
make sure that a high proportion of the better graded theses will be included, we can get 
a better picture what they are like; how good they are. This has the advantage that even 
if the lower graded theses were, how to put it, absolutely terrible, we would still have 
the positive comparison point which would show not only the good that is produced but 
also, that there is a correlation between the content and grades, at least at the higher 
level. In short, if there is a correlation between a grade and thesis’ content, then such a 
link should be present especially at the higher grade level. An automatic side-effect of 
this will be that we will obtain a description of the theses’ methodology – the scientific 
principles – and, thus, a comparison can be performed between the methodology 
literature (general or specifically media studies). If strong correspondence between the 
two is found then this will indicate that not only students are being thought non-science 
but also, that the non-scientific argumentation is accepted and, perhaps, even rewarded. 
In such a case, a thesis and its evaluation will resemble works of general literature and 
less science. 
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The selection, then, proceeded in a two-stage manner. First the population was divided 
into two groups: that with above average grade (7 total) and that with average or below 
average grading (24 total). As a next step, a random selection was performed from both 
groups even though the total amount of instances of the higher grade group was kept 
intentionally disproportionately higher. But as was already mentioned, due to 
availability and other reasons, I ended up with a sample of 7 theses where 4 were graded 
above average and 3 below average – mcl, mcl, ecl, ecl, and la, la, nsla respectively. 
 
 
4.2 The method(ology) 
 
As I have been trying to say, not many methods are really “methodological” – most of 
them, at least in the qualitative/hermeneutic tradition, are nothing but vague constructs 
void of content or they are simple truisms. Then again, even in the “hard” sciences what 
is considered as a method concerns mostly statistical analysis. In experimental research, 
for instance, to devise and arrange an experiment is a creative process, one that is even 
more important than any possible “methodology”. Of course, serious research tries to be 
as much as possible valid, factual, true, contain causal explanation, and so on, but much 
if not most of the procedures leading to the basic principles will vary, even considerably 
– that is, in a research that studies something new. Much of the “methodology” is 
actually an explanation of what has been done in this or that particular research rather 
than mechanical repetition of an “off-the-shelf, one-size-fits-all” method. The used 
method of this thesis can be described as a combination of comparative analysis, 
“layman’s descriptive statistics” both in scope and presentation, use of empirical 
material, descriptivism, and the use of theory and other available knowledge to analyse 
and/or explain whatever there is to be explained or analysed. The same holds true for 
causal analysis: it is one thing to show a statistical strong correlation, another is to inject 
this relation with such knowledge – any kind that can be considered as knowledge – as 
to firstly, elevate the status of correlation into causality and, secondly, offer a plausible 
mechanism (or explanation) why things are as they are. In other words, the “method” is 
the kind of common sense empiricism which, in principle, underlies all research. 
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Whatever choices made may be rudimentary and simple compared with the professional 
researcher’s approach, but the underlying approach is the same. 
 
Considering the “layman’s” statistics part, fancy illustrations and what not will be kept 
to a minimum since, as Frey, Botan & Kreps (2000: 292) write, “when one has a 
relatively small data set ... one can verbally describe the entire data set by referring to 
each individual entry...” And the data set used in this thesis is certainly not 
overwhelming. No so-called qualitative methods will be used since, as by now I hope it 
has become clear, there are really no qualitative methods, i.e., actual and concrete 
procedures that should lead to certain type of results. (Thinking, writing, and observing 
are demanded in every research but they are as methodological as the existence of the 
researcher: necessary yes, an actual method no.) This means that no critical or uncritical 
discourse analysis, nor any grounded theory approach where a purified mind will throw 
itself at an unknown reality and witness the miraculous rise of theoretical skyscrapers 
(as if by magic) will be used. 
 
But not even (quantitative) content analysis – as a statistically oriented method – has 
much of relevancy for this thesis. The frequency of any parts of the analysed content are 
beside the point: a thesis will either show a sufficient scientific competency or it will 
not, regardless of how many instances there are of this or that sentence or idea. If a 
student explains only once his conduct and that conduct turns out to be insufficient, 
confusing, or in any way untenable, then that one instance is enough. If, on the other 
hand, there are many but contradicting instances of methodological argumentation, the 
result will be no different no matter what the frequency of these arguments. 
Contradictory arguments are not the correct recipe for sound methodology. Although 
the reason behind a possible methodological contradiction may vary, from 
incompetence to a simple human error, for the reader the result is the same; the reader 
sees a contradiction and has very little means of knowing why such a mistake happened. 
Then again, it depends what kind of mistake was made: when the “methodology” is 
written in an overwhelmingly incomprehensive way, it is usually a sign that the writer 
didn’t have much idea about the issue in the first place. And, lastly, if there is only one 
instance of “good methodology” (without any contradicting ones) or several (consistent) 
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of them, it is to be understood as a sufficient command of the logic of science. (By 
“good methodology” I mean that the writer has grasped the basic scientific components, 
i.e., that her or she does principally the correct thing.) 
 
Why discourse analysis – and their semiotic variants – has very little usage is because it 
tries to go “beyond” the literal meaning (or the given). It tries to “uncover” things that 
are impossible to establish – hence, going beyond literal meaning. Even such things as 
exposing hegemony, discrimination by the ruling class, etc., must be based on the 
“literal”, text or other kind of events where literal simply means the empirical of which 
we can have knowledge; something which cannot be further “interpreted”. Setting aside 
the fact that such uncovering the invisible cannot possibly work as a method, in this 
case it isn’t even wanted; for we are very much interested in the literal, i.e., the concrete 
arguments that the students have written. It would be ludicrous to base the evaluation 
not on what has been written but on what might have been intended. First of all, how 
can we possibly know what might have been intended and, secondly, why wouldn’t the 
student write according to his intentions? (Again, by intentions I mean those aspects of 
the content that pertain to the logic of science. It is possible that the topic, the empirical 
material, the questions, etc., might not be those about which the student really wanted to 
write but that is irrelevant for the purposes of this thesis and its methodological 
approach.) It is, then, assumed that the student writes according to his intentions in 
which case it makes much more sense to treat that text literally. If a text can be taken 
literally – and there is very little reason, at least in this case, to do otherwise – it can be 
approached “unmethodologically”, by verbally describing what has been written and/or 
omitted. 
 
And, thirdly, why different versions of grounded theory are mostly useless here is that – 
disregarding completely the idea that a sand castle is supposed the somehow materialise 
itself as long as we keep pouring enough of sand on one spot – we are, here, interested 
in “uncovering” what students actually do, i.e., we try to describe a certain part of 
reality. If it turns out that what the students do corresponds to media studies particular 
but also to methodological notions of human sciences in general, then we already have a 
likely theory to explain it, which is, in a simplified form, that to a large extent, the 
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scholars of yesterday do train the scholars of today. Hence, the good as well as bad 
habits and practices are most likely going to be renewing themselves. 
 
Although this explains most of the things, it still leaves open the crucial parts: why 
certain breaks happened in the history of science. The case of transition from old 
science to the new is only to be expected since the old science simply could not offer 
not only answers but a general approach – one that was not bound to the bible, 
scholasticism, etc., to finding out new things about the world we inhabit as well as 
ourselves. What is more difficult to explain – and here grounded theory offers zero help 
– is why, for instance, the so-called alternatives to positivism have been 
institutionalised. Considering that these “alternatives” are, partly, a repetition of 
hermeneutics but, surprisingly, also partly the exact philosophy that is criticised 
(positivism) – and sometimes neither of them by being a pure political program 
(feminism) – one has to wonder how they can, in a supposedly technologically and 
otherwise advanced contemporary society, not only to barely survive in the academia 
but to actually flourish and entrench themselves as a part of the establishment. Weber’s 
idea of the charismatic leader and his followers could explain the initial state but not 
necessarily the phase after the initial euphoria has disappeared. The alternative 
explanations are, perhaps, better left for the reader to contemplate as they are not that 
flattering of human nature and their explicit formulations might be considered as an 
outright hostility on the part of the writer. In a nutshell, then, this part of the thesis is an 
attempt at a methodologically common sense approach to science that rests on 
describing and explaining a certain part of the reality which, in this case, is the seven 
theses. 
 
 
4.3 The theses and their analysis 
 
In this chapter I will list each sampled thesis and give a short overview: positive if the 
thesis is principally correct (in its scientific approach) or negative if the analysed thesis 
shows serious shortcomings regarding the basic grasp of what is science. I am not 
interested in an overall critique of the thesis, i.e., how much literature was used, what 
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kind, does the work show that the writer is familiar with the field, whether it is 
stylistically pretty, etc. The object of interest is simply whether or not the analysed 
theses can be considered scientific in the traditional sense of the word. Each thesis will 
be introduced by its title, written in italics. An English translation will be offered in 
parentheses, also written in italics. For the most part, the titles will give an adequate 
idea what the theses are about. 
 
Ideally the assessment of any research (methodologically) is a comparison between the 
stated goals (as well as intended solutions) and what was actually done. Quite a lot can 
be said based on this kind of comparison, and while a consistency here may not 
necessarily guarantee good results, the lack of it certainly leads to failure. When 
methodological “clues” are scattered here and there, and if the evaluation of whole work 
is required, in order to grasp what has been done, it can be a sign that the writer was not 
sure himself and that, perhaps, the work was somewhat rushed. Now, it can be the case 
that the author of any research knows perfectly well what he is doing, but the reader 
does not. It is the writer’s responsibility to state his aims and methods as clearly as 
possible. This is not a mere question of style, it is an absolute necessity. 
 
Kuusitoista elonmerkkiä: Vuosien 1993–2004 latvialaisten näytelmäelokuvien 
kerronnan analyysi (Sixteen Vital Signs of Survival: An Analysis of Latvian Cinema’s 
Narrative, of the years 1993-2004) The aim of the author is to analyse and describe the 
narratives of post-socialist Latvian films, i.e., what is similar, what is not, and so on. His 
empirical material is formed by 16 Latvian films which were produced between the 
years1993 and 2004. (p.3.) What is not clear, however, is the relation. He mentions, for 
example, that “societal perspective and contemporary viewpoints ... form a background 
context for the analysis of these films” (ibid.). In which sense is this context supposed to 
matter? If the analysis is supposed to describe the empirical part of the films, the visible, 
then this context is not necessary. If, on the other hand, the context is supposed to help 
in some kind of semiotic analysis, especially if the aim is to show why the films are 
what they are, then without a further empirical evidence the context can be useful but 
only to the one doing the analyses and not to the reader. 
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The aim seems to be the explanation of the films’ nature since the author introduces the 
idea that the films are what they are due to the changes in post-socialist Latvian society 
and that the films are or could be a kind of a mirror of that society. However, this leads 
to a dual purpose not originally stated; that on the one hand, the interest is in analysing 
the films and, on the other, exploration of the Latvian society and linking it to the films. 
On page six, this duality of purposes is perpetuated when the author states that “the aim 
is to approach Latvian independence through the films’ narratives and that, finally, the 
aim is to classify the particular qualities of those narratives”. These same intentions are 
stated also in his conclusions on page 145. We may therefore find three aims: 1) the 
already mentioned analysis of the films, of their empirical content; 2) explaining how 
the societal changes etc. have affected the narratives of the films. This implies a causal 
connection; 3) how the films (or their narratives) mirror the surrounding society. This 
can mean three things: a) same causal structure as in the previous point, where society is 
the cause and narratives the effect with the difference that here the causes are inferred 
(or more likely guessed) through the effects; b) reversed causal structure, i.e., to which 
extent the Latvian cinema (cause) affects the society (effect); c) a simple 
correspondence, i.e., not a causal relation, just a comparison between two objects. 
 
The author categorises his work simply as qualitative in nature (ibid.: 9). Now, any 
attempt that tries to go beyond the first aim – analysis of the visible content of the films 
– will be impossible for the qualitative approach. The central problem here is causality 
or, rather, the convincing “proof” of it. Causality can be talked about, different guesses 
can be suggested, but above all, the relation must be shown to exist. For example, 
excessive drinking of alcohol does not cause a higher risk of cirrhosis simply because 
someone thought of it. A synthetic statement is true or false not based on that statement 
alone, it must be proved or disproved empirically. We can think of the link between 
society and films as a logical one, i.e., analytic but it would turn out to be quite 
uninteresting, for it would be a mere tautology. Stating that “what happens in a society 
is societal in nature” might be true but meaningless in the sense that we already know it. 
To say, more or less, that “what is, is” is of course true but it does not have much of 
explanatory power. There are good reasons to believe that there is not a one to one 
correspondence between films (as a whole) and society (in Latvia or any other country). 
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Therefore, a rigorous empirical investigation is required, especially if we are interested 
in causal relations. Qualitative research which, at least in the literature, is mostly 
described as one that tries to “understand” the “meaning” of human action, what 
meanings are attached to the action, etc., is ill fitted for this task. According to an 
extreme version of constructivism, reality is created by talking about it, which means 
that it could be possible to show that if there exists speech (written or spoken) of society 
causing particular films, then the reality must be so. I do assume, however, that this 
variant of qualitative research can be ruled out. 
 
Can qualitative approach be sufficient for proving a correspondence between films 
content and the surrounding society? Obviously a one to one relation is out of the 
question, but what about some parts of the films, say, the attitudes of the characters? 
Can a parallel be drawn between the film and society on a psychological level? Again 
the answer is mostly no. On the one hand any person, as an individual and as a part of 
his society, can make a comparison between a seen film and reality. That person has 
certain feelings, aims etc., and he lives and has lived among other people who also have 
feelings, aims etc. and so has certain kind of anecdotal knowledge about himself and his 
surroundings. Based on that a comparison point can be made. But this is something that 
is open to almost anyone and qualitative method does not add anything extra to this. 
However, to go beyond the anecdotal, no matter how much sense it seems to make, 
requires rigorous empirical testing which is not present in this work, and for which 
qualitative research does not offer tools. The author can guess, as a Finn or as a Finn 
who has spent some time in Latvia, about the connection between the Latvian films and 
Latvian society, or he can make an “educated” guess based on what to him seems like 
relevant literature, but that guess, if it is to be taken seriously, will need something 
much more. And this “much more” is absent from this work. 
 
There is one author’s aim where the qualitative approach, or some version(s) of it, can 
work; namely the first aim, i.e., analysis of the films (or their narratives). For example, 
the films can be described as having these or those characters, the plot can be explained, 
all or some of the films can be classified according to existing genres or new ones can 
be made up. In short, anything that has something to do with the description and/or the 
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interpretation of meaning can be at this point classified as qualitative. I say “at this 
point” because a description or the act of describing is not something that is immanent 
to the qualitative approach. In fact, it is not a prerogative of any method. Rather, it is 
something that we as humans do in everyday lives. There is nothing scientific about it. 
But a description must be in any case “good enough”; it should be shown why this or 
that conceptual framework is particularly good or useful. 
 
The most important classification is both the sjužet and fabula which are, according to 
the author, formulated as how “the concrete narrative (sjužet) exposes the story as a 
whole (fabula) in a temporally continuous process. There are five additional 
classificatory categories: exposition, narrative voids, causality, narrative strategies, and 
classical narrative. (ibid.: 3.) Now, the concepts of sjužet and fabula do not seem to be 
that simple, at least the author presents them in a rather difficult manner. So for example 
on the page 39 the author explains that 
 
fabula can be illustrated in the following way: The story [or narrative] contains two events A and 
B of which one is present and the other is not. When A is present, B is not. A relation can be 
imagined between them which can be causal, temporal and/or spatial; for example, A can be the 
cause and B the effect. According to the formalists [here the author is referring to the Russian 
formalism] imaginary or idealised connection corresponds to the fabula, i.e., the story [or 
narrative]. Fabula also means the imaginable narrative totality which contains both A and B. The 
fabula-level thus forms an imaginable chronological chain of events and a world which is based 
on causal relations. ... Fabula corresponds to the ideal [or idealistic] level to which the concrete 
sjužet relates; according to Šklovski (1965b: 57) ... the fabula serves as the material for its’ 
sjužet-shaping [or forming]. Sjužet, or the concrete storytelling, exposes this narrative totality in 
time – by slowing down and delaying. Sjužet can be translated as plot but, for example, 
according to Bacon (2000: 26), the concept of plot is too limited to accurately describe sjužet-
narrativeness to which everything that is presented connects – including so called “having no 
plot”. Sjužet is above all the transmission of fabula-related temporal, spatial, and logical 
relations. According to Tynjanov (2001: 311-315), fabula is not given, it does not cover the 
sjužet-level, instead fabula must be formed based on the sjužet-narrative [or sjužet-story telling]. 
(brackets added) 
 
There are even more “definitions” of these concepts but, frankly speaking, it is difficult 
to understand what is actually meant by all this. (Heikkinen (2001: 128) describes 
fabula as all those themes that more or less every human being shares, e. g., birth and 
death, love, struggle, freedom, etc., and sjužet as the concrete manifestation of those 
themes, for instance, as this persons love, in this particular place and time. Although 
this makes more sense, it does lack that esoteric ring to it.) When one reads the actual 
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analysis it becomes quite apparent that all these concepts are more or less equivalent to 
already existing, everyday-language counterparts and that, in the end, we are dealing 
with a case of “word magic”. 
 
So what the author does is a description of films where it contains elements that 1) are 
visible and knowable to everyone who can potentially see the films but also elements 
that 2) are not visible to everyone else, i.e., elements which – without further evidence – 
are the products of the author’s imagination. These latter elements are quite obvious 
when one reads the actual analyses of the films, i.e., opinions of not what is given but of 
supposed meaning. For example, on page 75, the author describes the acts of “Eriks” (a 
character from the film “Drosme nogalināt”) who, after witnessing his own father 
raping his beloved, ends up stabbing his father. According to the author, “Eriks’ actions 
can be compared to (in a psychoanalytic interpretation) a symbolic act, to killing his 
father, which releases him from his father-related past and thus frees his own future” 
(ibid.).  Although quite fitting for the qualitative approach, this does not offer the 
required necessity which enables to go beyond what is subjective, in this case dependent 
on the author (his moods, feelings, expectations etc., which more than likely would vary 
when compared with someone else and thus which would likely cause different 
interpretations). 
 
The third ingredient – in addition to the theoretical part and the films themselves (with 
their respective interpretations) – is formed by interviews. The author has interviewed 
17 directors and/or other experts and tries to form (based on the interviews) the context 
of Latvian cinema (ibid.: 9). Unfortunately no further elucidation of the interviews, as to 
what was asked, how they were conducted etc., was given. The author only mentions 
that the interviews were conducted according to recommendations of “Hirsjärvi & 
Hurme (2000: 17, 22, 24–26, 105)” (ibid.). Clearly this is inadequate, for the purpose of 
a methodological clarification concerns the author’s own work. Any author can add 
legitimacy to his claims by an appeal to an authority (although this is principally an 
incorrect form of argumentation), otherwise known as referencing, but whether there is 
a reference or not, the author must explain what he is doing in his own work. To write a 
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book, an article or a thesis where the author states that he has done something, and that 
something is to be found completely somewhere else, is simply unscientific. 
 
But there is also an additional problem concerning the interviews, namely the intended 
proof which these interviews should give. Considering that the interviewed are directors 
and other experts (whatever these might be) it is more or less obvious where their field 
of competency lies. Or in other words, it is obvious what they represent. And what they 
represent can very well be Latvian cinematography, not only the present but also the 
socialist one, but what they cannot represent is the Latvian society as a whole. Their 
memories and general knowledge can give great insights into the development of 
Latvian cinema during the post-socialist era (and here the author seems to be quite 
successful) but any further linking between the cinema and the society as a whole would 
be quite difficult. Again, guesses can be made, but these guesses can be, to the extent 
possible, assessed only with the help of much more robust material, both theoretical and 
empirical. Unfortunately, this material is absent. The problem, then, is the following: on 
the one hand, these interviews cannot give and explain the necessary connection 
between the cinema and society and, on the other hand, they are not necessary for the 
act of describing the individual movies. 
 
We can say, then, that the source of methodological problems lies in the mismatch 
between aims and supplied evidence: the type and qualities of the objects of interest 
cannot be answered with the type and qualities of the evidential objects. On a more 
“positive” note, the initial mistake is at least carried on consistently and coherently, i.e., 
that the author sticks to what he is doing and not sailing here and there.   
 
Viestintäteknologia ja utopiana ja dystopiana (Communications Technology as Utopia 
and Dystopia) The author states that the aim of the work is to “study the relation 
between communication technology and both utopia and dystopia” (pp. 3, 5). On the 
same pages the author explains that this relation is to be approached from a historical 
perspective (i.e., what different “thinkers” have thought), by making a comparison 
between these thinkers and religious accounts, and that there will be an attempt at 
finding reasons (or causes) for why attitudes towards technology can reach such overly 
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optimistic (utopian) or pessimistic (dystopian) levels. A suggested tentative explanation, 
for the cause(s), is that of technological determinism, or where it is being thought that 
technology is the primary “mover” behind changes in society and culture (ibid.). 
 
The first categorisation of this work is to be found on page five, where the author 
classifies his study as theoretical. He continues, on page six, that the used method can 
be described as philosophical. This is immediately followed by stating that “the method 
of my qualitative research is philosophical” – because he finds the character of 
contemplative approach (the philosophical part) as best fitting (ibid.). The confusion, 
then, concerns the description of the work as, theoretical, qualitative, and philosophical. 
There is an important “qualitative” difference: theoretical work is theoretical while 
qualitative is both empirical and theoretical. In reality, based on what the author has 
actually done, the work can be tentatively classified as theoretical, mostly in the literary 
review sense since the different theories are more or less taken “as they are” without 
doing any interpretation of what the authors “really” meant or if they made any sense, 
i.e., lack of analysis. It is possible to describe a work as philosophical but it should be 
clarified what it means. After all, there are metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, 
aesthetics, logic, philosophy of language etc., to choose from. It seems, though, that 
what the author had in mind is really to contemplate, or to think. However, we cannot 
accept the act of thinking as a particular (philosophical) method. So, at this point, we 
can say that the description of this work as philosophical is wrong and that there also 
seems to be some amount of discrepancy between the used terms “theoretical” and 
“qualitative”. 
 
If we return to the work being theoretical, the author explains it as something that can 
be characterised as, inside media studies (or research), “historical systems research” 
(ibid.: 5). By “historical systems research” the author means a direction inside media 
studies “that tries to combine societal aspect and the media attempting at an overall 
historical perspective”. This includes, in addition to the history of technology, media 
and communication, also historical review of society and ideology, not to mention 
cultural philosophy. (ibid.) First question here concerns “historical systems research”. 
What is it exactly? There is systems theory (with all of its derivatives) which can be 
 131  
studied as it is now and/or how it has evolved over certain time (historical perspective). 
But systems theory has nothing to do with this particular thesis. And, on the other hand, 
the combination of societal with communications/media/technology is nothing new or 
out of the ordinary. In fact, the societal part is strongly present in media studies; so 
much so, that sometimes it is very difficult to differentiate it from the other various 
social sciences. Media studies, for instance, could very well be categorised as media 
oriented sociology. The author elucidates also his “philosophical method”. On page six 
he writes: 
 
Niiniluoto (1984: 66-67) describes the core of philosophy as being an activity based on critical 
thinking and debate [or argumentation]. It does not consist of ready and final knowledge but, 
rather, it is a continuous attempt at clarification ... of concepts and thoughts. Philosophy can be 
as “scientific” as any other scientific field, however, the problem of value-free science is 
connected with theoretical philosophy. According to Niiniluoto (ibid.: 328), values cannot be 
logically inferred from knowledge [or facts] and knowledge [or facts] cannot be inferred from 
values. But there can be interaction between them (ibid.). (brackets added) 
 
What is presented here is a philosophical “cocktail” of different aspects of not only 
philosophy but also science in general. But the real question here is “what does this 
mean?” What is this supposed to explain? We can say the same thing of any scientific 
field, or even everyday life, that “it does not consist of ready and final knowledge”; and 
science in particular tries to “constantly clarify”. There is an obvious connection 
between “what” is knowledge and “how” it can be reached. However, hopes of “final” 
knowledge have been long since abandoned, therefore, an explanation of method should 
be an explanation of said method. Final or absolute knowledge is irrelevant from 
methodological point of view; being better suited or giving more reliable results 
compared to some other method(s) is all that is needed. Nor does it help much, from 
methodological point of view, to suddenly jump to the question of values. What is 
meant by value-free or the lack of inferential capabilities between facts and values? 
Perhaps this is meant to say that the different theories of different “thinkers” are value-
laden and, hence, represent not so much what “is” but only opinion or preference. But 
even if this interpretation would be correct, the existence and the usage of those theories 
(as in: this person wrote this and that person wrote that) would be a matter of fact, not 
value. In any case, it is really impossible to say what the author meant by this. 
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We can now turn attention to, what is perhaps, the most serious methodological 
inconsistency. The author stated that one of his aims is finding reasons for the overly 
optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards technology, i.e., establishing causes and their 
explanations. Nothing in the stated methodological content suggests, even remotely, 
how this is to be done. Yes, the author mentioned technological determinism as a 
possible cause but, unfortunately, this does not even begin to resemble a sufficient 
solution – both analysis of and empirical evidence of such a relation is missing. One 
certainly can make guesses about anything at all – and in science guesses are made – but 
the work cannot remain exclusively at that level. Otherwise any outrageous claim 
should be considered as science. Fortunately real science doesn’t work like this. 
Unfortunately, there is a lot of pseudo-science that does. (Furthermore, technological 
determinism, even as guesswork, is not convincing since the author briefly manages to 
introduce the idea that technology might be neutral after all. On page 97, he writes: 
“Huxley (1983: 59) reminds that mass communication, in itself, is not good nor bad, 
instead it can be used for both”. This is a considerable anticlimax since the chapter of 
technological determinism comes after this.) The shortcoming of this thesis is, then, the 
same as was the case of the previous one: the type of result cannot be, and is not, 
supported be the offered “evidence”. But, additionally, there is a healthy dose of 
inconsistency added on top of the initial problematic. (If a claim is made – no matter 
how weak – one should stick to it. Otherwise it leads to a “both yes and no at the same 
time” contradiction which is pointless.) 
 
Valokuvan suhde todellisuuteen digitaaliajassa (Photograph’s relation to Reality In the 
Digital Age) Although I wrote that stylistic issues don’t concern me, here I make an 
exception. Now, style in itself - any style that is considered as “proper” – is not a 
guarantor of the overall quality of results. But despite this, there are some things that, 
rather than being included, should better be left out. One of these stylistic issues is the 
“dear diary”-approach. The purpose of introductory chapter is to raise interest and to 
perform a “fade-in” operation, to build an opening for the main work. The beginning of 
the introduction says that “photographs are very important in my life and that is why I 
want to study the topic more in depth. I am an enthusiastic photographer... ...Digital 
image processing is my personal passion.” (p. 3). While it may be true that the writer 
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has deep interest for photographing, it does not mean that the same applies for the 
reader. Therefore some other way of approaching the topic might be more appropriate. 
The fact that this work does not contain a methodological chapter is but a moot point. It 
is impossible to reconstruct from the whole thesis what has been done 
methodologically. Based on the actual text it can be said – very generously indeed – that 
the work is simply theoretical in nature no matter how meaningless this description in 
this case actually is. 
 
The author states her aims as “an interest in a photograph’s relation to reality”. 
Particularly, the author attempts to describe a “photograph’s relation to reality, what is 
this relation now, and what it has been before”, and if “digital technology changed this”. 
She wants to “especially delve into questions regarding a photograph and reality...” 
(ibid.: 3-4.) These aims, in themselves, are not problematic; after all, this relation has 
been and still is debated. The problem is that the author tries to extend this relation to 
cover everything but the kitchen sink: the result is a random list of quotations and 
references rather than a structured and themed development of thought. The only thing 
that can be considered as a methodological reference or a clarification is the following 
remark on page 7: “The structure of my work is strongly dialectic. I will construct a 
continuous discussion, from different perspectives, about photographs and their relation 
to reality in digital times.” From a strict methodological point of view, describing a 
work as “dialectic” is not really saying much. Furthermore, there are, for example, the 
Socratic, Hegelian, Marxist etc., dialectic but it does not seem that the author had any of 
these in mind. There is really no Socratic dialogue which refines and clarifies different 
concepts, nor is there a Hegelian construct of a thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. If the 
author means by a dialectic structure that there will be a dialogue of sorts then that is 
sorely missing. However, if a list of quotations and references can pass for “being 
dialectic” then yes, this work is dialectic. 
 
The work can be summarised by the author’s reference to Juha Suoranta when she says 
that “being digital in itself does not change the form of messages nor does it make the 
photographs more false [or deceitful] or true. Instead, it opens new possibilities 
regarding the production and manipulation of photographs.” (ibid.: 64.)(brackets 
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added.) It is difficult to see how the author’s closing remark is something that needed 
scientific (even as an attempt) study. For laymen living in the same society as the 
author, and who are thus expected to have some basic experience with photos in 
general, the offered “grand finale” will contain very little of substance. For the most 
likely audience, i.e., those studying media, communications, or students in general, the 
final chapter offers even less. In other words, the author has done something which, in 
science, should not be done, namely, saying the obvious, or studying and concluding 
what is already known. It is difficult to say what is the most serious methodological 
offense. The work is too incoherent for that. It can be said that all the things that make 
science what it is are missing here. No amount of random references can be an adequate 
substitute. 
 
Myöhäiskapitalistinen kulttuuriteollisuus: Mytologinen analyysi postmodernistisista 
kulttuuriteollisuustuotteista. (Late Capitalist Culture Industry: Myth analysis of 
Postmodern Culture Industry Products) The author’s aims are 1) to show that critical 
theory (Frankfurt school) is still useful as a tool for analysis of the present day media 
culture; 2) to introduce an “updated” version of the concept of culture industry by 
combining it with Fredric Jameson’s ideas of postmodernism and Barthes’ myth; 3) to 
proceed from the general to the particular, i.e., to begin with Frankfurt school and 
ending up with a case analysis of a song (Vihma by the band Värttinä) and to show a 
general ideological continuum in media research from the beginning of 20th century 
until the present day and ending with 4) a myth analysis, based on the “updated” 
concept, of a contemporary culture industry product. (p. 3.) It is not exactly a 
straightforward task to categorise this work – for reasons that will be mentioned later. 
Let us call it provisionally as “theoretical”. 
 
Since the author has not really offered any methodological explanation, we may just as 
well conduct the “deconstruction” according to the author’s intended aims. In the 
introductory chapter the author, among other things, criticises the “linguistic shift” in 
science and the followed methodological preference for discourse analyses. This 
critique is justified, and supported by two categorical examples: 1) if all is about 
discourse, and everything is just a linguistic (social) construction, then, for example, the 
 135  
discrimination of poor people could be solved by changing the use of language (the 
author here, p. 6, referenced Naomi Klein); 2) that media is part of a system (society) 
which is affected by economical issues, it would, therefore, be rational, when 
investigating media, to also investigate the affecting economy (the author, p. 7, 
references Ampuja). What creates some confusion, though, is the fact that the author 
speaks of this economical aspect as that of “political economy” but states that he is not 
going to follow this route and that, rather, he is more interested in another, namely, 
Frankfurt school and its critical concept “cultural industry” (ibid.). 
 
Now, it is true that Horkheimer and Adorno’s depiction of cultural industry includes 
many elements regarding the “aesthetics” of culture industry’s products, as well as use 
of language that many times is closer to general literature than science, but one thing is 
for sure: the inheritance of Marx, which is present in their work, is about critique of 
capitalism which in essence is about political economy. Many of the concepts that Marx 
used, for instance, the fetishist nature of things, lack of choice, alienation etc., are also 
to be found in the critical theory. In other words, while critical theory adds, for example, 
the aesthetic element, a great deal remains Marxist in the “political economy” sense. If 
the author, then, wants to take into consideration the economic aspect of media, he has 
to deal with political economy in one way or another, especially so if he is interested in 
the concept of “cultural industry”. Now, both Adorno and Horkheimer can be accused 
of overlooking the kind of analysis carried out by Marx – and I think this would be a 
justified accusation – but that is a fault which should be corrected, not further 
perpetuated. In other words, critical theory (or the concept of culture industry in this 
case) took one part of Marxism while leaving out others without severing the 
connecting points. The links to economy are left open without delivering the actual 
goods. The author also mentions (ibid.: 22-25) that there exists critique against critical 
theory, especially the concept of cultural industry. It is not clear if the substance of this 
critique is shared by the author as well, or if its function is simply “to be”; to show that 
there is critique, regardless of its merits. At this point, however, the usefulness of the 
culture industry concept remains open. 
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Next, the author delves into postmodernity and Barthes’ myth (analysis) which, 
roughly, comprises two thirds of the overall theoretical part. This is also the most 
problematic part, which really shouldn’t come as a surprise considering the track record 
of “postmodern thought”. For instance, the author does not limit the use of 
“postmodern” only to refer to a particular artistic style, he, so to speak, tries to capture 
the “ethos” of contemporary times in a linguistic fashion that is difficult to “decode”. 
Referring to Morley he states, p. 26, (brackets added) 
 
that postmodernism can be seen as a new era of social life, an era that delays [the author uses the 
Finnish word “myöhentää” which could be translated into a more poetic “latens”] the modern; 
secondly, postmodernity can be understood as a cultural sensitivity; thirdly, the topic can be 
characterised as an aesthetic style, as the ethos of the times; and finally, postmodernism can be 
understood as a way of thinking, a sort of  theory that fits contemporary analysis. 
 
Except for a reference to particular (aesthetic or artistic) style, the other usages are 
highly contestable; the question is not one of fit but of meaning, i.e., what does, for 
example, the phrase ‘new era of social life that “latens” the modernity’ mean? The 
author does mention Habermas and his idea that the project of modernity is not yet 
finished, but to say that, on the one hand, there are certain things that have not happened 
and, on the other hand, that these things will surely happen, it’s just what we are doing 
now “latens” them, are two different things. The previous makes sense as it is a simple 
observation while the latter is either a more or less nonsensical jargon or a claim of 
future state of affairs which, regrettably, has no evidence (empirical or logical) in its 
support. On page 27, the author continues that “the death of grand narratives” is perhaps 
the most distinguishing mark of postmodernity and as an example mentions the fall of 
Soviet Union, the crisis of welfare state etc. However, the human history is filled with 
“big events” such as these, for example, the end of the Roman or British Empire, the 
black death, the Russian revolution of 1917, just to name a few. In this sense, then, we 
have been living in postmodernity at least since Ancient Athens lost her independence. 
 
If the postmodern remains somewhat vague a concept, the Barthesian myth makes it 
certain that clarity and validity are not the aims of this analysed thesis. The author 
writes (ibid.: 46) that according to Barthes, myth is simply speech and thus everything 
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can be myth. There are some limitations but these do not apply to content, only form 
(ibid.). Myth does not arise from the nature of things, instead, it is discourse chosen by 
history. Myth steals language in order to naturalise an object, to make it ahistorical. In 
Barthesian sense myth’s endeavour is to wipe out history.” (ibid.: 47.) On pages 47-50, 
the author describes myth as a semiotic system (based on Barthes) which, as is/was the 
case with postmodernity, is more a projection of the analyst’s mood rather than 
clarification. On pages 50–52, the author explains how to read or interpret a myth but 
there is nothing procedural about these procedures, i.e., any “interpretation” will be 
equally valid and procedural if evaluated according to the Barthesian “method”. And if 
really “everything goes” then the system is defunct for there are no criteria for 
evaluation. 
 
The author continues that in order to expose myths, the mytholog has to be able to 
explain concepts. This is done with the use of neologisms, since the concepts found in 
dictionaries lack historical spectrum. (ibid.) Two problems emerge: 1) neologisms (as 
concepts) may have meaning to the person using them but not necessarily to anyone 
else; 2) the definitions of concepts in a dictionary do contain historical continuation, for 
they are put together based on the wider linguistic usage. Common acceptance or 
implementation of a word or a concept does not happen overnight. This process can take 
time but once a concept becomes common usage, it can remain so, relatively 
unchanged, for a long period of time. Therefore, it is more likely that a definition of a 
concept from a dictionary will be clearer and having “wider historical spectrum” than 
any neologisms produced by this or that individual. 
 
Moving along, the author is ready to put together a decoding mechanism which then can 
be used to analyse cultural products. It has been mentioned before, and on page 58, the 
author mentions it again, that “Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s model does not include a 
theory of decodification [or interpretation]. However, a suitable one can be found from 
Barthes. (ibid.: 58.). The possible unclarity, according to the author, mostly concerns 
which role (especially that of the mytholog) is reserved for whom. (ibid.) Not anyone 
can be a mytholog for he needs (here the author references Jameson) to have “the 
political will to hold on to the truth of postmodernism, its fundamental object, the 
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universe of multinational capital” (ibid.: 59). However, as we have learned from Corner, 
semiotic analysis is broken as a method. We can talk of it, if we like, as a theory of 
decodification, but that doesn’t change the fact that it is a useless tool. To see 
contemporary culture as schizophrenic or perfectly sane are both equal interpretations 
under the Barthesian model. As if this wasn’t enough, the author decided to fuse it with 
Jameson’s wisdom. What on earth does Jameson mean with the above quote? And how 
does it affect the “decodification model”? Unfortunately, no answer is given. So, on the 
one hand, we have the author saying that there is a decodification model that is useful in 
someway or another and, on the other hand, we have no idea what that model is 
supposed to be; how it should be used, what are its limits, and so on. In reality, then, 
this so-called useful model has no use whatsoever. 
 
As to the third point, we can certainly ask if the one particular song by a particular band 
“represents” the culture industry enough. Though, it should be added that it is not only 
culture industry, it is the whole culture which is supposed to be more and more 
commercialised. So, then, does this one song represent adequately the whole culture? 
The answer must be a strong no. Additionally, the things that ought to be signs of 
commercialised culture products are, among other, certain “standardisation” and 
manipulativity of those products. However, if we begin, let’s say, from the Renaissance, 
we will find that most of the art, whether painting, music, or theatre (and later cinema), 
has been structurally “standardised”. Even the great works of Mozart and Beethoven 
can be (or could have been) manipulated, i.e., substituting any part with something else, 
or cutting off some of its material. Victor Borge, the Danish pianist, in his numerous 
comedy acts, performed a sort of pastiche where he would “glue” together parts of 
different classical compositions (from different composers) making the shift (from one 
part to another) fluent and “fitting”. This “manipulativity” is not a sign of lack of 
quality; every meaningful composition is a certain melodic “construction” containing 
different parts, in certain key and tempo. In addition, both tempo and key can be 
modified which makes “substitutability” of different parts even more straightforward. 
Naturally, there is a difference between a symphony and a three-minute pop-song. The 
latter one, being based on perhaps three or four chords and simpler melodic/rhythmic 
progressions, will be easier to manipulate but if we take, for example, the older folk 
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music, the difference between then and now becomes less evident. So if a pop-song is 
analysed and concluded that it is “substitutable”, it not only cannot prove that critical 
theory is correct, it cannot even support the feasibility of the “new and improved” 
decodification mechanism. 
 
Based on the above, it can be said, then, that the thesis contains serious flaws: 1) 
feasibility of the old concept of culture industry is left open. The author simply doesn’t 
explain what he means by this feasibility (or usefulness). For instance, the quality of 
being repetitive or, to a certain extent, standardised, cannot be used to differentiate 
between “high” and “low” culture as all cultural creations share these qualities. It is, 
then, the personal preference of the analyst what he considers as high or low culture, or 
commercialised and non-commercialised respectively. Adorno certainly didn’t conceal 
it in any way that he disliked jazz. On the other hand, Adorno had high respect for 
Arnold Schönberg whose music certainly isn’t comparable to jazz. Then again, even 
Schönberg’s music suffers of all the commercial culture’s qualities since it is repetitive 
in the sense of a pure cacophony – one certainly can substitute any part of the music 
with, say, the initial tune-up by the orchestra; it is also a wonderful sing-along for the 
completely tone-deaf; 2) due to the initial critique of the so-called linguistic shift in the 
human sciences, one would have expected a development of the political economy side 
of things. Surprisingly, however, the author, for whatever reason, didn’t step out of that 
linguistic shift at any point of the thesis; 3) the updated model (culture industry + 
decodification theory + postmodernity) is useless. After peeling off the meaningless 
postmodernist jargon, we are left with culture industry and Barthes. But since the 
latter’s model is unmethodological as anything can be, no correction or improvement 
can be achieved over the initial state of affairs, i.e., the concept of culture industry; 4) 
the case example remains uninformative as no valid generalisations can be made. For 
that more is needed: wider sample and more precise theoretical knowledge that would 
explain why this or that quality makes cultural creations commercialised. Although the 
concept of culture industry contains such qualities, these are shared by all culture as 
such and, therefore, it has extremely limited analytic value; 5) because the analytic 
model is so loose and all-encompassing and conducted by only one person (the author) 
the thesis only shows what the author thinks of this or that but that is all; 6) as such the 
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work suffers from two basic problems: incoherence and a mismatch between aims and 
intended evidence. 
 
Kriittisen mediatutkimuksen alkulähteellä: Theodor W. Adorno ja teoria kulttuurite-
ollisuudesta (At the Fountainhead of Critical Media Research: Theodor W. Adorno and 
Theory of Culture Industry) This thesis represents what can be called ”plain vanilla” 
approach. Not only is the stated methodological part cut down to an absolute minimum, 
but the author also stays true to it and does not start to “wander about”. What little there 
is about methodology, it is to be found in the abstract and introductory chapter as 
simply: “my thesis is theoretical in nature” (ibid.: 3, 5). And after reading the work, it 
has to be concluded that, yes, this is the case. Now, the author could have added some 
minor details, such as, is the theoretical review historically oriented, is it contemporary, 
or both perhaps etc., but the lack of these details, from the “grand scheme” point of 
view, is really irrelevant. 
 
The author states, as his aim, that, firstly, to present an overview of Adorno’s thinking 
and, secondly, to defend critical theory (especially the concept of culture industry) from 
perhaps too hasty and one sided critique that has been put forward in media research, 
especially in its culture or linguistically oriented branch. (ibid.: 3.) In short, the author 
aims to review mainly Adorno and to a lesser extent also other representatives of the 
Frankfurt School and to show that critical theory is not dead. One thing remains unclear 
though, namely, that on page five, the author writes: “It is my aim to find out what 
Adorno really wanted to say and what he meant when he talked about culture industry”.  
 
There are two basic ways how to approach this, one is relatively problem free, while the 
other, relatively problem ridden. Alternative number one can be described, to a certain 
extent as positivist, but even better description would be the “common sense” approach, 
where whatever someone means is to be found out from what that person said or wrote. 
In this case, then, what Adorno meant was simply what he wrote. Some “interpretation” 
(or approximation) will be present because there is no 1:1 correspondence between a 
concept (or a term) and reality. And since it is mostly reality we talk or write about, the 
non-perfect correspondence will leave some things in need of “interpretation”. On the 
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other hand, every meaningful concept (or term) will have a certain “core” that is more 
or less clear. Alternative number two is more esoteric and, therefore, fit of being 
labelled as qualitative or hermeneutic. It will try to go beyond the empirical evidence 
(written text) and to show the “real meaning” (whatever this “real” may mean. This 
would be, of course, utterly impossible for what Adorno really meant is known only to 
Adorno, and he has been dead for some time. Fortunately, the author has mostly chosen 
the first alternative. 
 
Quite frankly, on the basic level there is very little to be criticised. I mean, sure, the 
attempt to show that critical theory is alive and kicking has strong resemblance to the 
previous example’s myth analysis in the sense that the fit of the theory will be based 
mostly on personal preference – unless, of course, one raises the level of precision, 
narrows down the scope of application, and produces convincing empirical and/or 
theoretical evidence which shows that such and such must be the case. Also, it would 
have been nice if the author was more verbal about his aims and intended course of 
action, but, if we concentrate on the theoretical nature of the thesis, in the literary 
review sense, then it must be repeated that the author has basically proceeded correctly. 
It is, quite frankly, disheartening to see that only 1 out of the 4 sampled higher grade 
theses got it more or less right. 
 
Elokuva unten mailla – Unen ja elokuvan analogia (Sleeping Cinema – Analogy 
Between Dream and Film) What sets this thesis apart from the previous ones is that this 
one contains a chapter on methodology. However, the attempt remains as perhaps the 
only redeeming factor of the work for the contents of that methodological chapter make 
little sense a) in themselves, b) in relation to the aims, and c) in relation to the overall 
work. 
 
Ad a. It is difficult to understand what is/was the purpose of the stated methodological 
considerations. Different concepts are mentioned but they do not create a meaningful 
whole. They seem to be put together without checking if they fit and what they amount 
to. Secondly, some of the stated concepts are either wrong, from the scientific point of 
view irrelevant, or obvious (i.e., necessary but not really scientific as in, for example, 
 142  
breathing is necessary but it is not a particular scientific method nor a philosophical 
consideration). According to the author, who is referencing Algulin, the scientific 
approaches of the humanities can be divided into five areas: 1) observation, 2) 
description, 3) analysis, 4) interpretation, and 5) total experience. Further, that the first 
and last points do not really belong to a scientific research. Explanations are mostly 
given in the analytic phase. This phase consists of various analytic methods, for 
example, linguistic, stylistic, genetic, structuralistic, and semiotic. (ibid.; 6-7.) First of 
all, what does “total experience” even mean? And if it does not really belong to science 
why has it been mentioned? Also, how come the first point (observation) does not 
belong to scientific investigation? When the most fundamental aspect of science (even 
in the scope of the humanities) is claimed to be unscientific, something has gone terribly 
wrong. There exist no (empirical) scientific field that does not rely on observation. The 
difference between the various scientific fields affect how observation is conducted, i.e., 
how controlled the situation is, how the observed material has been chosen etc. 
Observation as such is of course self-evident, but much of discussion concerns what 
kind of observation is adequate, what can or cannot be observed, what must be observed 
and so on, and this part is quite at the heart of science. 
 
On pages 7-8, the author (referencing Routila) writes about different ways of reasoning: 
deduction, induction, and abduction. She continues that according to Routila abduction 
is the primary form of reasoning in studying art. However, Routila didn’t exactly write 
that. What he did write is that: “to construct abductions and using both deduction and 
induction is a central task even for the study of art” (Routila 1986: 28). Furthermore, 
Routila emphasised that these three forms of reasoning are “tightly connected with each 
other, so that none of them can be even temporarily bracketed without destroying the 
essential nature of this totality” (ibid.: 26). Then again, considering that abduction 
basically means “having a hunch”, well, there isn’t anything methodological about that. 
I mean having a hunch or inventing hypothesis is, of course, a central feature of science 
but, so far, that part has not been formalised into a method. And it even cannot be, since 
it would literally mean to “discover the logic of discovery” or “the method of 
invention”. 
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The author continues, on page 8, that “reasoning plays an important role when 
interpreting films. When films are compared with dreams, the starting point is an 
assumption for which, at first, a basis is built by reasoning and interpreting films.” Also, 
the author claims (ibid.), that she is going to incorporate the previously mentioned five 
approaches, apparently even including the “total experience” whatever it may mean. 
She continues (ibid.), that she is going to use this in interpreting the film Mulholland 
Drive and, also, to choose as the theoretical framework Freud’s and Jung’s 
psychoanalysis. It is good to know that “reasoning plays an important role”. This is 
certainly better than if reasoning did not play an important role. As to the second point, 
well, reasoning and interpretation doesn’t really strengthen the assumption; an 
assumption is a result of the two. However, if by assumption is meant a completely 
unfounded and wild guess, then as long as we are talking about empirical matters, it is 
the empirical evidence that decides. But even this is irrelevant because to say that one 
intends to compare films with dreams is equally uninformative as saying that one is 
interested in comparing leprechauns with unicorns. Let us hope that the author will 
explain in higher detail what this comparison should entail. 
 
At this point it seems that the author considers her work as qualitative for she writes 
(referring to Eskola & Suoranta) that “the purpose of analysing qualitative material is to 
bring clarity to this material and thus create new knowledge about the researched 
object” (ibid.). Apparently this is to be done, in her thesis, “through combining the 
thoughts about Mulholland Drive’s dream-likeness by analysing it as a dream in 
multiple ways” (ibid.). Immediately there are several points that demand examination. 
Firstly, how does qualitative material differ from quantitative? According Dey (1993: 
11), for instance, “quantitative data deals with numbers, qualitative data deals with 
meanings”. Dey (ibid.: 12) continues that 
 
qualitative data embraces an enormously rich spectrum of cultural and social artefacts. ... By 
comparison with numbers, meanings may seem shifty and unreliable. But often they may also be 
more important, more illuminating and more fun. 
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Now, Dey’s statements may seem as typical of those of the qualitative camp, although, 
in reality, he seems to be a “soft” positivist in disguise as he continues (ibid.: 28) that  
 
It is more useful to define qualitative data in ways which encourage partnership rather than 
divorce between different research methods. In suggesting that quantitative data deals with 
numbers and qualitative data deals with meanings, I do not mean to set them in opposition. They 
are better thought of as mutually dependent. Number depends on meaning, but in a sense 
meaning also depends on number. Measurement at all levels embraces both a qualitative and a 
quantitative aspect. 
 
In other words, films are not qualitative material (from methodological point of view), 
nor are they quantitative. They do have certain discernable “qualities” though. We can 
discuss and think what these qualities mean and, equally, we can also measure them. 
The difference, then, between qualitative and quantitative is not at the level of material. 
Rather, the difference is “in our heads”, i.e., what we are interested in and what we end 
up doing with the material.  Secondly, the idea of “bringing clarity” is surely not limited 
to qualitative research or analysis. It would be strange if the purpose of quantitative 
analysis would be to “bring fogginess”. The fact is that all (scientific) analysis aims at 
clarification. Any form of analysis that does not do or attempt to do so, has no place in 
science. Thirdly, although it is possible I have misunderstood the author, it still seems to 
me that she is talking about brining order or explaining the material. Insofar as this is 
the case, it would be unsatisfactory (see more, for example in Töttö 2000: 125-126). 
What Töttö is essentially saying is that by explaining the data, and not the phenomenon 
which the data is supposed to represent, nothing has been explained. This is because 
every empirical data can be “explained” in any way whatsoever; every thus created 
“explanation” will be “true” because the data will ascertain any claim made about it. 
 
On page 9, the author writes that empirical data can be studied either with or without 
theoretical assumptions. Now, it is true that empirical research can build on existing 
theoretical knowledge but it is absolutely false to claim that empirical study can be 
carried out without a guidance of a theory, at least if by theory is also meant any leading 
idea-structure. (The idea here is that a theory is formed inductively by sifting through 
empirical material. Considering the complexity and abundance of qualities that the 
various objects and phenomena have, one really has to wonder how anyone could arrive 
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at a meaningful theory.) This idea of a theory-less research can be found among some or 
many supporters of qualitative research. Some, for example, Holloway (1997: 5, 153-
154), think of it as being a general feature of qualitative research, whereas some think of 
it as belonging to grounded theory, for instance, Dellve et al. (2002: 141). On the other 
hand, for example, Kiviniemi (2001: 72) concludes that the mind of the researcher is not 
“tabula rasa” and that there is at minimum some kind of theoretical guidance. This is 
more or less admitted even by Holloway (1997:. 6) which makes it difficult to know 
what she really means. Eskola & Suoranta (1998) offer the same “perhaps or perhaps 
not” for, on the one hand, they say that quantitative research can be theory-less and even 
easily so and, on the other hand, that theory is more important in qualitative research 
(ibid.: 81). However, on page 83, they write that in qualitative research, theory can be 
built from the empirical data. This “first data then theory”-approach is repeated again on 
page 196 in relation to discourse analysis. Empiricism as a complement to reasoning – 
in the Comtean sense – is what science is about; Empiricism as a 100 per cent inductive 
system, i.e., as “empirical data first, theory second” is impossible. 
 
Ad b. What the author essentially tries to do is to show that there are or can be 
similarities between dreams and films. Although she writes of “analogy”, she ends up 
doing a comparison of qualities; for example, a dream can have a certain kind of visual 
content or a temporal progression and if something similar can be found in films, then 
there is a similarity between the qualities of a dream and film. It is something like 
making a connection between a carrot and a car based on the same colour, for instance. 
The theoretical framework of psychoanalysis turns out to be “the wrong tool” for the 
purpose because psychoanalysis tries to give explanation to visible qualities (behaviour) 
– well, technically it is the “invisible” qualities which manifest themselves in a material 
way. Psychoanalysis as just a description of (empirical) behaviour has very little to 
offer. To say that “Tom was hostile”, “Sarah violently tossed around her food”, etc., is 
something that can be described with the use of everyday language by regular people in 
all situations. So to say that “a dream can be hazy” and that “film x is hazy” is not 
particularly theory-laden. Furthermore, even in a comparative study, representativeness 
must be maintained. Do the films mentioned (or analysed) truly represent cinema as a 
whole? An explanation of the films’ possible represenrativeness has not been given by 
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the author and, so, it must be assumed that they are singular cases. But this raises the 
question of what does it matter if there is a connection of sorts between dreams and this 
or that particular film? How does this further science? Or is this, perhaps, another case 
of “art critique”, or postmodern thinking perhaps? 
 
Ad c. What happened in this thesis is something similar to the previous ones. It 
unfortunately seems like the authors have misunderstood what really is the empirical 
material and what is being researched. In these confused theses the empirical material is 
in fact the authors themselves; it is about what meaning(s) they give to whatever it is 
that they write about. We, as in readers, can not know if the meaning is really contained 
in the objects of their analysis because it goes beyond the material, i.e., beyond what 
could be perceived by the human senses. What is available, though, to the senses – for 
us readers – is the text contained in the theses. Therefore anything about the meanings 
of the films, that go beyond the literal, is available only as written statements by their 
authors; and it is these statements that are open to evaluation, not the meanings that may 
or may not be contained in the films. These are, then, really case studies where the cases 
are the authors and/or the meanings they attach to these or those objects. Based on the 
evidence we can take seriously the fact that the authors have certain opinions and 
believe in their meaning constructs. But the links from the content of these opinions and 
beliefs to the real world are missing, i.e., no necessary correspondence. It must be 
concluded, then, that even this thesis fails at the very basics of scientific conduct: the 
aims are vague, methodology incoherent, and the type of evidence is unsuitable. 
 
Urheilujournalismi Etelä-Pohjanmaan maakunnan imagon rakentajana. Esimerkkinä 
sanomalehdet Ilkka ja Pohjalainen. (Sports journalism as the image builder of Southern 
Ostrobothnia. Case newspaper examples: Ilkka and Pohjalainen) The confusion starts 
immediately in the abstract part of the thesis where the author states that it is his aim “to 
examine the relationship between sports journalism and Southern Ostrobothnia’s 
image” (ibid.: 3). He continues that what makes his thesis peculiar is “a mismatch 
between the title and his closing remarks”; “that sports journalism is not so much an 
image builder as it is more of a ritualistic” process which “produces, maintains, and 
changes reality through communication”; “it is then the reproduction of Southern 
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Ostrobothnia’s collective identity.” (ibid.) But on the sixth page, fifth paragraph (a sort 
of a “in a nutshell” part), the author says that the media builds (constructs) both 
identities and images. 
 
What is this supposed to mean? Is this the author’s “updated” or preliminary belief 
which then gets transformed in the end? The author basically managed to state a 
contradiction as the aim: that both X and not X. Furthermore, it is simply false, or 
illogical, to claim that (any kind of) journalism constructs identities but not images. 
Although these terms may somewhat differ in meaning, there is nonetheless a strong 
bond and similarity between them, a dependency. Based on the seventh page, it is not 
clear if the author thinks of the media’s role in image construction as “one among 
many” or if it is supposed to be the most important. He also speaks, on the one hand, of 
sports journalism and, on the other hand, of the particular newspapers as totalities, 
covering more than just sports journalism. Based on this, it is difficult to conclude in 
what kind of journalism is he interested. Is it sports journalism in particular or 
journalism in general. Lastly, to say that sports journalism constructs reality through 
communication is, first of all, a constructivist claim. Such a claim is precisely the kind 
of example that I have been criticising throughout these pages as its basis lies in 
impossibilities. Anyway, the analysed thesis contains a contradiction even on that level 
because the claim of constructing and reproducing an identity – a collective one at that – 
are two different things: construction can contain reproduction but the opposite relation 
is more difficult. 
 
As to the nature of the thesis, the author mentions that it is theoretical. He continues that 
the work includes “illustrative empirical ingredients which are meant as additional 
elucidation. (ibid.: 8.) Interestingly, the author writes that his “aim is not to create new 
knowledge ... but enrichment of already existing research” (ibid.). The million dollar 
question is, how research is enriched if not by coming up with new knowledge. (I 
assume here that the author is not talking about an elaborate deductive inference which 
is principally nothing more than a certain way of connecting already known things. Of 
course, even though the inference “only” combines the already known, the result can 
still be de facto new.) Nor is it mentioned how the work is theoretical – is it, for 
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instance, a literary review type or, perhaps, developmental. The author states that the 
theoretical framework is based, among others, on James W. Carey’s views of 
communication as a ritual which focuses instead of image construction on reproduction 
and reflection of collective identity (ibid.). Again, what is the author after; is it 
construction, reproduction, or both? 
 
As to the explanation of the empirical data (articles) – which, by the way, changes the 
type of the work – well, the same style continues. In addition to omitting the 
explanation of the selection process, there is only one thing that can be conceived of as 
being methodological. On page 9, the author writes that what the articles say is not that 
important, rather, it is the way things are said. This “how”-part refers to such things as 
on what page is the article (or story), how the articles are laid out, etc. It seems quite 
odd that the actual contents (of what is said or written) do not play an important role in 
identity or image formation. For instance, the author says that “according to Moring, 
Southern Ostrobothnian identity consists of patriotism, the will to defend, 
entrepreneurship, and a lifestyle that emerges from rurality...” (ibid.: 45). But if form is 
more important than the content, how is it possible to arrive at the statement quoted by 
the author; surely not on visual layout alone. The claim of form over content, at least in 
this case, remains unsupported. 
 
But perhaps the most important thing is what the author has completely left out. 
Namely, that the work, in reality, tries to establish causality. This is evident from the 
title and aims. If sports journalism or the newspapers as a whole are thought of as 
constructing identity or image, then we have a basic causal relation where X (journalism 
or newspapers) cause Y (the effect, in this case identity or image). According to Töttö 
(2005: 94), establishing causality demands two things: firstly, it requires theoretical 
guesswork about what X could cause Y and, secondly, empirical evidence that X really 
does cause Y. It should be added that, at least sometimes, a “guess” about X implies a 
“guess” about mechanism. There is plenty of material about how media does or can 
affect perception; this applies to propaganda, perception of self and others, etc. 
However, the author has not chosen this type of literature, choosing instead a random 
and unrelated mix of concepts. Another possibility is that the author thinks of media as 
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“one of many” which affects identity and image. But be as it may, even these 
possibilities require empirical proof, one that is more specific than simply saying “it 
does affect” or that “everything affects everything”. This other option of a combined 
causality has not been pursued by the author. 
 
One of the necessary conditions of causal relation is temporal succession; such that X 
precedes Y. This is particularly important, for the difference can mean a 180 degree 
change of the research question. In this thesis the hypothesis is X (media) and Y 
(society’s identity or image). Again, there is a plethora of literature which points out 
that media do not operate in a societal vacuum; that the media is affected by many 
societal aspects which can be political (for instance, the domination and control of the 
media by a political party) or financial (i.e., the effect of money on the media, the 
content and also “financial” censorship), or perhaps, if there is peace or war, and so on. 
So now we have the situation where X (media as part of society) and Y (identity or 
image as something societal). If the temporal succession is in reality reversed then the 
situation becomes one where the media do not create images nor identities but where the 
media “merely” reflects those aspects which are already present in the surrounding 
society. The thesis contains hints and clues of this scattered around here and there but 
they are not developed further; such things as having a certain different mentality (or a 
perception of different mentality) of the region already existing before the case example 
newspapers (Ilkka and Pohjalainen) were even established or the possible effect of 
catering for the popular demand (pp.47-48, 39-40), i.e., the financial gain. 
 
These mistakes – and certainly not limited to these – show that two principal mistakes 
were made which affected the whole thesis. Firstly, the initial confusion about, well, 
pretty much everything. Secondly, this was followed by a very strong claim of 
causality, i.e., media constructing a collective image or identity (or both, difficult to 
say) without any actual causal analysis. The failure – if we are allowed to talk about 
such a thing – is of the most basic kind: the logic of science is successfully absent.  
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4.4 Remarks and results 
 
It can be said, then, that methodologically six out of the seven analysed theses failed. 
And not at some higher, nuanced level, but at the very basics. It is impossible to commit 
even more rudimentary mistakes. Actually, no, it is possible to make worse mistakes. A 
thesis can be so incoherent that whether aims and evidence match becomes irrelevant. 
The level of incoherence in some of the analysed theses was certainly thought-
provoking. 
 
Now to some interesting results. Based on the sample, there seems to be no correlation 
between the grade of a thesis and the level of command of the logic of science, as the 
better graded theses were equally at a loss compared with the lower graded theses. The 
fact that one better graded thesis “passed” is no indication of correlation as, firstly, it is 
only one case of the total sample and, secondly, other higher graded theses do not share 
this quality. In addition, considering that it is only one thesis, it doesn’t really matter 
that much if it was a better or worse graded thesis, as this singular instance could be 
explained by accidental reasons; luck, for instance. Based on the methodological 
content alone (of the “better” thesis) there is very little reason to think that all the 
choices, etc., were made with deliberation and in a methodologically informed manner, 
as the methodological content of that particular thesis was extremely lean. Furthermore, 
a theoretical work in the literary review sense is considerably less prone to mistakes 
than a more complex empirical/statistical research. Thus a relatively error-free work is 
more a result of the nature of the work itself rather than due to the excellent 
methodological capabilities of the author. This is not an insult, nor am I belittling the 
author’s work, it is simply a matter of fact. (We can find a similar situation in a morally 
correct action: we don’t particularly value a person’s action if that person didn’t have 
any other choice but to do the “right” thing.) 
 
On the other hand, at least two (first and fifth, graded mcl and ecl) of the higher graded 
theses showed higher level of consistency and in a certain sense even coherence than the 
rest. And although I am generally unhappy about the other two higher graded theses 
(second and fourth, also graded mcl and ecl), regarding consistency and coherence, 
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these were better than the remaining three lower graded theses. Whether a thesis is 
graded as mcl or ecl seems to make no difference as both are in this regard equal. 
Thirdly, and although this hasn’t really been discussed, the higher graded theses showed 
a higher level of development of their ideas whereas the lower graded theses seemed 
more “rushed”. So, all and all, there are some things that seem to correlate with the 
grade although, and unfortunately, the most important part, doing and understanding 
science, does not. 
 
If we compare the theses, science wise, with both media studies and human sciences in 
general, we find strong similarities; that is, if we limit them both to the 
postmodern/hermeneutic/constuctivist/etc. part. Such a limitation doesn’t necessarily 
change much the overall nature of these fields. For instance, the methodology of human 
sciences was once dominated by positivism which gave way to the so called alternatives 
(whether new or old). And even if the trend changed once again, or if the trend is 
changing already, the fact remains that right now positivism (or traditional science) is 
not fashionable. Likewise, in media studies there are certainly examples of rational 
research, again, one that is rests on traditional premises. However, what seems to be 
fashionable now is the so-called linguistic shift which is nothing else than a 
combination of the “alternatives” found in human science in general. We have already 
noticed that although these “alternatives” can be verbose, there is actually very little 
content. Hence, there is talk of methodology without there being any proper methods; 
jargonistic “discourse” that is either meaningless or a repetition of truisims and things 
already known, contradictory and confusing statements, and so on. With such 
methodology and/or science the analysed theses (except for one) certainly correspond. 
 
The main reasons, then, that speak against the possibility that the thesis being what they 
are is just accidental: 1) they match the human sciences (in their present state) in being 
non-scientific. It would seem strange (though not impossible) and commendable, if the 
university of Vaasa was somehow able to resist following fashion trends and instead, 
concentrate on doing science. That not only is the educational policy not resisting the 
fashion trends but actually actively supporting it, is exemplified by the fact that a 
student of the humanities is not required to take any course related to statistics. Also, 
 152  
other courses (number, content, etc.) in methodology are cut to an absolute minimum. It 
seems strange that in an institution supposedly devoted to science, it actually seems to 
be the lowest priority issue; 2) the sample should be particularly representative of the 
higher graded theses part of the population, especially when the majority of that part 
was selected. Furthermore, although the situation is more difficult with smaller 
population, the proportion of seven theses is, after all, 22,6 per cent of the total – quite 
high then; 3) the probability of the event that, for any reason, only the sampled theses 
just happened to be – science wise – what they are (except for the one thesis), i.e., that 
the rest of the population is “scientifically adequate”, is extremely low. (It is: 
(6*5*4*3*2*1*25) / (31*30*29*28*27*26*25)  = 10-6 * 1,36 = 0,00000136) 
Represented numerically, even more probable events will look unlikely. For instance, 
the probability of an event where the six out of seven theses are unique but are not 
selected is: (25*24*23*22*21*20*19) / (31*30*29*28*27*26*25) = 0,18. On a scale of 
where 1 = happens with certainty and 0 = does not happen with certainty, even the latter 
result looks like somewhat unlikely. But the main point here is the fact that the latter 
result is orders of magnitude higher than the previous. (A difference of five orders of 
magnitude is certainly large.); 4) the theses were not analysed semiotically, i.e., no 
attempt to expose “hidden meanings” was made. Whatever methodological 
argumentation, or the lack of, the students made is contained in those theses as an 
empirical fact and not as a projection of the analyst. In other words, anyone who might 
be interested can go to the university library and verify the results for him or herself. 
 
It seems, then, that my analysis of the theses may be a bit harsh – as only one of the 
seven got a favourable review. However, I do think that the critique is justified. First of 
all, no student should be expected to perform as a full-fledged researcher – I certainly 
do not expect that. On the other hand, it is fair to expect that a student will have at least 
a rudimentary understanding of science. After all, five years (on average) of university 
education – supposedly scientific – should amount to something more than random list 
of references. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
We may no return to the beginning and ask: “Is the field of media studies in trouble?” 
The question, however, leads automatically to ask the same thing about human sciences 
in general and this ultimately leads one to speculate whether the whole university 
institution is up to task. (These things are interconnected: it is impossible to treat media 
studies as an isolated case.) There are few basic positions which depend on how we 
would like to understand science. They do, however, lead to difficulties. 
 
According to the first option, science is to be understood in the 
postmodern/constructivist/etc. sense. The “all discourses are equal” point of view is 
decisive here. According to this stance, then, the “white male science” has no 
supremacy in saying and/or defining what is science or what it ought to be. Considering 
that not only “all discourses are equal” but also, “equally valid”, every activity which is 
claimed to be scientific ought to be understood as, well, scientific. But this cannot be 
morally/politically right as claims of being scientific are privileged while other claims 
would end up being discriminated. Such is not the way of all-encompassing postmodern 
equality and, thus, every claim/statement/discourse/etc. should be granted the right of 
university presence and, most importantly, tenures and public financing. Of course, in 
such relativistic system the word science might be dropped altogether since it would be 
completely meaningless: a word that refers to everything cannot refer to anything.  
University would become just a roof under which there would be any kind of activity 
that can be found anywhere else. Partly this is already going on as traditional subjects 
are either substituted with or new additions made by more and more meaningless 
courses, or even full programs. In such a bazaar of fair-attractions, university must 
eventually lose its justification. 
 
Second option seems initially as less relativistic. This is, to a large extent, the situation 
of the present. According to it there is a basic dichotomy between human sciences and 
natural sciences. Although this solution might keep cooking classes out of the university 
– for the time being that is – such a dichotomy, however, would still be problematic as 
the word science would refer to two completely different kind of activities. 
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Furthermore, such a dichotomy cannot demarcate reality and its effects into two non-
overlapping categories. As is the case now, human scientists do not and obviously 
cannot keep their claims and statements from “infringing” the realm of the natural 
sciences. The claims of, say, literary criticism contain both logical and empirical 
components which open doors for their analysis – and possible dissatisfaction about 
them. If natural scientists made statements that contained components of literary 
criticism, literary critics could justifiably analyse and possibly criticise them. However, 
the human sciences have continuously and unsuccessfully attacked the matters of fact 
and logic. Considering that they have been shown wrong time and time again, and that 
despite all of this, they continue to be established as “sciences”, one certainly wonders 
when will the natural sciences finally say that enough is enough and “resign” the 
university institution. In a setting where nonsense is academically rewarded, it is 
difficult and unmotivating to carry out serious research. The second problem concerns 
the nature of the dichotomy itself, or rather, the approach of the human sciences. 
Considering that “its way of doing things” lacks any clarity and concreteness and that it 
basically attacks many of the sensible – and so far the only functional – parts of science, 
it has nothing with which to prevent a slide to complete relativity. This dichotomy, then, 
is nothing else than a precursor to the first point. Under this and the previous points 
media studies (and even the human sciences) would be perfectly fine as sciences. In 
other words, when science and high-level research are achieved as a matter of simple 
announcement, even knitting would qualify.  
 
According the third option – which is also the position of this thesis – we take the word 
science a little bit more seriously, that is, we mean by it what is and has generally been 
meant the word “science”. In this sense, for instance, such philosophies and approaches 
as positivism, empiricism, etc., would continue to be valid. Not because there is a 
complete and perfect philosophical proof justifying them, but because practice has 
shown them to be “more or less” correct. Certainly the merits of scientific results speak 
in favour of these concepts as opposed to their so-called alternatives. If we, then, want 
to hold on to what is generally meant by science and demand that universities ought to 
be places where the highest level of science is being taught and produced, those fields 
that either will not or can not meet the requirements would sooner or later be forced out 
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of the university. Such an event would not in any way prevent people from practicing 
and participating in those fields. They simply would be practiced elsewhere, as non-
sciences – like astrology, for example. It goes without saying, then, that if we want to 
hold on to the concept of science, media studies (and human sciences) in its/their 
current fashion-form are in direct contradiction and as such cannot be accepted as 
sufficiently meeting scientific criteria. (Again, this is not to say that they cannot be 
scientific, it’s just much of it currently isn’t.) 
 
These factors – which can be thought of as external – can be extended by the eternal 
problem of what is the role of a university: is it supposed to provide with practical skills 
or scientific knowledge. In this thesis, we have already evaluated media studies (and 
human sciences) from the science point of view and have concluded that the science 
part is severely lacking. But what about practical skills? Quite frankly, I cannot think of 
any skill that could be achieved by devoting years to studying media (or other human 
sciences) – unless we include, say, statistics and statistical analysis, which has its 
concrete practical usages but, unfortunately, is not being taught. Maybe the practical 
part lies in the ability to produce totally obscurantist texts. Whether this is a valuable 
skill or not, there seems to be a high level of success as each new generation of scholars 
is able to produce fantastically meaningless studies. However, if we do not count this 
dubious ability, the human sciences in general rest on extremely weak justification 
indeed, as they lack both scientific and practical foundations. Even categorisation as art 
does not really fit as most forms of art require concrete skills: a musician must know 
how to use an instrument, how to read music notation, grasp of music theory; a painter 
must, unsurprisingly, know how to actually paint, and so on. From this point of view, 
then, media studies (and human sciences) are in a sort of limbo; not science and neither 
practical ability (or both). 
 
But – continuing on the external factors – perhaps justification is to be found 
completely somewhere else. The many examples mentioned in this thesis showed strong 
political/ideological leanings. Even if we disregard such over-the-top cases like 
feminism and postmodernism, there are even more “reputable” names in human 
sciences that seem to defend this view. For instance, Giddens (1982: 166) wrote that “as 
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critical theory, sociology ... poses the questions: what types of social change are feasible 
and desirable, and how should we strive to achieve them?” (The same question is fitting 
even from the media studies point of view as much of it is really just “media oriented” 
sociology.) Is this the agreeable reason for existence, as a science that is? Or, to ask in a 
more Weberian manner, do value-judgements belong to science, and not as a mere side-
effect but as the main legitimator? If the answer is yes, can the separation between the 
sciences themselves and/or any other politically motivated activity be maintained? If 
social (or political) change becomes the driving force then not only every scientific field 
must, and indeed will, have equal say in such matters but so will everyone else as long 
as they make an “ought-to-be” claim. Such science, however, must decide between the 
preference for factuality or values. These are necessarily exclusive as, for instance, there 
is nothing factual about a desirable social change. Feminism is a perfect example of 
what happens when facts are sacrificed in favour of value-judgements. This leads, 
almost invariably, to a situation where it is not facts that are used to give support to 
value-judgements but, rather, a mixture of other value-judgements, half-truths, and 
outright lies. In a case of conflict – which is a guaranteed situation as there is no 
universal view on what is “right” – there are two ways where this could lead: 1) open 
and violent conflict resolution where it is the “biggest guns” and not any of the 
competing values themselves which will ultimately win; 2) or, in a more “civilised” 
situation, people “agree to disagree” which leads us back to square one, namely, to a 
relativist position. As a last point, value-judgements need to be authoritative to be taken 
seriously; by what higher right sociology or media studies (human sciences in general) 
could appropriate such authority for themselves? Needless to say, then, politics cannot 
legitimise a scientific field, nor to correct any mistakes carried out in that field. Facts 
and values are two entirely heterogeneous problems: scientists deal with the former 
while prophets and demagogues with the latter. A field that chooses the latter over the 
former will necessarily be in trouble. 
 
If analysed internally, it is difficult to arrive at different conclusions than as compared 
to the external factors. That is, even if we ignore the effects of the university institution, 
other fields, ideologically motivated science, etc., we realise that exactly the same issues 
would be found internally. For instance, the questions – raised by the representatives of, 
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in this case, media studies – of what the field ought to be have no other choice but being 
exactly the same questions as put forward by, say, natural scientists. Possible demands 
of being more scientific will correspond to what is usually understood by science. 
Defending relativistic positions would put the field in the same situation as according to 
the first and second points already mentioned above. No solution there then. The only 
solution would be to, on the one hand, redefine science, so that the activity has no 
resemblance with what is presently meant by science and, on the second hand, give it a 
reasonably clear definition so that only a particular kind of activity would pass the 
requirements. Of course, such a solution would not necessarily make much sense, as the 
field would have to meet and solve all the external factors which would, again, return 
the whole issue back to square one. To avoid this, the field would have to be totally self-
contained and independent. Although theoretically possible situation, it is, nonetheless, 
extremely unlikely. But considering that no such internal solution is in the works, the 
matters will, for a foreseeable future, remain somewhat chaotic; certainly far from being 
just perfect. 
 
Considering the undoubtedly strong connection between a field’s formation and how it 
is being taught, some brief remarks should be directed at education, especially the role 
of a thesis. First of all, the analysed theses are not an exception; not as representatives 
of media studies, nor human sciences as such. This is not a premature claim 
considering, for example, in what kind of state the methodology of human sciences 
presently is. Of course, to get a more precise idea, theses – master’s as well as higher 
level – from different human sciences should be analysed. This is definitely an area 
where additional research is certainly called for. 
 
Anyway, the defence of the theses – and not only the analysed ones but also any other 
that are similarly unscientific – could be conceived of as resting on two possibilities: 1) 
we redefine or obscure science so that it would either mean something completely else 
or nothing at all. However, as noted above, this solution is untenable as it introduces a 
whole range of destructive consequences – destructive for the argument(s) that is. We 
can, then, skip over this one; 2) we proclaim that it is not the function of a master’s 
thesis – or higher education as such – to be scientific but, rather, it should fulfil some, 
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well, other functions. In the following I will consider some of the possibilities – it also 
should be kept in mind that these possibilities are to a certain extent interconnected. 
 
First of all, it could be said that the purpose of a thesis is to show that its writer is 
capable of producing a bit longer text. If this would be the function of master’s level 
then at what point are the students to learn counting; during post-graduate level? With 
such a speedy progression researchers would die of old age before they could even 
proceed to such advanced concepts as, say, causality. It is certainly possible that lower 
levels of education have failed in their task and that students who enrol in higher 
education cannot write (or count) sufficiently. In this case the university has no other 
option than to take over some or even all responsibilities of the lower level. But this is a 
result of a broken system. It is hardly the ideal state of affairs. Secondly, it can be 
claimed that the purpose of a thesis is to show that its writer knows the basic issues of 
the field. But what about exams then? Isn’t it also their purpose to test the exactly same 
things? If the exams (or an essay, etc.) and the thesis are supposed to do the same thing 
then one or the other is redundant - and thus an unnecessary expenditure.     
 
The above can lead to certain sub problems. An emphasis on “knowing the field” leads 
to a repetition and, at best, produces texts where the students show that they have read – 
or at least successfully copied it from earlier theses – the material mentioned in the list 
of references. However, shouldn’t a thesis epitomise scientific thinking rather than the 
mere fact that something has been read? While reading is important, it is the thinking 
part that pushes science forward. It is, therefore, the faculty of the mind that should be 
cultivated and tested. Furthermore, the requirement of knowing the field would not only 
produce repetitive texts, it actually would lead to more or less uniform texts. If we take, 
for instance, physics – which is composed of such branches as mechanics, 
thermodynamics, electromagnetism, etc. – the result would be that each and every thesis 
contained exactly the same things; the potential only difference being how the branches 
were ordered. Such a requirement would make research questions obsolete as these, 
firstly, narrow down the scope of the field and, secondly, possibly could lead to new 
ideas, hints, and paths which are located in a “scientific no-man’s land”, for example, 
situated between two scientific fields. But such a thing would be impossible if we set up 
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“knowing the field” as the requirement. Such a demand doesn’t lead to innovation, it 
actively stifles it. How is a field supposed to evolve when that evolution is discouraged 
during the most critical phase and by what logic are we to think that if during the whole 
master’s level period a student does what he is being told, suddenly afterwards will his 
mental capabilities burst into bloom. In this case higher education would be, in fact, an 
obstacle, not help. 
 
Lastly, it should be mentioned, it can be claimed that by writing a thesis the student 
should learn how to write “scientifically”, to produce a sort of “scientific prose”. This is 
partly related to the requirement of “being able to write in the first place” but mostly it 
is a nonsensical requirement: it is wholly subjective and it cannot, in any way, increase 
the validity and/or reliability of theoretical and empirical results. Science deals with 
factuality, poetry with style. It is either deceitful or simply a matter of confusion to 
claim to do science while the emphasis is totally on non-scientific issues.   
 
There is really no way out of this: either we aim at science or at something else. 
Unfortunately the whole chain of media studies, human sciences, and higher education 
point to the something else part. This “something else” can be, and it truly is, anything; 
ranging from full-blown obscurantism, ideological propaganda, to efforts of producing 
at the “science factories” poets rather than scientists. At the very least one would hope 
that the representatives of the whole axis were honest enough to admit that they are 
doing and want to do something else than science. But, alas, the show continues on. So, 
to reiterate again, if science is the aim then the field of media studies in particular and 
the human sciences in general are in a mess. If, on the other hand, science is not the aim 
then everything is potentially fine, as long as the field(s) correspond with that other aim. 
However, considering that the alternative aim – if there is one in the first place – is so 
far unclear, there can be no correspondence in which case the result is also a mess. It is 
safe to say, then, that for the foreseeable future things will keep on going as they have 
gone so far until the system will grind to a halt and a “new” paradigm is established. 
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